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On the Merit of the Legacy of Failed Olympic Bids*

Cesar R. Torres

Abstract: Olympic legacy has become a dominant theme within the Olympic Movement. For decades, legacy concerns were confined to the hosting of the Olympic Games. However, these concerns have been recently extended to the bidding process itself. Cities bidding for the Olympic Games are now required to identify their legacy regardless of the outcome of their bids. This paper explores the merits of extending legacy discourse in case bids failed. It contends that the extension of legacy discourse into failed bids, at least as typically articulated in Olympic circles, is problematic. It also contends that failed bids should be seen themselves as a form of legacy worth recognizing and protecting.

Key words: Olympic Games, Failed Bids, Legacy

Reference to legacy has permeated and shaped Olympic narratives since the creation of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in the late nineteenth century. However, it was only in the last three decades that legacy discourse became central in Olympic circles. Thus, the IOC has been asking bidding cities to conceive and specify what they would leave behind to their local, regional, and national communities as well as to the Olympic Movement if they were awarded the right to host the Olympic Games. Similarly, the IOC now monitors that the organizing committees of the Olympic Games follow through with their legacy promises. The prevalence of legacy discourse prompted the IOC and the Autonomous University of Barcelona to organize a symposium in 2002 entitled “The Legacy of the Olympic Games: 1984–2000” to better understand the phenomenon and ultimately to more effectively ensure commendable Olympic legacies.¹ Since then, Olympic legacy has increasingly attracted the attention of scholars, sport administrators, and international consultants.²

¹ Paper written in the framework of the IOC’s OSC Postgraduate Grant Selection Committee (2011 meeting).
So far, legacy discourse has been confined to what would be left behind as a result of the hosting of the Olympic Games. Recent developments though have extended legacy concerns beyond the hosting of the Olympic Games to the bidding process itself. In its Candidature Acceptance Procedure for the 2020 Olympic Games, the IOC asks prospective host cities to clarify “the long-terms benefits for your city/region/country of . . . Bidding for the Olympic Games (irrespective of the outcome of the bid).”\textsuperscript{3} In other words, the IOC now expects even failed bids to leave behind some kind of beneficial effect at the local, regional, and national levels. This novel twist in legacy discourse is expanding the attention of scholars to the study of failed bids’ inheritances. A handful of scholarly works can be counted in this trend.\textsuperscript{4} Indeed, one of them claims that it “can be seen as the start of a new topic of future research regarding Olympic issues: the legacies of unsuccessful Olympic bids.”\textsuperscript{5} The author might be right.

The few scholarly works dealing with the legacy of failed Olympic bids are framed within the prevailing legacy discourse in Olympic circles. Thus, they identify the potential legacy that failed bids can bring to a city, region, or nation. By doing so, they presuppose that legacy speech makes sense for failed Olympic bids. The purpose of this paper is to explore the merits of this presupposition. Following the portraiture of a protracted South American bidding resolve, the paper summarizes what bidding entails. Then, it discusses the rise of legacy discourse within the Olympic Movement. Finally, in light of the previous sections, the paper analyzes whether bidding is amenable to the logic of legacy as articulated in Olympic circles. What the paper suggests is that requiring bids to work out a legacy in case they fail seems to go beyond what should be expected from a structure that is short-lived and typically disbands right after it learns it has failed. However, it argues that failed bids should be seen themselves as a form of legacy worth recognizing and protecting.
A South American Bidding Portraiture

For the best part of modern Olympic history, Argentine Olympic officials sought not only to demonstrate their commitment to the Olympic Movement but also that they were at its forefront in South America. One way in which these officials have done so was to continuously send robust delegations to the Olympic Games since the early 1920s. Another way was their persistent efforts to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires, the capital of their country, ever envisioned by the elites as a South American enclave of Western civilization. Indeed, Buenos Aires vied, unsuccessfully, throughout the twentieth century to become the first South American city to host the Olympic Games. That honor was ultimately secured by Rio de Janeiro in 2009 when the IOC awarded the Brazilian city the right to host the 2016 Olympics. However, the persistent efforts for an Olympic Buenos Aires as well as the manner in which they were, and are, conceived and remembered, raise questions that illuminate the poignant relationship between failed Olympic bids and their legacy.

As I have argued elsewhere, despite the fact that Pierre de Coubertin chose to include Argentine educator José B. Zubiaur to serve on the original IOC when it was established in 1894, the South American nation only showed interest in Olympic matters a decade later. In 1907, there was an attempt to send a national delegation to the 1908 Olympics. Subsequently, in 1909, a prominent politician declared that someday the Olympic Games should be organized in Buenos Aires and that it was a national wish. The following year, Buenos Aires hosted an international multi-sport event modeled after the Olympic Games commonly referred to as the *Juegos Olímpicos del Centenario* (Centennial Olympic Games) as part of the commemorations of the centenary of Argentina’s revolution for national independence. Coubertin believed that the term...
Olympic Games had been used improperly, which led to the expulsion of the Argentine IOC member that had replaced Zubiaur in 1907.

In the early 1920s, not only were two Argentines chosen to serve in the IOC but the nation also established a permanent Comité Olímpico Argentino ([COA] Argentine Olympic Committee) and started sending teams to the Olympic Games. During the 1924 Olympics, one of the Argentine IOC members declared to his colleagues the national desire to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires in the future. In 1925, Argentine Olympic officials declared their intention to bid for the 1936 Olympics, which was repeated in 1929. Yet, by putting the bid on the back burner, the Argentines rendered it ineffectual. Whatever the reasons behind that move, at the 1932 Olympics, Buenos Aires was listed as a candidate to host the 1940 Olympics. The South American city remained a candidate until 1935 but everything indicates that the candidacy was abandoned in Argentina.

These initial expressions of interests and attempts to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires were followed by three full bids. The first was the bid for the 1956 Olympics. This time the COA along with the government put together an elaborate plan and promotional campaign that impressed the IOC. In the closest election ever, Buenos Aires lost to Melbourne in the fourth round of the 1949 election by a vote of 21-20. Immediately after the loss, it was announced that Buenos Aires would bid for the 1960 Olympics, but with the changing political situation in the mid 1950s the Argentines abandoned the project. Nonetheless, in 1962, local politicians and Olympic officials announced a Buenos Aires’ bid for the 1968 Olympics. Despite misgivings about the bid both in Argentina and abroad, authorities carried through with it, obtaining two meager votes in the 1963 election. It took three decades for Buenos Aires to renew its hopes to host the Olympic Games. In 1994, a committee was created to bid for the
2004 Olympics. It produced a comprehensive bid dossier. Buenos Aires was chosen as one the five finalist cities in March 1997. To the disappointment of bid officials, six months later, Buenos Aires tied with Cape Town in the first round of the election and was eliminated in the run-off. In the early 2000s, a few voices declared that Buenos Aires could be the host of the 2016 Olympics albeit to no ensuing action. Lately, Argentine Olympic officials, conscious of the city’s long-standing Olympic aspirations, have been demurely suggesting that Buenos Aires could bid again for future Olympic Games.

Although concise, this account of Buenos Aires’ interest and failed bids to host the Olympic Games clearly points to the city’s rich, complex, and evolving history that links it to the Olympic Movement. Even if unfulfilled, the one hundred year old aspiration of an Olympic Buenos Aires is an integral and vital part of the larger Argentine Olympic and sport narrative. Nonetheless, the city’s history of bidding for the Olympic Games (or its supposed commitment to the Olympic Movement for that matter) has not been intentionally given any place in its cultural landscape. The Buenos Aires’ bids are mostly invisible in Buenos Aires. The only public Olympic marker in the city is the Plazoleta Pierre de Coubertin, a small plaza adjacent to the French Embassy and a few blocks away from the COA, in the posh Recoleta neighborhood. The small plaza, which boasts a bust of the IOC founder, was donated to the city by the COA and inaugurated in 1992. It is primarily meant to honor Coubertin and the Olympic Movement. Unfortunately, there is no indication of the date of the small plaza’s inauguration nor are visitors provided any reference regarding Argentina’s Olympic tradition. On a related note, the city’s bidding history only occupies a marginal space in the museum of the COA.

As suggested at the outset of this portraiture, its point is that it raises poignant questions that illuminate the discussion on the relationship between failed Olympic bids and their legacy.
Have the Buenos Aires’ failed bids also been unsuccessful by not leaving behind any sort of material reality tying them more firmly, if largely symbolically, to Buenos Aires? Should failed bids leave something prominent behind? In other words, should they have to construct culturally significant “places”? Are failed bids worthy of remembering or celebrating? If so, how? These are important questions directly related to the IOC’s new request that bids clarify what their legacy would be, successful or not.

**Olympic Bidding**

Simply put, Olympic bidding refers to the process by which cities interested in hosting the Olympic Games make an offer for and attempt to secure such privilege. In this sense, Olympic bidding is the formal procedure by which interested cities announce their intention to become Olympic hosts. While bidding, interested cities articulate and propose a vision of what they are willing to provide the Olympic Movement for hosting the event. By doing so, bidding cities hope to convince IOC members not only that their bids are coherent and viable but also that theirs are the most coherent and viable of all bids proposed for any given edition of the Olympic Games. So, the core of Olympic bidding comprises of announcing (the intention to host the Olympic Games), requesting (the right to do so), offering (a vision for the Olympic Games), inviting (all members of the Olympic Movement to share this vision), and convincing (IOC members that this vision is worth supporting). Given the requirements of Olympic bidding, the process presents ample junctures for vibrant debates on interested cities’ pasts and futures. Using Benedict Anderson’s terminology, Olympic bidding allows for interested cities to imagine how they have, are, and ought to develop in the future. It obviously involves complex
intersections of multiple stakeholders not only at the local level but at the regional, national, and international levels as well.

Olympic bidding was born with the creation of the IOC in 1894. Nonetheless, the process has changed substantially in the almost one hundred and twenty years of modern Olympic history. As argued by Martha McIntosh, “What was a simple strategic debate with only a few proposed candidates in 1894 . . . has gradually, over time, evolved into a highly detailed, lengthy, and competitive process that is undertaken by current candidate cities.” Although the details of the 1894 debate that led to the choice of Athens for the inaugural Olympic Games two years later are still unclear, bidding cities have indisputably been requested ever more sophisticated organizational demands. Yet, except for a brief period encompassing the election of the hosts of the Olympic Games between 1976 and 1988, interest in hosting the event has been strong and on the increase.

For about the first half of the twentieth century, Olympic bidding was not a standardized process and thus interested cities enjoyed considerable laxity while conceiving the structure and specificity of their bids. For instance, during that period, bidding frequently “consist[ed] of nothing more than a letter from the city’s mayor informing the IOC of the relevant decision by the city fathers and indicating sports venue already available or yet to be built.” Sometimes, the letter of intent came directly from national Olympic officials, while the support of the city’s authorities was, at best, implicit in the letter’s content. Such a case was the Buenos Aires’ bid for the 1936 Olympics. According to the IOC, during the early years of Olympic bidding, by the time it “considered that the moment had come to decide, there usually remained only two serious contenders.” Probably, the laxity and informality of the bidding process contributed to the advancement of unsubstantiated bids without proper local support that, as the election date
approached, were subsequently abandoned. Clearly, until the early 1950s, “applications from candidate city hopefuls had varied greatly in terms of both their design format and their informational content.”

The increasing complexity, with its resultant challenges, of organizing the Olympic Games demanded the streamlining of the bidding process. One incident that forcefully revealed this urgency was the unforeseen crisis created by the necessity to reallocate the equestrian events of the 1956 Olympics due to Australia’s equine quarantine law. Apparently, Melbourne’s bid documents made no reference to such law. Therefore, the IOC developed a questionnaire designed to address the organizational capabilities of potential hosts. Starting with the bids for the 1960 Olympics, all bidding cities were required to submit their answers to the questionnaire as part of their bids. The intention was to collect information that would allow the IOC to better assess bidding cities and thus more effectively decide the host of future Olympic Games. By 1955, the questionnaire had been incorporated into the Olympic Charter. In order to ensure that elected Olympic hosts fulfill their obligations, twenty years later, the IOC developed “a new, legally binding contract that would be in force with all host cities in the future,” that became an important element in the bid process.

From a structural point of view, Olympic bidding remained, with some changes and additions, basically the same until the 1990s. However, the answers to the questionnaire provided by bidding cities were increasingly elaborate and took the form of comprehensive dossiers or files that included several volumes. A notable change in bidding came after the financial success of the 1984 Olympics. To address the extremely competitive dynamic resulting from the precipitous surge of interest in Olympic bidding, the IOC placed more stringent demands than ever before on bid expenditures. An even more drastic change was implemented
in the mid 1990s. Facing a record number of nine bids for the 2002 Winter Olympics and a pool of eleven bids for the 2004 Olympics, the IOC implemented a two-tiered selection process that would facilitate the assessment of the bids and the election of the host cities as well as to reduce the expenditure of the bid committees. In the first phase, the IOC Study and Evaluation Commission scrutinized the bids, including a visit to each of the cities, and prepared a report while the newly created IOC Electoral College chose the finalist bids. The second phase, which included only those cities that were chosen as finalists, “reverted back to the established routine of IOC visits, bid books, presentations, voting, and the announcement of the winning city’s name.”

Another substantial reform to the bidding process came as consequence of the “Olympic bribery scandal” of 1998 and 1999 that revealed schemes by which candidate cities attempted to influence by dubious means, and apparently in many cases succeeded, the votes of IOC members. Similarly, it was also revealed that IOC members had either solicited or taken indiscreet gifts or privileges from bidding cities. What the scandal made clear was that the bidding process, at least in the late twentieth century, had been corrupted. The IOC launched an internal investigation and established two commissions to recommend any changes they considered necessary and appropriate. All in all, ten IOC members were brought down by the scandal. Among the recommendations was the implementation of a new bidding procedure. Consequently, the bidding process currently encompasses two phases. In the first, cities are “applicants” and they are required to submit detailed answers to a revised version of the IOC questionnaire, which is now divided in several “themes” and forms the basis of the technical analysis of each bid’s proposal. Any application must be approved by the NOC of the country in which the city is located. Applicant cities, much like in the past, establish a “bid committee”
whose mission is to articulate their efforts. After the applicant cities’ bid dossiers are reviewed, the IOC Executive Board decides which ones will be accepted as “candidate” cities and therefore enter the second phase of the bidding process.

The second phase involves an Evaluation Commission that studies the candidatures, inspects the cities, and submits a report to all IOC members. In turn, the IOC Executive Board draws up the final list of candidate cities that IOC members would vote on. Noticeably, visits by IOC members to candidate cities are prohibited and they are not allowed to vote if they are nationals of a country that has a candidate city. In addition, the election of a host city should take place in a country having no candidate city to host the Olympic Games. The novel bidding process is meant not only to make it more transparent and minimize the potential for corruption and excessive lobbying but also to better assess interested cities’ technical capabilities as well as the viability of their projects, which would avoid unnecessary expenses by those cities deemed insufficiently prepared.

In sporting contexts, bids are classified in different ways. A thorough examination of them is beyond the scope of this paper. However, for my purposes here, it is important to briefly distinguish two main types of bids. The first type might be called “legitimate” bids. These are bids whose main goal is to obtain the right to host the Olympic Games. To accomplish that interested cities and their respective bid committees make a genuine effort to develop and present a bid dossier and campaign that is comprehensive, credible, and viable. The second type might be called “utilitarian” bids. These are bids whose main goal is not to obtain the right to host the Olympic Games but rather to use the bidding process as a means to achieve other goals. For instance, bids could be implemented to globally advertise a city, region, or even country. Bids could also be mounted to attract international tourism or transnational investment. Similarly,
bids could be articulated to serve as a catalyst for social change or urban regeneration. Another alternative is to use bids to gain relevant experience to mount a realistic Olympic bid in the future or to use them as stepping stones to bid for other global events, sporting or otherwise. This does not suggest that these bids are necessarily designed to lose, but while realizing the complexity of the challenge they recognize that success is unlikely and that bidding is a useful process to go through.

**The Rise of Legacy Discourse**

In the Olympic Movement, the issue of legacy goes back to its very beginning. Indeed, the conceptualization of both the Olympic Games and Olympism, its foundational philosophical vision, was tied to events and ideas that not only preceded them but also served as their inspiration. Coubertin adamantly reinforced the notion that the modern Olympic Games were inextricably woven to their ancient forbearer. Yet, as a nineteenth century French aristocrat, Coubertin also embraced modern ideals of progress.\(^{23}\) His Olympic Games “came into existence in the dialectical cosmos bounded by conceptions of tradition and modernity” and “led him to propose the Olympics as a site for constructing common ground between the various ‘isms’ of modernity and the communal fealty of the traditional cosmos.”\(^{24}\) What this shows, as Mark Dyreson rightly contends, is that “the Olympics are themselves the legacies of other historical movements and moments” both ancient and modern.\(^{25}\) The constructed, and ever evolving, Olympic imagination started with a discourse juxtaposing legacies in order to promote a further legacy—which signifies a sort of founding Olympic legacy. After all, Coubertin’s aspiration was that the Olympic Games offer a cosmopolitan platform to spread the internationalist mission of the Olympic Movement.
Under the lofty goals of Olympism, the inauguration of the modern Olympic Games meant that each edition of the event left an actual legacy, which obviously led to legacy awareness even if none of this was actually labeled “Olympic legacy” until after more than half a century later. For instance,

The 1896 Athens Olympic Games drew aspects of the ancient Greek heritage into modern transformation, and these games left that city with a refurbished Panathenaic stadium (‘hard legacy’ in today’s parlance) and a renewed national Greek self-confidence (‘soft legacy’, as it would be said today).²⁶

Prior to the late 1940s, bids to host the Olympic Games were not requested to and did not fully articulate what they planned to leave behind as a consequence of hosting the event. References in this regard were rather vague. Interested cities emphasized their advantages and capability to serve as Olympic host and made promises to ensure the successful celebration of the event. This does not mean that legacy identification was absent in early Olympic bids but that it was rather unarticulated and not labeled as such. For example, the initial expressions of interest to bring the Olympic Games to Buenos Aires included the affirmation during the first decade of the twentieth century that the city would construct “a model house for the practice of physical exercises” and during the 1920s the promise of an elaborate sport complex that would include a stadium for 100,000 spectators.²⁷ Early bids identified other positive outcomes, such as their willingness to encourage Olympic participation or their intention to generate revenue that would later be used for beneficial purposes.²⁸ In spite of the implicit legacy identification during the first half of the twentieth century and the undeniable fact that every edition of the Olympic Games left something behind, the word legacy was not to be found in Olympic bids during this period.
According to McIntosh, it was not until the late 1940s that a bid first included the word legacy in its bid documents.\textsuperscript{29} The pioneer bid was that of Melbourne for the 1956 Olympics. By the mid 1950s, the Olympic Charter made reference to the tangible and intangible potential benefits of hosting the Olympic Games.\textsuperscript{30} The progressive enlargement and global reach of the Olympic Games in the 1950s and 1960s, due in large part to the publicizing effects of television, gave some impetus to legacy as a relevant aspect of bidding for and hosting the event.\textsuperscript{31} In addition, this process was also fueled by the necessity of interested cities to justify to their citizens the resources needed for the organization of an event such as the Olympic Games, whose proportions were starting to grow markedly. The expectation probably was that bid narratives that contained ideas about leaving something positive behind as a result of hosting the Olympic Games were more likely to be supported. Given these conditions, along with the mounting challenges of hosting such an intricate event, the IOC progressively expanded its bid questionnaire to request more information regarding interested cities’ projected Olympic legacy.

If legacy discourse grew steadily during the thirty years following its appearance in bid documents in the late 1940s, it became a major concern in Olympic circles once the Olympic Games proved to be commercially viable during the 1980s and 1990s. The prospect of profitable Olympic Games renewed the interest in hosting the event and generated much competition among bidding cities. In turn, to distinguish themselves from and outdo one another, bidding cities started making ever more lavish promises in their bid dossiers. These promises were difficult to fulfill and when fulfilled left host cities, on too many occasions, with white elephants\textsuperscript{32} or even substantial debt associated with presumably unnecessary expenditure. On the one hand, the rise of legacy discourse within the Olympic Movement is a response to these new conditions, which also further address older ones such as the need to justify to local as well
as national communities the utilization of vast resources to organize the Olympic Games. On the other hand, the rise of legacy discourse within the Olympic Movement is a way for the IOC to monitor the financial resources it transfers to organizing committees of the Olympic Games to ensure that bidding promises are carried through, to press for benefits that include a larger number of Olympic stakeholders, and to legitimize such request and monitoring. In addition, legacy discourse legitimizes the aims of the IOC by giving substance to the claim that the Olympic Games can play a catalyst role for positive change. Thus, legacy discourse, with its emphasis on planning and delivery, forces officials in bidding cities to be more prudent and realistic about their promises both to their own citizens and to the IOC. In short, legacy discourse validates bids locally as well as internationally, and thus the whole Olympic project, while serving a regulatory and monitoring function from bid conception to legacy evaluation, especially now that the IOC has developed The Olympic Games Impact Study with the intention to scientifically measure and analyze the effects of the Olympic Games on the host city, region, and country.

Legacy discourse is nowadays an integral part of the established and dominant Olympic lexicon. John J. MacAloon maintains that legacy discourse has accomplished what brand discourse failed to do: it penetrated and was accepted throughout the entire Olympic system. Whereas for some in Olympic circles the attempt to conceive and explain Olympism as a brand was unpalatable and thus resisted embracing such logic, Olympic legacy was widely accepted not only without resistance but rather enthusiastically. After all, who would oppose an organizational rationality aimed at ensuring that the Olympic Games are not just an enormously expensive festival of fleeting allure but an event that also includes distinct plans to leave behind beneficial effects for the organizing city that perhaps extend to the city’s region and country? In
MacAloon’s words, legacy discourse attained “in a very short time a cross-functional, cross-contextual, transnational hegemony denied even to Olympic brand speech in its heyday.”

In consonance, the Olympic Charter stipulates since the early 2000s that part of the role of the IOC is “to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries.”

There is considerable research focusing on the legacy associated with the Olympic Games. Despite this research, the intension and extension of the concept of legacy is still a topic of debate. As Richard Cashman argued almost a decade ago, “Legacy is an elusive, problematic and even dangerous word.” This is in part due to the word’s multiple meanings and uses. However, that the intension and extension of legacy are often debated does not mean that it lacks a central core of persistent and shared features. Undeniably, legacy is related to what is bequeathed or handed down by a predecessor to a successor. Both the predecessor and the successor could be understood as an individual or group of individuals as well as an event or era, which of course involve the actions of an individual or group of individuals. That is to say, legacy involves a legator and a legatee. Besides the form that legacy takes, in Olympic circles, since the 1980s, the word has been used “in a specific and targeted sense to refer to planned outcomes from the staging of an Olympic Games.” Typically, infrastructural, economical, cultural, and educational outcomes figure prominently in the legacy planning of both bids and organizing committees. Certainly, as it has been pointed out by some scholars, legacy is both planned and unplanned as much as positive and negative. However, the distinct intent is that legacy be planned and positive.
Legacy and Failed Olympic Bidding

As of late, the pervasiveness of legacy talk in Olympic circles has extended beyond the organization of the Olympic Games and reached into the bidding process itself. Whereas for decades the exclusive focus of the IOC was on the substantial bequest that the Olympic Games themselves would offer a city, region, and country, bid officials nowadays have to enunciate what their bids would bequest to their cities, regions, and countries whether successful or not.\(^{41}\) In other words, bid officials are expected to conceive two sets of legacy: one pertaining to the Olympic Games and another pertaining to the bid process. Given the rise of legacy discourse (along with the “magical” properties MacAloon argues is ascribed to it by many in Olympic circles as the key not only to build successful bids’ storylines but also to coalesce Olympic affairs), this new reach is hardly surprising.\(^{42}\) As an IOC document expressly states, organizing committees of the Olympic Games as well as interested cities should “look at what they believe the Games, and even just bidding, can do for their citizens, cities and countries.”\(^{43}\)

Even before the IOC formally extended legacy rationality into the bidding process by requesting interested cities to enunciate their plans for their bids’ legacy, a few bids articulated a legacy in case they failed to obtain the right to host the Olympic Games. The Manchester 2000, Lille 2004, Sion 2006, and Chicago 2016 are increasingly mentioned as bids that, although unsuccessful, efficaciously planned for such eventuality and actually left behind a commendable legacy. Manchester can show the National Cycling Centre and the Manchester Evening News Arena. City officials in Lille affirm that the bid for the 2004 Olympics contributed to change the perception of their city both in France and abroad. Sion bid officials argue that their efforts left a legacy of sustainable development awareness and a number of initiatives in this regard. Finally, Chicago bid leaders created a youth sport organization during the applicant phase that received
financial support from the bid’s surplus.\textsuperscript{44} These bidding legacy projects are progressively seen as the winning side of losing bids.

If bids officials, and more broadly the Olympic system, are embracing the rationality of planning the legacy of failed bids, academics are starting to analyze such legacy and make recommendations for its implementation. A recent master’s thesis argues that failed bids are capable of delivering considerable legacies. Moreover, the study emphasizes that given the cost and problems associated with the legacy of hosting the Olympic Games, “it can even be proposed that submitting an unsuccessful Olympic bid can be the best possible scenario.”\textsuperscript{45} The author recommends that to succeed, the projected legacy of failed bids would be better off by integrating it into the city’s long-term vision, partnering with the public sector, and focusing on developing sport facilities.\textsuperscript{46} Another recent master’s thesis categorizes potential positive and negative legacies of failed bids. It also makes a number of recommendations to minimize the latter and optimize the former.\textsuperscript{47} A third scholar endorses the notion of planning just to benefit by bidding. The focus is on physical legacy and their capacity to generate other forms of legacies. The author maintains that conceiving bids as a means to an end is the solution to a likely decline in the number of interested cities due to the rising cost of bidding.\textsuperscript{48}

As is the case with Olympic authorities, the incipient scholarship of failed bids, in one way or another, embrace legacy discourse. The studies mentioned above are indeed framed within the prevailing legacy discourse in Olympic circles. By doing so, they presuppose that the extension of legacy speech into failed Olympic bids makes sense. To analyze whether this is warranted, it is important to keep in mind what legacy has come to mean in Olympic circles as described above.
There seems to be several problems with extending the characteristic legacy discourse in Olympic circles to the bidding process. To start with, it seems that asking bid committees to plan for a legacy in case their bids to host the Olympic Games fail overburdens them. Bid committees are formed to articulate coherent, credible, and viable blueprints to host the Olympic Games. They have plenty of work to do in this regard and adding the conception of a legacy in case their bid is unsuccessful goes beyond their primary mandate. This suggests that planning a legacy for failed bids could complicate as much as it could add additional costs to an already complicated and expensive process. This could potentially distract bid officials from their primary mandate. As they might think that planning a legacy for failed bids might be an important factor in outbidding their competitors, these officials might start conceiving legacy projects that end up being unfulfilled promises or encumbrances for their cities. If anything, in its complexity and cost, the bid process does not need to broaden its scope to the prospect of failure nor it needs its potential negative consequences.

It should be remembered that bid committees are structures that function for a short period of time and are disbanded once the election is over. This raises practical issues. For instance, while bid committees articulate their legacy in case they fail, it most probably plays, at best, a negligible role and, at worst, no role at all in its implementation. The projected legacy has to be implemented once the bid committees have disbanded. Thus, another administrative structure has to interpret and implement the legacy design. Also, who would be in charge of overseeing and monitoring that what was promised by the bid committees actually materializes? Perhaps, it should also be remembered that given the number of white elephants and unfulfilled promises left by several Olympic Games’ organizing committees, the IOC now closely monitors the impact of hosting the event. However, since organizing committees disband within two years
of their conclusion, there is not much the IOC can do to ensure positive legacies once the
disbandment happens. In light of the history of the legacy of the Olympic Games, from white
elephants to current monitoring, the implementation and monitoring of what was promised by
failed bids presents serious challenges. It is unclear who would take on those tasks. The
establishment of a legal framework to make sure failed bidding cities measure up to the
responsibilities of their promised legacy could be an option to control the issue. This, however,
presents numerous challenges of its own and seems impractical. One has only to consider the
number of contracts that would have to be signed, not to mention the ramifications of any breach
of them.

Another problem with planning for a legacy in case bids to host the Olympic Games fail
is that they might promote the emergence of “utilitarian” bids. As seen above, these are bids
whose main goal is not to obtain the right to host the Olympic Games but rather to use the
bidding process as a means to achieve other goals. Cities are increasingly using the bid process
for a whole array of purposes, from positioning themselves as strategic destinations for global
investment to coalescing forces to precipitate social change or urban regeneration. The
proliferation of a utilitarian outlook toward bidding could be potentially harmful to the Olympic
Movement. Cities would not be bidding with the intention to host the Olympic Games but
simply because the bidding process offers an exceptional platform to further their goals. It could
be argued that interest in the bidding process is advantageous to the IOC. This is the case if
cities genuinely intend to host the Olympic Games. However, the instrumentalization of the
bidding process diminishes the value of the event as the focus is on the qualities of the bidding
city qua city and not on its qualities qua potential Olympic host. In other words, the main
concern is not on how to enhance what McAloon calls Olympic heritage, “the inherited cultural
capital that distinguishes Olympic from other international sport and is the general source of
type that makes anyone want to bid for the Olympics in the first place,” but instead to advance a
city’s, region’s, or country’s appeal. Olympic authorities should be wary of such inauthentic
bids.

Bids put forward to gain relevant experience to mount realistic Olympic bids in the future
present an interesting situation. They are obviously utilitarian in nature. However, these bids
hope to become serious contenders to host the Olympic Games in the future. It is rumored that
cities expressing interest to host the Olympic Games for the first time are sometimes advised by
Olympic authorities to engage in “introductory” or “practice” bids to prepare themselves better
for future “full” bids. If that is the case, it is unreasonable to require these cities to plan a legacy
in case their bids fail because they do not intend, and have little chances, to win. Why should
they plan for a foregone conclusion if they know that in the future they will most probably bid
again? At best, the legacy here is the bidding itself, as it is meant to improve the chances of
future bids. One wonders whether there should be mechanisms in place to assist interested cities
in preparing robust bids without having to go through “introductory” or “practice” bids. These
mechanisms would minimize the instrumentalization of the bidding process and allow to fully
concentrate on how legitimate bids envision their contributions to Olympic heritage.

A final problem with planning for legacies in case bids to host the Olympic Games fail is
that bidding is in itself a form of legacy. McIntosh recognized this almost a decade ago. For her,
“it is essential to recognise that the bid process must be thought of in terms of not only being the
starting point for Games-related legacy development but also as a legacy in itself.” This
recognition is even more important at this juncture of Olympic development in which bidding
cities are required to articulate a legacy whether their bids are successful or not. This is so
because this requirement does not recognize bidding as a form of legacy. For McIntosh, bidding is a form of legacy in that it creates a wealth of knowledge that is accessible and at the disposal of future interested cities and bid groups. “Just as candidates are able to learn from examining the Official Report of past Olympic Games organizers,” she argues, “so too can they learn from the methodology, ideas, and dreams contained in the documentary evidence left behind by past candidate city hopefuls.” Based on this idea, McIntosh makes the case that bidding cities’ documents should be preserved, not only for their value to future interested cities but also for their value to better understand the Olympic historical experience.

This understanding is central to the discussion of legacy in Olympic circles. For instance, MacAloon argues that when it comes to legacy, what bidding officials are really being asked is not a list of pay-offs (for example, additions to the urban landscape, jobs created, or an enhanced workforce) and catch phrases to promote Olympic values but “how their city will understand, rethink, and rework in a serious and deeply informed way the great themes of the Olympic historical experience.” As intimated above, he prefers the term heritage to legacy, among other reasons because it does not refer to just what is left behind but to “that which is widely held to be significant in what is left behind.” Obviously, what is significant here is related to the inherited Olympic cultural capital. If when talking about legacy Olympic authorities really have in mind the kind of project MacAloon says they do (and it is reasonable to believe that this more profound understanding of legacy is meant as the IOC is not entirely comfortable with purely instrumentalist bids), it appears to exceed what bid committees can do in case they fail. It takes organizing committees years of enormously careful and painstaking labor to first envision and then deliver their Olympic legacy, and not all of them succeed. A bid committee does not have the capacity, and to reiterate a point made before nor does it have the mandate to reconceptualize
and encapsulate in a legacy project the broad Olympic historical experience in case it fails. The risk is to underestimate what legacy entails by coming up with a list of hopefully useful endeavors, mostly made of brick and mortar, but with little, if any, symbolically poignant Olympic power. In other words, the risk is that what is left behind is simply “something” but not “something Olympically meaningful.”

So, is there anything worth legating when bids fail? Of course there is, for the efforts of failed bid committees is part and parcel of “the sum total of accumulated Olympic cultural, historical, political, moral, and symbolic capital.” And a very important one. In an important sense, bids are at the same time equally complex responses to, celebrations of, and dreams to redefine the Olympic historical experience. As much as successful ones, failed bid committees conceive a vision for the Olympic Games, including their planned legacy, as well as a plan to execute it. These visions and plans represent their contribution to the accumulated cultural Olympic capital. They are possible because of the synergy among a number of social, cultural, economic, and political forces fostered by a bid, which is also an important part of the legacy of bidding. The whole process by which bid committees, successful or not, conceive their visions and plans for the Olympic Games is, as suggested by McIntosh, worth preserving or, simply put, leaving behind in a properly organized fashion. Said in another way, the bid committees’ efforts constitute their primary legacy. If not safeguarded, their importance for the Olympic historical experience might be inadequately understood or, perhaps even more damaging, simply forgotten. Failed bid committees then would do a great service to the Olympic Movement if their legacy is a comprehensive plan to preserve, protect, and make public their entire records and documents. A reasonable failed bidding legacy is related to the trajectory of the bid committees more than to any list of cost-benefits analyses. Other forms of legacy are, of course, permissible but should
not be mandatory. Nevertheless, these projects should be economically modest and sustainable as well as easy to implement and manage.

At this point, it is fitting to come back to the South American portraiture presented above. Has Buenos Aires doubly failed by the inability of its multiple unsuccessful Olympic bids to bequeath something prominent to the city? The answer is partially yes and no. No because, as suggested in this paper, the Buenos Aires’ bids constitute a form of legacy in themselves. Throughout the twentieth century, Argentine Olympic officials sought to bring the Olympic Games to Buenos Aires to demonstrate their commitment to the Olympic Movement and that they were at its forefront in South America. In the process, they debated and imagined different visions for the Olympic Games in their city. What the Buenos Aires’ failed bids expressed and bestowed is a tradition of concern for Olympic matters, which might, among other reasons, inspire new bids in the future. This is a strong legacy. However, bid officials partially failed in that the records and documents of their persistent efforts are, to put it mildly, not well preserved. The study of how the Buenos Aires’ failed bids fit in the larger Olympic historical experience is, consequently, more arduous than necessary. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there were some historical lacunae in the materials and commentaries surrounding the last Buenos Aires’ failed bid that could have been avoided if those records and documents were easily available.59 Finally, it would be appropriate if the city’s failed bids occupy a more conspicuous place in the museum of the COA and that the Plazoleta Pierre de Coubertin includes references to the failed bids and to Argentina’s Olympic tradition. This would also strengthen the legacy that the Buenos Aires’ failed bids constitute in themselves.
Conclusion

This article contends that the extension of legacy discourse into failed bids, at least as typically articulated in Olympic circles, is problematic. Conceiving and materializing a legacy in case bids fail, seems to fall beyond the confines of bid committees’ mandates and responsibilities. In addition, there are a number of serious practical challenges to such conception and materialization. While practical difficulties are not definitive, they are instructive with regards to the challenges of implementing legacies for failed bids. Moreover, what should be recognized is that bids, successful or not, constitute an important legacy in themselves. Bids provide ample junctures for vibrant debates among different stakeholders about how their cities have, are, and ought to develop in the future, which is encapsulated in their vision for the Olympic Games. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the legacy of failed bids be primarily the preservation and protection of the records and documents that made possible submitting such a vision to the IOC for its consideration. Their legacy should be to safeguard the legacy that they themselves are. This would be a significant contribution to the Olympic historical experience. This is the kind of legacy that should be stressed by Olympic authorities rather than the customary practical pay-offs, with their emphasis on cost-benefit analyses, so dear to the current wave of Olympic legacy advocates and experts.\(^6\) Other forms of legacy that increase the accumulated Olympic cultural capital in inexpensive and organizationally sensible ways are also to be welcome, but they should not be required.

Undoubtedly, the rise of legacy discourse has done much to bring a renewed sense of responsibility and accountability to both bid committees and organizing committees of the Olympic Games. The event is too large, too expensive, too important, and too symbolically meaningful not to carefully consider what it could and should legate to the cities, regions, and
countries hosting it. However, this does not mean that such discourse should be uncritically extended to all areas of Olympic life, including failed bidding. Academics should question the logic of the legacy of failed Olympic bids. If not, they might uncritically reproduce the “unintended but no less pernicious consequences of legacy speech.”61 One potential consequence is represented by those who propose to see bidding as a means to an end other than obtaining the rights to host the Olympic Games. Another is a possible “more and bigger is better” mentality that would commit bidding cities to increasingly costly legacies in case they fail hoping that such promises would situate them more favorably in the bid process. Neither seem necessarily to add much to “increasing the accumulated [Olympic] cultural capital that will attract bids and hosts for future Games.”62 There is a case that failed bids can primarily and more effectively contribute to the latter by seeing their efforts as a form of legacy worth leaving behind in an organized fashion, even if their bids were only concerned with creating the traditional sought after pay-offs. This is what the IOC should mainly expect failed bids to leave behind.


7 See Torres, “Stymied Expectations: Buenos Aires’ Persistent Efforts to Host Olympic Games.”


10 At least that was the case in December 2011. According to the *Olympic Review* (no. 303 [1993], 43), at the time the small plaza was inaugurated, “The project is not yet completed for still to come is a frontispiece with all the names of Argentinian medallists.” In August 2010, a Buenos Aires’ newspaper reported that the COA would restore the bust as well as add the Olympic rings and information about the history of the Olympic Games to the small plaza (See Pablo Novillo, “Más empresas apadrinan y mantienen parques y plazas,” *Clarín*, 21 August 2010, <http://www.clarin.com/ciudades/capital_federal/empresas-apadrinan-mantienen-parques-plazas_0_320968010.html> [accessed November 1, 2011]). However, unfortunately, almost twenty years after its inauguration, the small plaza has neither the promised frontispiece nor the additions announced in 2010. The project is still conspicuously incomplete. Interestingly, at least two Internet websites argue that the small plaza was inaugurated in late November 1996 when the IOC Evaluation Commission visited Buenos Aires to assess its candidacy for the 2004 Olympics. See <http://detallesdebuenosaires.blogspot.com/2011/02/monumento-pierre-de-coubertin.html> and <http://www.amigosacampantes.com/t291-barrio-de-la-recoleta> (accessed November 1, 2011).


Ibid., 318.


Torres, “Stymied Expectations: Buenos Aires’ Persistent Efforts to Host Olympic Games,” 45. See also pages 44-49 and 60-61 in the same article.


Ibid., 451.

Ibid., 452.


The expression white elephant refers to something that requires extensive expense to upkeep but yields at best modest benefits. Some Olympic venues have been referred to as fitting this description. See, for example, Michael

33 See MacAloon “‘Legacy’ as Managerial/Magical Discourse in Contemporary Olympic Affairs,” 2061-2062.

34 Ibid., 2061.


36 For a few examples of publications dealing with this topic, see endnote 2.


38 Ibid. Olympic scholars and practitioners, for example, frequently distinguish between hard and soft, tangible and intangible, direct and indirect, local and global, intended and unintended, and positive and negative legacy.

39 Several categories of Olympic legacy have been identified. For instance, for Cashman (The Bitter-Sweet Awakening: The Legacy of the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, 16 and “What Is ‘Olympic Legacy’?,” 36-37), there are six such categories: economics; infrastructure; information and education; public life, politics and culture; sport; and symbols, memory and history. For Chris Gratton and Holger Preuss (“Maximizing Olympic Impacts by Building Up Legacies,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 14 [2008], 1926-1929), there are also six categories: infrastructure; knowledge, skill-development, and education; image; emotions; networks; and culture.

40 See, for example, Gratton and Preuss, “Maximizing Olympic Impacts by Building Up Legacies,” 1924.

41 See endnote 3.

42 See MacAloon “‘Legacy’ as Managerial/Magical Discourse in Contemporary Olympic Affairs.” These properties are “magical” because they permitted legacy discourse to quickly spread across the entire Olympic system.


44 See n.a, Beyond the Bid, Thriving Today. Legacies of Bidding for the Olympic Games (n.d.) and De Blauwe, “The Legacy of Unsuccessful Olympic Bids.” See also Masterman, “Losing Bids, Winning Legacies: An Examination of the Need to Plan for Olympic Legacies Prior to the Bidding.”


46 Ibid., 63-64.


48 Masterman, “Losing Bids, Winning Legacies: An Examination of the Need to Plan for Olympic Legacies Prior to the Bidding.”

49 Cashman (“What Is ‘Olympic Legacy’?,” 38) argues a similar case for the legacy of the Olympic Games.

50 MacAloon “‘Legacy’ as Managerial/Magical Discourse in Contemporary Olympic Affairs,” 2067-2068.
51 McIntosh, “The Olympic Bid Process as the Starting Point of the Legacy Development,” 454.

52 Ibid., 455.

53 See ibid., 454-456.

54 MacAlloon “‘Legacy’ as Managerial/Magical Discourse in Contemporary Olympic Affairs,” 2067.


58 MacAlloon “‘Legacy’ as Managerial/Magical Discourse in Contemporary Olympic Affairs,” 2068.


60 See MacAlloon, “‘Legacy’ as Managerial/Magical Discourse in Contemporary Olympic Affairs,” for a critique of these actors.

61 Ibid., 2067.

62 McAlloon, “Cultural Legacy: The Olympic Games as ‘World Cultural Property,’” 271.