Trust as Robustly Moral

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Alisa L. Carse

The things we typically do value include things that we cannot singlehandedly either create or sustain (our own life, health, reputation, our offspring and their well-being, as well as intrinsically shared goods such as conversation, its written equivalent, theater and other forms of play, chamber music, market exchange, political life, and so on). We must allow many other people to get into positions where they can, if they choose, injure what we care about, since those are the same positions that they must be in, in order to help us take care of what we care about (Baier, 1994a: 101).

We need to trust others in order to survive and thrive. Sometimes those in whom we place trust are strangers we’ll never know—the subway mechanic, the county arborist, the person in the back office where our loved one took a job; sometimes they are nearer and dearer to us—a neighbor, doctor, teacher, parent or friend. We need to assume, in a general sort of way, that the brakes will work, the trees won’t fall on our house after the storm, our loved ones will be safe from cruelty or abuse. We also need to trust that we will be cared for competently, taught responsibly, treated fairly, and loved well. In these and many other ways, trust is a vital good. Yet trust can be fragile and is often unwise. How, then, are we to understand this necessary, but risky good?

In everyday discourse we don’t use the word “trust” consistently. We say, for example, that we ‘trust’ that the sun will be out by noon, that the umbrella will hold up in the wind, that the dog is friendly. We are delighted to find a plumber we ‘trust’ and grateful our family ‘trusts’ us. We worry about the ‘trustworthiness’ of the judicial system, the metro, and our banks. While there are points of commonality among these diverse forms of trust, my discussion here concerns trust between people rather than ‘trust’ in nature, things, animals or institutions.² And I will focus, in particular, on trust between people in relationships of dependency and inter-dependency.

Our dependency on others can vary in intensity and scope; it can play a role in our relationships with strangers, intimates, or everything in between; it can configure relatively short-lived or long-term relationships, as well as single or repeated interactions. Characteristically, our dependency relationships involve inequalities of knowledge, expertise, need or power, so that one party is in some respect especially dependent on, and vulnerable to, the other. Contexts of dramatic asymmetrical dependency can seem most urgent in thinking about trust because of the special susceptibility of dependents to injury, neglect, and abandonment.
Yet we need only think of trust’s role in romantic love, friendships between peers, or collegial partnerships to appreciate the full scope of its vital importance. Trust in all contexts carries both risk of harm and possibility of benefit. In trusting others, we allow them “to get into positions where they can, if they choose, injure what we care about since those are the same positions that they must be in, in order to help us take care of what we care about” (Baier, 1994a: 101).

Are there features different cases of trust share in virtue of which they are cases of trust? How, if at all, can trust’s role in our interactions with the plumber compare to its role in romantic love? There is no single right answer to this question. It matters what work we want our account of trust to do, what questions we hope it can help illuminate. Here I seek an understanding of trust that can help us think critically and reflectively about dependency relationships and their moral risks.

**Trust as a three-place predicate**

In her influential essay, “Trust and Anti-Trust,” Annette Baier proposes we represent “trust” as a three-place predicate, formulated schematically as A entrusts B with valued [good] C (1994a). Offering elaboration, Baier states that “a relationship of trust [is] one where A has entrusted B with some of the care of C and where B has some discretionary powers in caring for C”. “Caring for C” is to be given a broad interpretation – to include everything from “show concern for [C]” to “leaving [C] alone” (1994a, 101-2). Baier recognizes that this schematic representation “will involve some distortion and regimentation of some cases” (Ibid.). Most importantly, the language of “entrustment” risks reinforcing the mistaken idea that to trust is to entrust something to another, rather than, for example, entrusting another with ‘non-things’ like secrets, plans, or the care of one’s children. Moreover, we can trust others to do something—take out the dog before work or recommend a good doctor; or to be a certain way (e.g., attentive, honest, conscientious). Thus the language of “entrusting” can be awkward. But a three-place model seems right to me, and permutations of it prevail in recent literature on trust. I’ll adopt it here, using the language of ‘trusting’ rather than ‘entrusting’.

Crucially for us, Baier’s three-place formulation captures the fact that trust is relative to a domain. The domain can be wide or narrow. We might trust a friend as a confidante (in general) or we might trust her with a particular secret; we might trust someone with the wellbeing of our children, or trust them with our children’s teeth. We say sometimes we that we trust someone “absolutely” – as if in all domains – but what we tend to mean is something more like, I trust her to have integrity and moral virtue, but no! I wouldn’t let her near my car or my tomato plants. The scope of trust is often implicit.
There is no question that just as the domain or scope of trust can vary, so too our trust can be more or less secure or wary, sturdy or fragile. If we are fortunate, we will experience contexts in our lives of calm, easy trust, unburdened by concerns about risk. When we experience no cause for uneasiness or anxiety about others’ trustworthiness, the issue of trust may not be one we grapple with consciously or explicitly. Of course, “calm, easy trust” can be naïve, unwise, even foolish. And when trust is betrayed, the stakes are often high.

**Trust versus (Mere) Reliance**

It is common in current philosophical work on trust to distinguish trusting, properly understood, from (merely) ‘relying on’. We rely on others for a great deal that we cannot do ourselves or alone, sometimes without an expectation that they will come through for us and sometimes, even, with the expectation that they won’t. You’re working late and you’re relying on your neighbor to pick up the kids, but you can’t reach her and you’re not sure she remembers; the transformer explodes during the hurricane, and you’re relying on someone from the electric company to fix it, even though you expect that, like last time, they’ll botch the job. In this sense, ‘rely on’ essentially means something like ‘depend on—for better or for worse,’ sometimes because we have no choice.

There is a second, different sense of ‘rely on’ (or ‘reliance’), which conveys the confident expectation that those relied on will do what they are relied on to do. It is this second sense of ‘rely on’ that we will focus on here in thinking about trust. Many writing on trust agree that it is a form or “species” of reliance in this second sense—that is, reliance grounded in relatively confident predictive expectations about what another or others will do. Trust, it is then further maintained, is to be regarded as a form of reliance, grounded in “normative” as well as predictive expectations. In this sense, to trust is, broadly, to hold certain normative expectations of another (e.g., that he tell the truth, take good care of the dog, remember your birthday) and to expect (predictively) that he will meet them. Disagreement lies in how we might best understand the nature and role of normative expectations constitutive of trust (as opposed to mere reliance). I want here to examine several contrasting accounts of the reliance/trust distinction and key points of disagreement among them. I will focus primarily on the work of Annette Baier (1994a, 1994b), Karen Jones (1996) and Margaret Walker (2006), whose influential views on trust will set a framework for some of my own thoughts about how we might see this distinction and – more specifically – how we might understand a kind of robustly moral trust important in dependency relationships.
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Trust and Goodwill

In “Trust and Anti-Trust,” Baier proposes that in trusting, we rely on others’ “goodwill,” rather than merely on their “dependable habits,” or their “dependably exhibited fear … or other motives compatible with ill will [and indifference] toward [us]” (1994a, 98-9). We can rely on others, Baier says, even when we don’t (or don’t any longer) trust them—as when, for example, we have evidence that it is in their self-interest to behave as needed: “We may rely on the shopkeeper’s concern for his profits to motivate him to take effective precautions against poisoners” (1994a, 99); “[w]e put our bodily safety into the hands of pilots, drivers, and doctors with scarcely any sense of recklessness” (1994a, 98). If our reliance is based in a confident expectation that those relied on will come through for us, if only from a desire for profit, fear of sanctions, concern for their reputation, and the like, our reliance can be reasonable, but it is not yet trust (1994a, 126; 1994b). In trusting, we rely on others to do as they should, and to do so with the right motivation—that is, with “goodwill.” Trust can be “betrayed…and not just disappointed” (1994a, 99).

Belief in another’s “goodwill” does not, of course, suffice in grounding trust. When we hop into a cab, we hope that the cabbie has goodwill – that he won’t overcharge us, drive us to a remote area and rob us, or stop to chat with a friend, oblivious to the ticking meter. But we also hope he is a competent driver with a good sense of direction. A dentist whose knowledge is dated and skills rusty might be dangerous, however great his goodwill. Thus it is a “belief in the trusted’s goodwill and competence” that “grounds the willingness to be or remain within the trusted’s power in a way the distrustful are not, and to give the trusted discretionary powers in matters of concern to us” (1994b: 133, my emphasis).

It is apparent in thinking about examples, that the competence expected in trusting isn’t always or only a form of specialized skill or knowledge. Sometimes it is normative competence. Consider Baier’s example: “[T]he babysitter who decides that the nursery would be improved if painted purple and sets to work to transform it, will have acted, as a babysitter, in an untrustworthy way, however great his goodwill” (Baier, 1994a, 101). In misjudging the scope of what he is trusted to, the babysitter has taken inappropriate initiative in the nursery. He may be well-meaning and skilled, his choice of purple lovely, but he has exercised poor judgment as a babysitter. He has failed to understand the normative expectations of him, the nature and limits of the responsibilities and freedoms of this role.

A central piece of Baier’s account of trust is the need, in trusting, to give discretionary latitude and “power” to the trusted party with confidence they will not abuse or mismanage it. When we trust, we rely on others to understand what it is we are trusting them to do and to make good judgments in doing it (1994a, 101). Consider our relationships with health care providers, which are paradigmatic
in this sense. They are configured by dramatic inequality of knowledge and vulnerability—they tend to be asymmetrical dependency relationships, initiated out of need imposed by illness or injury. They standardly require the patient to grant a significant degree of discretionary latitude and power to physicians, nurses, and other professionals. Even in cases in which the risk of dependency can be reduced and we have some control in reducing it (when you need a doctor, you try to find one highly recommended), there is an unavoidable element of dependency and its attendant vulnerability. You’ve done your research, chosen a reputable surgeon, and now you’re heading into the operating room on a gurney.

Though the kind of discretionary latitude and power we give those we trust can vary greatly across contexts, it is a key source of risk. We cannot predict all the contingencies in yielding control to someone else and the simple truth is that we are often, in trusting, not in a position to monitor whether and how our trust is being fulfilled.

Crucially, for Baier, the normative expectations characteristic of trust concern both what we expect another will do and their motivation for doing it. These expectations are based in our beliefs about the other’s goodwill and competence. When we trust, we accept our vulnerability to those we trust, relaxing our oversight. Trust can, of course, admit of degrees, but, it entails a degree of confidence in the trusted other that is incompatible with wariness and anxiety about their trustworthiness. “Trust,” Baier writes, “is an alternative to vigilance and reliance on the threat of sanctions, trustworthiness an alternative to constant watching to see what one can and cannot get away with, to recurrent recalculations of costs and benefits” (1994b, 133).

**Trust and the Affective Attitude of Optimism**

In “Trust as an Affective Attitude” (1996), Karen Jones follows Baier in giving a central role in trusting to confidence in the trusted’s goodwill and competence. At the same time, Jones rejects the emphasis Baier places on the truster’s beliefs about the trusted as a basis for trust. She defends a conception of trust on which it is “most centrally” an “affective attitude of optimism about the goodwill and competence of another as it extends to the domain of our interaction [with them]” (11).

As an affective attitude of optimism, trust does not consist in a bald “yay!” attitude toward the prospect of another’s goodwill and competence. Trust is complex. It involves beliefs and forms of reasoning, but it also powerfully shapes what we regard as evidence in believing and reasoning as we do: “Trusting,” Jones writes, “functions analogously to blinkered vision: it shields from view a whole range of interpretations about the motives of another and restricts the inferences we will make about [their] likely actions ... for it gives rise to selective interpretation,
which means that one can be fooled, that the truth might lie, as it were, outside one’s gaze... we impute honorable motives to those we trust, and typically do not even stop to consider the harms they might cause” (12). Jones offers what I would call a dynamic view of trust, for trust as she understands it consists in a practical and perceptual stance that shapes what we notice, the interpretation we give what we notice, and hence the way in which we think and reason about others. What we believe about others, in turn, informs and fortifies our trust in them: “If I trust you, I will, for example, believe that you are innocent of the hideous crime with which you are charged, and will suppose that the apparently mounting evidence of your guilt can be explained in some way compatible with your innocence. Of course the resistance to evidence is not limitless; given enough evidence, my trust can be shaken and I can come to believe that you are guilty. I will come to see you in quite a different light” (1996, 16).

One consequence of Jones’s view is that the evidentiary basis for reasonable trust is less stringent and demanding than it is for rational expectation and prediction more generally (17). This is true of distrust as well. Even if you regularly commute on the metro, news of a mishap on your metro line due to conductor error may switch your default expectation that metro conductors are trustworthy, reversing it to the default expectation that they are not. This expectation may then “seek out evidence for [itself]” and be to some extent “self-confirming”. You might, for example, be acutely aware that your conductor looks sleepy, or is chatting while the train is in motion. Beliefs grounded in distrust are, like those grounded in trust, “abnormally resistant to evidence,” as is the optimism (or pessimism) grounded in them (20).

While trust most centrally consists in an attitude of optimism regarding the goodwill and competence of another, this alone does not suffice. A second essential element of trust, Jones claims, is “the confident expectation that, when the need arises, the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that you are counting on her” (6). This expectation distinguishes trust from mere reliance: If you believe I will meet your expectations because I am anxious that you’ll seek violent vengeance on me if I don’t, then you reasonably believe that my direct motivation is anxiety about payback, and the thought that you are counting on me at best indirect and secondary (9). This second element of trust helps also to distinguish blanket optimism we might have in someone’s goodwill from optimism we have in trusting someone in a specific domain (9). If you anticipate that a particular cosmetic surgeon views plastic surgery on adolescents unfavorably, this surgeon is unlikely to be one to whom you entrust your fourteen year old’s nose job, however confident you are in her overall goodwill.

This is not to say that in trusting you I expect the fact of my trust to trump any and all other considerations you might have in acting; I can perhaps grant
that other considerations may be decisive for you in the end. But it does entail confidence that you will not dismiss or disregard the fact that I’m counting on you in favor of “just any other concern” (9). Moreover, in trusting, we are also confident that another’s interests in fulfilling our trust are not primarily instrumental ones, keyed to her own interests, and hence merely contingently connected to our own. This suffices in some cases of reliance, but not in cases of trust, properly understood.

Trust and Strawson’s Participant Stance

In “Damages to Trust” (2006), Margaret Walker rejects the view that trust entails confident expectation regarding the goodwill of those we trust: “[T]he idea that trust requires you to respond to my reliance on you out of good will towards [me], rather than for other reasons that are reliably motivating, asks too much” (76). Walker also rejects Jones’s assertion that trusting entails an expectation that the trusted party will be moved “directly and favorably by the thought that you are counting on her.” While this characterization of trust fits relationships “among individuals who are directly aware of each other” it “doesn’t translate well to our reliance on those countless persons, ‘seen and unseen,’ upon whom we indiscriminately and mostly unthinkingly rely to behave acceptably” (75-6). There is, on Walker’s view, no in principle exclusion of any kind of motivation as in and of itself incompatible with “trustworthiness”; nor is it problematic as such to understand ‘trust’ as grounded in confidence that the other will meet our expectations for purely self-interests reasons.

In addition to the kind of trust in relationships and interactions in which people are “directly aware of each other,” we rely on a “vast web of strangers” (75, 73). This highlights an important form of trust—“that unreflective and often nonspecific expectation that strangers or unknown others may be relied upon to behave in an acceptable and unthreatening manner,” including, or example, trust in those “whose actions could harm us through causal chains and over time and distance (food processing workers, air traffic controllers)” and those “in various roles where, from our point of view, the occupants are replaceable and we are relying on them to perform a function (assembly-line workers, airline pilots)” (84-5). Walker calls this “diffuse, default trust.” Violations of diffuse, default trust can, to be sure, damage, even shatter, our basic sense of safety and control (85, 92). Yet it is unrealistic, Walker argues, to view them as grounded in goodwill.

We might wonder why we should view our dependency relationships within a “vast web of strangers” as trust relationships rather than ones of (mere) reliance. I will reconsider this issue later. Walker appeals to the sense of betrayal and indignation we often feel when our default trust is disappointed. This, she claims, “is a signal that our reliance is trusting, and that it assumes others’ responsibility
and not just their predictability” (85).

In seeking a “generic” account of trust that can better encompass the array of different kinds ‘trust’ relationships we have, Walker attempts to make a distinction between reliance that is essentially and exclusively “interpersonal” and “the confidence we repose in things (and sometimes people) behaving in predictable ways” (79).

In an intriguing turn, she takes up and applies P.F. Strawson’s distinction between the “participant” and “objective attitudes” from which we can, as human beings, regard other each other (and ourselves) (Strawson 2005). The “participant attitude” characterizes inter-personal relationships in which we “hold ourselves and others responsible” (Walker 2006, 104). This is contrasted with the “objective attitude” that we typically adopt toward things, and at times toward other people when we regard them as “to be managed or handled or cured or trained (Strawson, 2005, 79). “In the fully objective attitude,” Walker writes, “we regard the wills, attitudes, and motives of others entirely as bases of prediction that support our own ends for them. In doing so, we cease to treat their relationship either to their own ends or to us as one of responsibility, something for which they are required to account” (2006, 104-105).

At the heart of Walker’s “generic” conception of trust is the view that it represents a form of reliance we undertake from within the participant attitude. In trusting, we rely on others to meet our normative expectations not merely confidently predicting they will, but also because we (normatively) expect it of them that they will do so “in the awareness (if only implicit or unreflective) that they are liable to be held responsible for failing to do so or to make reasonable efforts to do so” (2006, 80, my emphasis). In trusting, we “stand ready” to hold those we trust accountable for fulfilling or disappointing our trust. When our trust is disappointed, we may feel betrayed, resentful, indignant. While we can ‘rely on’ things—our vacuum cleaner, computer, or winter boots, we do not “hold them responsible” for their ‘reliability’ in this “interpersonal” sense; we may be frustrated, irritated, fed up, but (unless we are viewing them anthropomorphically) we will not see them as betraying us, or react to them with resentment and indignation, let alone stand ready to “rebuke” them for their “failure”.

An important virtue Walker claims for her account of trust lies in its “generic” character. Trust, as “reliance with responsibility,” is distinguished from (mere) reliance of the sort we “repose” in things and, sometimes, in people when we regard them from an “objective” perspective. Though our trust in someone might, in a particular case, hang on our expectation that they will have goodwill, this expectation is part of what we are trusting in, rather than constitutive of trust as such: “While I trust my dry cleaner with my clothing, I do not generally expect her to perform her tasks with particular concern or regard for me, but with responsibility to handle the clothing competently because this is reasonably expected by all
her customers, of which I am one” (80). In different contexts the bases for our confidence that someone will satisfy our expectations can be different.

Walker is concerned to free her account of trust from an expectation of others’ goodwill. An account of trust tied to good will is, she claims, too narrow to capture the bulk of trust relationships on which we depend. Trust in others might, Walker claims, be grounded in our belief in their “desire to please,” “desire of good repute,” “fear of opprobrium or sanctions” or in the “pressure of community expectations” (81). Walker contends that there can also be “sad or perverse reasons” for trusting people, such as “their abject dependency” or their “servility” (Ibid.).

**Trust as Robustly Moral: Reflections**

In trusting, we hold certain (normative) expectations of another and expect them to meet them. Trusting expectations can be more or less conscious and explicit; they can also be more or less confident. In cases of thoughtful, explicit trust, we project into the future, drawing inferences from what take to be evidence for framing our expectations—e.g., “she has never misled me before; I can’t believe she’d do so now.” In this respect, trust clearly has cognitive dimensions. But it is also an “affectively loaded way of seeing” that “directs our patterns of attention and tendencies of interpretation,” shaping how we understand the situations we’re in and the others we’re in them with. In this way trust (and distrust) are lenses through which we navigate our complex dependencies.

In the (merely) predictive sense I might ‘depend’ or ‘rely on’ you to finish the Sunday crossword puzzle or to cry in sappy movies—to do the things you tend, ‘reliably,’ to do. But the fact that we can say, ironically, “I can always rely on you to forget my birthday” or “to come into the house in muddy shoes” indicates that ‘rely on’ (or reliance) can have an honorific meaning—that we take others to be “reliable,” not just in being “predictable,” but in predictably doing what we hope they will, and believe they should, do. Are all such cases of ‘reliance’ ‘trust’?

If in trusting, as we have been thinking about it, we hold certain normative expectations of another and expect (predictively) that he will meet them, it would seem the answer is yes. Yet, as we’ve seen, this is not the answer always given. Baier, Jones and Walker each make a case for seeing trust to be a specific form of reliance, maintaining that we can (sometimes) rely on others even when we do not trust them. While, as we’ve seen, Baier and Jones claim that trust entails an expectation that those we trust will have goodwill, Walker seeks to liberate our understanding of trust from this expectation, while tying it to responsibility in a way reliance in many of its forms need not be tied.

I want here to turn to some critical reflections, especially about Walker’s views, and to locate considerations supporting what I regard as a morally robust
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notion of trust, one in which a flexible notion of “goodwill” has a central role.

1. There are, to be sure, many reasons why people meet others’ expectations. They can be threatened, manipulated, shamed, or seduced into doing so. They may be hungry, too shy to question expectations, or eager to please. They may be wily, greedy, and masterful tricksters, driven by ambition but doubtful that they can sabotage you without getting caught. Are these, in principle, motivations that can ground our trust in others? Walker seems to think so. While she does not deny that distinct motivations must in certain cases be part of what we trust in, they are not, she claims, a basis for trust as such. There is no in principle exclusion of any kind of motivation as in and of itself incompatible with trustworthiness, “generically” understood.

Yet there is something morally troubling, I think, about including someone’s predictable desire to please, their fear of “opprobrium,” or their susceptibility to the “pressure of community expectations” among the legitimate bases for trusting them. Even more troubling is the attachment of “trust” to reliance on someone’s “abject dependency” or “servility.” Walker acknowledges that these last two are “sad and perverse” grounds for trusting someone (82). But why see them, or any of these, as legitimate grounds for trust at all? This is not just a matter of semantics (viz., what we want to call ‘trust’). It concerns substantive moral question about whether a conception of trust should remain “neutral” regarding motivations, whether such a conception can work well in illuminating and addressing moral risks carried by our dependencies.

2. Suppose you rely on me to manage the cash register in your restaurant. You have the normative expectation that I will be careful in giving change and honest in my transactions with customers, and that I will do so “in the awareness (if only implicit or unreflective) that [I am] liable to be held responsible for failing to do so or to make reasonable efforts to do so” (Walker, 2006, 80). You are also confident in expecting (predictively) that I will meet your (normative) expectations. Your confidence is grounded in your observation that I am intensely anxious about getting fired and hence wish ardently to remain in your good graces. And suppose you are right—I am intensely anxious about getting fired and do wish to remain in your good graces, and this, rather than responsiveness to the normative expectations themselves, is what is motivating me in meeting your expectations.

What reasons are there for resisting the view that we are in a “trust” relationship? Surely there is a concern that, if being honest isn’t in and of itself gripping for me, I may have no compunction about stealing from you if I believed I could get away with it. This reason highlights a potential downside any time we rely on someone because we expect their self-interests and ours to (contingently) coincide. This is a real-world, pragmatic challenges of relying on others, and hence of trusting them too. While realistic conceptions of trust should be responsive to the risks of trusting, they are essentially normative. They take a stand on what should count as...
trustworthiness, how we should understand trusting as opposed to other forms of dependency. They convey views about what we should look for, remember, notice and care about in assessing someone’s trustworthiness and in thinking about our own. I want here to address what I take to be moral concerns, among other things, about a conception of trust that includes as cases of trust cases in which we rely primarily on what we take the other to regard as in her self-interest.

It seems clear that, as your cashier, I’m taking an essentially strategic attitude in my relationship with you, one that is oriented to realizing my own end (keeping the job). You, in turn, are regarding me strategically in basing your reliance on me in your confidence that my fear of losing the job suffices in motivating me not to steal.

This said, it’s true that you may have no inclination at all to threaten or manipulate or frighten me into being careful and honest as your cashier. But your reliance on me is nonetheless grounded in your (predictive) expectation about how I will manage the situation, given my fear and my desire to remain in your good graces. In relying on me, you bank on my strategic orientation toward you. We are each, therefore, viewing the other through a strategic lens, assessing how to realize our own ends (or interests) given the other’s interests as we understand them. To echo Walker, we are each regarding each other’s “wills, attitudes, and motives … entirely as bases of prediction that support our own ends” (2006, 105). We are outside the domain of “participation,” of “reciprocity in the plane of responsibility” because each of us is taking an essentially “objective” attitude toward the other. Thus by Walker’s own lights, we are not, as cashier and owner, in a trust relationship.

This encourages the more general thought that on a consistently Strawsonian view, self-interested motivations, such as the desire to please, to avoid sanction, to protect one’s reputation—at least insofar as they are decisive rather than just in the mix—can ground forms of reliance, but cannot ground trust.

In occupying the participant stance on Strawson’s own account we “[feel] bound or obliged” to do what we should, and correlativelly, to react with guilt, remorse or even shame when believe we have not done so (2005, 84-85). This would support a conception of trust on which it entails an expectation that the trusted shares in the feeling of “obligation”—that she sees herself as “bound or obliged” to fulfill the normative expectations you trust her to fulfill. Moreover, the “participant attitude” is, on Strawson’s own account, inherently mutual. In taking a participant attitude toward me, you expect that I take a participant attitude toward you. From within the participant perspective, the normative expectations involved in both trusting and being trusted, among other things, “involve, or express a certain sort of demand for interpersonal regard” (85); there are constraints on the kinds of motivations that can ground your trust in someone; at the very least they must be compatible with my taking a participant
But if my principal motivation in meeting your expectations is to avoid sanctions or further my career, I am oriented strategically with respect to you, taking an “objective” rather than partipant’s perspective. Insofar as your reliance on me is grounded in your expectation that I will see it is in my strategic interest to meet your expectations, you do not trust me. For you are taking an essentially strategic attitude toward me. This brings us to reflection about the role of “goodwill.”

3. It is notable that, in rejecting goodwill, Walker writes that though it “might be of paramount importance in cases of intimacy and extended relationship—good will or regard for the feelings of the particular persons who are trusting in each other—[it] may have no role to play in other relationships, or may not play the primary or the decisive role” (2006, 77). Expectations of “particular concern and regard for us” as the individuals we are is appropriate to “long-standing relationships” but cannot be “focus of trust for a stream of daily encounters with unidentifiable individuals” (81). This is clearly a different understanding of “goodwill” than that of Baier, Jones, or Strawson.

To take the lead from Baier (who is clearly alluding to Strawson), to act with goodwill is to act in a way “incompatible with bad will,” e.g., with cruelty, contempt, the desire to see someone humiliated or destroyed. It is also to act in a way “incompatible with ... indifference,” e.g., with unconcern, dismissiveness, blunt inattentiveness. What it is to have goodwill in a positive sense? We can infer from the examples Baier and Jones offer that what counts as goodwill for them depends on the normative context of trust. While we might expect goodwill in the form of “particular concern and regard” in trusting friends and family, the goodwill expected of trusted strangers we encounter in library stacks or on the bus might consist in respect for “our valued autonomy” expressed in “leav[ing us] alone (Baier, 1994a, 103). A sense of reciprocity or fair play might constitute goodwill among team members, candidates for political office (trustworthy ones), or spouses. While acting with goodwill is distinct from acting with bad will or indifference, just what in particular it amounts to is keyed to the normative expectations the trusted is being relied on to meet.

Goodwill, so understood, need play no less a role in the “stream of daily encounters with unidentified individuals,” than in our “long-standing relationships” and “intimacies.”

Strawson writes: “We should think of the many different kinds of relationship which we can have with other people – as sharers of a common interests; as members of the same family; as colleagues; as friends; as lovers; as chance parties to an enormous range of transactions and encounters .... In general, we demand some degree of goodwill or regard on the part of those who stand in these relationships to us, though the forms we require it to take vary widely in different connections. The range and intensity of our reactive attitudes towards goodwill, its absence or its
opposite vary no less widely” (2005, 78-79, my emphasis). While “goodwill” may take many forms, the concept is not a no-holds-barred placeholder for any attitude or motivation one might have. It must be an attitude or motivation expressing (or evincing) due regard for others in the normative context at issue.

4. If we wish to account for trust in a wide range of relationships and interactions, we need to consider how a moralized understanding of trust might apply to them. This brings us to rude waiters, incommunicative airline employees and negligent police officers. Walker writes: “We may resent rude treatment by a waiter but we may also resent generally bad service on an airline when schedules are disrupted and information is unavailable or confusing. In the latter case the lapses are not directed at us, nor do we necessarily know whom we blame; individual employees are likely to be exposed to the indignation of the unhappy customer who feels irresponsibly served .... Crime victims may become furious at responding police officers who were “supposed to protect them” ... this reveals a tacit (and often unrealistic) reliance on unknown others who are believed to have responsibility for keeping public order” (2006, 85-6).

Walker is suggesting that the fact that we do sometimes feel betrayed by, and indignant toward, airline employees and police officers when we experience them as falling short of our expectations indicates that it is our trust, rather than just our reliance, that is disappointed. But the kind of trust we place in them, as “unknown others” on whom we depend, cannot realistically entail an expectation that they will have goodwill toward us. Nor can we expect them to respond directly and favorably to the fact that we are counting on them. In trusting them, she says, we rely on them to meet normative expectations—e.g., to provide “good service” or to “keep the public order,” and to do so with the awareness that they are being expected, and held accountable for, doing so.

Let’s start with the waiter. We may, to be sure, regard a waiter’s rudeness as compounding a disappointing evening. Along with the loud background noise, the long wait for a table, the salty food, it may leave us feeling annoyed or disgusted. But we might, additionally react to the waiter’s rudeness with resentment or indignation. We may, that is, hold him accountable for his failings. He has, after all, fallen short of meeting the normative expectations of him as a waiter that he be gracious and polite to diners at the restaurant. But does this short-falling alone account for a reaction of resentment or indignation? I want to suggest that in reacting to the waiter’s rudeness with resentment or indignation, we see his failure—his rudeness—not only as a normative failing, but as a normative failing that is demeaning of us.

Of course, Walker is saying that in many cases—in contrast to the case of the waiter—those we trust (or distrust) cannot be expected to have any specific kind of regard for us at all. We are nameless, faceless others for them, as they are for us. But while we are not “faceless” for the waiter, we may well be “nameless”—
that is, we may stand in a role-defined relationship to him, in which what is morally salient is not our individuality in its particularities, but the fact that we are customers. And as a waiter, one has normative responsibilities to customers, which our waiter failed to meet in being rude.

Surely, when as airline passengers we feel indignant and resentful in confronting lousy service, upset schedules, or poor communication from airline employees, we are not just annoyed or frustrated by a maddening situation; we are seeing the lousy service as a form of disregard. But we need not be reacting first and foremost to what we see as disregard for us as the particular individuals we are. We may feel we are being herded like cows, and experience the airline personnel as managing, manipulating, or—if we are lucky—assuaging us, regarding us more like things to be dealt with than as passengers who are people (despite the smiling faces in the ads and billboards inviting our trust).

Similarly, the failure of the police to “keep public order” may evoke indignation and resentment from crime victims (and others), not because the failure is seen as a personal affront or rebuff, but because it is seen to reveal a dismissive, disrespectful attitude toward those the protesters represent—in this case, perhaps, toward certain groups of citizens who rightly count on the police to value and pursue their safety yet feel their safety is not being sufficiently valued and protected.

Trust, even in relatively impersonal dependencies, is tied to the general expectation that those trusted will meet their responsibilities (satisfy normative expectations) among which is the responsibility to treat us with good will, with due regard—sometimes as the particular individuals we are, sometimes as occupants of a role, but always as people. What counts as “due regard,” is tied to the relational contexts, including the roles we occupy in relationship to one another; it is normative matter on which we often disagree. Part of trusting is that we rely on those we trust to share our understanding of the norms governing the domain of our trust. Finding out that they don’t may well be cause to cease trusting, to shift to a more vigilant, wary stance if we continue to rely on others at all.

Conclusion

Perhaps, if we are realistic, we should conclude that we must simply settle for (mere) reliance in many, even most, of our dependency relationships, especially those within the vast web of dependencies on others who remain faceless and nameless. Maybe this isn’t so bad. As Jones points out, “trust and distrust are contraries but not contradictories. One may fail to trust without actively distrusting ... [I]n between trust and distrust are found various forms of relying on and taking for granted which are not grounded in either optimism or pessimism about the other’s goodwill” (16). The absence of trust, that is, does not entail distrust. Yet,
I would hope that achieving (mere) reliance would not define our aspirations.

We are, as people, creatures with dignitary vulnerability. We should be realistic about how much “we actually mind, how much it matters to us,” as Strawson puts it so eloquently, “whether the actions of other people ... reflect attitudes towards us of goodwill ... on the one hand or contempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other” (2005, 76). All of us must live with conflicting expectations and pressures from others. And it is a brute reality that meeting the expectations of those who trust us can require making practical compromises and decisions that will disappoint them. In trusting, we have confidence that our interests or needs will not be forsaken too easily or for the wrong reasons by those we trust. This doesn’t, as noted earlier, entail an expectation that our interests and needs will, as such, be decisive for those we trust, but it does entail optimism that they will be given appropriate significance and weight. The diverse, and often complex, nature of our actual dependency relationships can make judgments about what counts appropriate significance and weight challenging, and subject to disagreement. But this is an important challenge to take on, to grapple with, in assessing the moral health of our dependencies. It is also a challenge that brings with it some of the moral risks of trust, especially in those relationships in which trust is most valuable. In the robustly moral sense, trust is tied to the expectation, whether explicit or peacefully presumed, articulate or inchoate, that we will not, in depending on others, regard them in merely instrumental terms, and that those on whom we depend will, likewise, show due regard for us.

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Notes

1 I wish to express thanks for the lively discussion of trust during my visit to SUNY Brockport, from which I learned a great deal. Special gratitude goes to Georges Dicker, for his hospitality, his keen reflections about trust (including self-trust) and his remarkable graciousness.

2 We also wonder sometimes whether we can trust ourselves. Self-trust raises important and fascinating questions in its own right, which are outside the scope of my discussion here.


4 See Margaret Walker (2006) for an excellent discussion of the distinction between “predictive” and “normative” expectations in the context of trust.

5 In her essay, “Trust and Terror” (2004) Jones herself comes to the view that a focus on goodwill is “too restrictive” to capture trust in all its varieties, in particular, what she calls “basal trust,” or a fundamental sense of safety in the world.

6 The rejection of goodwill-based accounts of trust is widely shared in recent accounts of trust. See, for example, Pettit (1995) and Hardin (2008).
Bibliography


