Stoic Equanimity in the Face of Torture

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Introduction

I begin with reflections of Jacobo Timerman, an Argentine Jew and editor and publisher of the newspaper La Opinion from 1971 until his arrest in April 1977 by an extremist faction of the Argentine Army. He was held captive for thirty months and tortured and interrogated inside the army’s clandestine prisons. He offers advice for those who may face torture:

Memory is the chief enemy of the solitary tortured man—nothing is more dangerous at such moments. But I managed to develop certain passivity-inducing devices for withstanding torture and anti-memory devices for those long hours in the solitary cell. I refused to remember anything that bore on life experience—I was a professional stoic dedicated to this task.¹

Timerman’s remarks point us to my specific interest in this paper—namely, stoic equanimity in torture. In particular, I want to ask: In what ways, if any, is stoic equanimity a plausible armor for enduring torture? More generally, is the case of torture instructive for understanding stoic equanimity as a more generalized kind of resilience and mode of well-being? Admittedly, I pick an extreme case, but I believe we can learn something about more ordinary cases by considering equanimity in the hard case.

As Timerman fashions it, his “professional stoicism” is a “mechanism of withdrawal” that helped him avoid lapsing into “that other mechanism of tortured solitary prisoners,” namely rapport building with a jailor or torturer (37).² This stoicism, as he put it, allowed him to cast aside “all logical emotions and sensations — fear, hatred, vengeance — for any emotion or sensation meant wasting useless energy” (35). Memories of his wife and children, and emotional longings for them, could only be viewed as “penetration from the outside world” that a victim of torture cannot afford to indulge. (85) “The image of my wife’s face is unbearable in this place” (84). If he is to survive, he must be a “blind architect,” reconstructing a world from the stimuli of his new, perverted environment — the moans and hysterical screams, the odor of the latrine that matches his own stench, the violent sound of metal and barking dogs, the constant shouting of guards meant to “intimidate and confuse prisoners” (83).

Timerman appeals to a popularized notion of being stoic as essentially a dissociation or splitting from painful aspects of reality that would either sap
one of mental energy or weaken control. My interest, here and more recently in
Stoic Warriors, is ancient Stoicism, as a philosophical doctrine of emotions and
a therapeutic set of tools. But certain aspects of popularized stoicism, perhaps
not surprisingly, bear relation to ancient versions. This shall become clearer
as we proceed. But first, I want to recall that another victim of 20th Century
torture, Jim Stockdale, relied in a studied and deliberate way on his reading of
ancient Stoicism as a survival tool. So in a prescient moment on September 9,
1965, James Stockdale, then a young naval aviator, muttered to himself as he
was shot down by the North Vietnamese, “Five years down there at least, I’m
leaving behind the world of technology and entering the world of Epictetus.” As
a graduate student at Stanford, Stockdale had received a copy of the Enchiridion
before deploying to Vietnam. In an uncanny way, he committed it to memory
and found himself relying on it routinely in what would become seven and one-
half years of imprisonment in the Hanoi Hilton, two and one-half years of which
were in solitary confinement. As head of the chain of command of POW’s in the
Hanoi Hilton, Stockdale made Stoicism the backbone of his leadership style.

By looking at examples and text, my ultimate focus will be on how and whether
a version of ancient Stoicism can defend against a fundamental vulnerability that
torture aims to lay bare—namely that one will use one’s will against oneself in
acts of collusion and self-betrayal. A Stoic, I suggest should argue that this, more
than physical and certain other psychological forms of abuse, is at the heart of
the specific moral challenge of torture,3 and something that should be of key
concern to any Stoic account. The discussion moves to this point.

But first, I proceed with a brief reminder of Stoicism’s break with Aristotelian
notions of eudaimonia (well-being), second, consider the Stoic conception of
apatheia (freedom from emotions) and the room it leaves for emotions, third take
up Stoic notions of physical pain and the endurance of bodily torture, and fourth
come to the challenge of torture as implicating the will in acts of self-betrayal.
Finally, I reverse perspectives and ask if Stoic apatheia might be used to train a
future torturer to become desensitized to the evil of torture. Ironically, Stoicism’s
most exportable lesson may be in averting that evil rather than in learning how
to endure, with equanimity, torture itself.

1. Stoicism’s Break with Aristotelian Eudaimonia

The ancient Greek Stoics break with the Aristotelian claim that eudaimonia,
well-being, happiness, or flourishing, is a matter of both the internal goods of
wisdom or virtue and the external goods, such as health, prosperity, honor, and
good fortune. If happiness is to be, as many ancient ethical theories stipulate,
not only the most complete and self-sufficient good, but also the most stable and
permanent human good,4 then it must be restricted to the excellent activity of

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one’s rational agency, namely virtue or wisdom. Moreover, ordinary emotions, such as pleasure and pain, desire and fear, and their many subtypes, in so far as they are paradigmatically attachments to external goods as important investments and aversions, will not be part of the sage’s moral psyche. The ancient criticism of this conception of well-being is clear in Cicero:

People come eagerly expecting to hear why pain is not an evil. The Stoics tell them that pain is a tough, unpleasant burden, contrary to nature and hard to bear—but not an evil, because it involves no wrongdoing, dishonesty or vice, no blameworthiness or cause for shame. Will anyone who hears this know whether to laugh or cry? They will certainly not leave any more resolute in enduring pain than when they arrived.5

The Stoic concession that Cicero is referring to—that pain is a “tough, unpleasant burden, contrary to nature”—is captured by the Stoic notion of the “indifferents.” Conventional (or external) goods and evils are roughly those that are in accord with or contrary to nature. So health is in accord with nature; disease or torture, contrary to it. Though these do not coincide with genuine good and evil (which are restricted to virtue and vice) and are thus “indifferents,” they are nonetheless things a sage selects and disselects, as “preferred” or “dispreferred.” Thus, the sage would prefer a life off the rack rather than on it. But even if the latter is his bad fortune, that fact ought not derail his virtue and thus, his well-being.

Ancient and modern readers alike have viewed this claim as wildly counterintuitive. Either the Stoics are guilty of a massive neologism, with the indifferents masquerading as a kind of (subordinate) happiness (with questions then raised as to the substantive difference between the Stoic and peripatetic i.e., Aristotelian, conceptions of happiness), or the Stoic view of well-being has no application to anything that resembles flesh and blood human beings. And yet, many reflective people draw, with varying degrees of success, on Stoic consolations. How do we assess these consolations and what are the plausible, exportable lessons?6

Stoicism’s underlying consolation is that the final good or happiness is a kind of apatheia, free from the stresses and perturbations of emotional investment in the vicissitudes of life. However, it is important for us to make clear that the sage’s apatheia is not an emotionless state, but rather is a kind of eupatheia—state of fine emotions. This becomes important for understanding what Stoic resilience under torture might look like.
2. Protoemotions and “Good Emotions”

There are two critical qualifications to the notion of sage-like freedom from emotions. First, the Stoics note that even the sage will experience protoemotional phenomena (propatheia) that are involuntary. These phenomena contrast with ordinary, full-fledged emotions, which, according to the Stoics’ cognitivist view, are voluntary and fully assented-to appraisals. So, they say, a sage may experience tremors and blushing, turn pallid or green when caught off-guard by a fright or sudden lapse of confidence. But a true sage never allows these protoemotions to turn into full emotions. He nips them in the bud. More accurately, he does not assent to the impulsive impressions.

Seneca’s On Anger (1st Century CE) and Aulis Gellius’s Attic Nights (2nd Century CE) are among the sources often cited for the doctrine of propatheia. So Seneca tells us that a preemotion of anger is that “first mental jolt which affects us when we think ourselves wronged. This steals upon us.” He continues by saying that we may be “incited” by the “martial sound of trumpets” or a “gruesome painting” or the “grim sight of the justest punishment.” “The fiercest soldier may tremble a little as the signal is given for battle;” “a great general’s heart is in his mouth before the lines have charged against one another.” But startles and jolts like this, momentary arousals, are not full emotions:

If anyone thinks that pallor, falling tears, sexual excitement or deep sighing, a sudden glint in the eyes or something similar are an indication of emotion or evidence for a mental state, he is wrong; he fails to see that these are just bodily agitations.

In short, preemotions lack “the mind’s assent” necessary for a full emotion. Aulus Gellius humorously narrates a similar view. He reports that he was aboard a ship with a Stoic when they were caught in a violent storm. The Stoic got jittery and grew pale, and Aulis asked him tactfully (after an uppity rich Greek, had asked him with less tact), How could this be? The eminent Stoic answered by appeal to the teachings of Epictetus: that even the mind of the sage “must shrink and feel alarm” at the occurrence of some terrifying sound or sight. But, he added, the sage never voluntarily assents to these impressions as genuine evils in the offing. “He rejects and scorns them.” He doesn’t see in them anything that ought to excite fear.”

A less noted, but insightful source is Philo of Alexandria (b. 20 BCE), himself unlikely to have had direct familiarity with the writings of either Seneca or Gellius, and so, most probably, an independent source of earlier, ancient Greek doctrine. Philo presents a version of the doctrine of protoemotions in his exegesis of Genesis. He asks us to consider Genesis 23.2-3. This is the passage,
recall, in which Abraham appears to grieve over the death of Sarah: “Abraham came to bewail Sarah and to mourn.” However, according to Philo’s Stoic gloss, if Abraham is to be an allegorical paragon of the Stoic sage, then he cannot be grieving in the ordinary sense. So Philo stresses in his exegesis that since Abraham merely “came there to grieve,” he did not actually grieve. He had time, after being aroused by a seductive impression, to withhold full assent to the impression:

> But excellent and carefully does (Scripture) show that the virtuous man did not resort to wailing or mourning but only **came there** for some such thing. For things that unexpectedly and against his will strike the pusillanimous man weaken, crush, and overthrow him, whereas everywhere they merely bow down the man of constancy when they direct their blows against him, and not in such a way as to bring (their work) to completion, since they are strongly repelled by the guiding reason and retreat.” (QGen 4.73; italics added)

Philo equally urges that the practitioner of devotional prayer should follow Abraham’s model:

> And so it is not fitting for a man devoted to moral excellence to stand (fixed) in prayer when something happens against his will or to be entirely rapt and moved and drawn toward this, but he should somewhat gradually go toward it, and retire before the end is reached. (QGen.4.73)

So at those moments when the devotee of virtue begins to be aroused by anger, grief, fear, or in the case at hand, the piety of prayer, if sufficiently advanced in moral progress, he can resist and reinsert his agency. In the above passage, Philo explicates in the language of physical movement—to go toward but retire before reaching. In other places, he makes clear that the giving of assent is what is critical. Thus, in Genesis 17 Abraham laughs when he thinks to himself that he, a centenarian, is going to father a child. For Philo’s purposes, it is critical that Abraham is only **thinking** the thoughts that make him laugh (QGen III.56). Entertaining a thought is not asserting it. The laugh is not the real thing, but only a potential prelude to it that Abraham, as sage, can resist: “words spoken by tongue and mouth fall under transgressions and punishment. But those which are in the mind are not at all guilty.”

Thus, emotional prearousals are, according to Stoic doctrine, meant to be compatible with sage-like equanimity. Whether we draw the line as the Stoics do and call such arousals emotions or not, the Stoic point is that these kind of
affective phenomena, unlike more robust emotions, are involuntary and can be shaken off quickly. Of course, we might disagree on both counts. We might argue that many emotions proper, and not just physiological arousals at the penumbra of emotional experience (like starts and startles), have an element of the involuntary. Moreover, even if we restrict ourselves to starts and startles, we might challenge the assumption that the most resolute sorts of subjects can regain control after undergoing the most violent versions of these jolts. Torture seems to be a lab for just that kind of experiment.

Indeed, one would expect that there is a substantive difference between prolonged and/or harsh exposure to what psychologists call “traumatic stressors” and more titrated exposures in relatively controlled conditions (such as perhaps administered to those who are learning how to survive torture, for example, in training schools\textsuperscript{12}). It is not hard to imagine that even the most resilient Stoic sage would suffer degraded capacities for resistance after chronic exposure to the tools of terror.

Seneca, though ever eager to downplay many varieties of fear as idle, and himself a firm believer that rehearsing dreaded evils in advance can remove much of the shock and awe that is part of terror, seems to agree that torture, and in particular, its “visuals” — the “spectacle” and “paraphernalia” of “the violence of the stronger” — are effective methods for engendering dread, even in those practiced to resist:

Picture to yourself under this head the prison, the cross, the rack, the hook, and the stake which they drive straight through a man until it protrudes from his throat. Think of human limbs torn apart by chariots driven in opposite directions, of the terrible shirt smeared and interwoven with inflammable materials, and of all the other contrivances devised by cruelty .... It is not surprising, then, if our greatest terror is of such a fate; for it comes in many shapes and its paraphernalia are terrifying .... Other troubles are not less serious .... they are, however, secret; they have no bluster and no heralding, but these, like huge arrays of war, prevail by virtue of their display and their equipment\textsuperscript{13}

Seneca’s remarks are, in part, a salvo to his countrymen on the “cruel contrivances” to which Rome has grown accustomed for sport entertainment, notably gladiator games that draw the rich and poor alike to the Coliseum. (We might take similar heed to revelations of our own recent practices of torture for sadistic sport, show of dominance, or interrogation.) But Seneca’s observations are also prescient in understanding why the spectacle of torture can psychologically traumatize its victims. Certain threats and encounters with violence are traumatic,
Judith Herman instructs in her landmark 1992 book, *Trauma and Recovery*, “because they overwhelm the ordinary human adaptations to life.” Here, Seneca anticipates this general point. “Displays” of imminent and intimate brutality “coerce and master the mind,” leaving us powerless. They overwhelm the human capacity for coping. The brute and violent images—“the disembowelled entrails of men,” “human limbs torn apart by chariots,” “the cross,” “the rack,” “the hook,” “the stake,”—all are meant to convey that human sensory and reactive capacities can absorb only so much before shutting down in terror.

Seneca seems to be pointing to a kind of torture that has as a principal function spectacle and the show of power. Perhaps this, or torture primarily for the end of satisfying the sadistic needs of the torturer, is harder to endure than torture for the purpose of extracting intelligence, where the victim may believe, correctly or not, that he has some control in stopping the torture. Also, Seneca would have us believe that torture that introduces novel methods, which one could not in any way, physically or psychologically, prerehear, would leave one less resistant. This seems to make sense. But the critical point is that he seems to acknowledge that some impressions of dread, lead not only to jolts and shocks, but full-blooded terror in the most resistant person. Even if the responses are involuntary, in the sense that impressions are not assented to as representing genuine evils, they nonetheless grip, last, and are not easily thrown overboard.

While the Stoics introduce protoemotions as a way to marginalize counterexamples of wayward emotional arousal, they introduce “good emotions” or *eupatheiai* as a way positively to insert types of emotions that are consistent with and constitutive of a sage’s, calm life. “Good emotions” are the cultivated emotions that track recalibrated values and that replace ordinary emotions. Thus, the sage is not insensible, but moved by a new, more equable kind of feeling. The new emotions correspond in rough, taxonomic type to the old emotions. So the Stoics carve ordinary emotions into four basic genera—desire and fear, pleasure and distress. These and their many subspecies are responses to apparent goods and evils in the offing, as in the case of desire and fear, or apparent goods and evils in the present, as in the case of pleasure and distress. The eupathic versions are meant to retain some of the feel of emotions, but without their excess and misappraisals. They are experienced as calm, equable, smooth and fully rational or “consistent.” More specifically, in lieu of fear will be caution (*eulabeia*), described in some texts “as well-reasoned shrinking” or “avoidance” (*ekklisis*); in lieu of desire will be rational wish (*boulēsis*), described as “well-reasoned stretching” or “desiring” (*orexis*); in lieu of pleasure will be joy (*chara*) or “well-reasoned swelling” (*eparis*). Significantly, there is no correlate to distress in the new taxonomy. And why? Cicero suggests that the sage, constitutionally, can do no evil and so will never experience the sort of distress or dejection that comes with doing it.

In this sense, there is nothing parallel to a nonsage’s regret, remorse, or shame.
This will become important in a moment.

How to construe “good emotions” is left vague in the texts. But one possible interpretation is that they still track (or “respond to”) external goods, but appreciated as indifferents, and so as investments calibrated correctly in the proper hierarchy of goods. Alternatively, they are responses only to genuine good and evil, e.g., the striving to promote (or having strived to promote) virtue in oneself and others (in the case of wish and joy) and of striving to avoid vice (in the case of caution). On the latter interpretation, emotional attachment to indifferents is replaced by emotionless “selections and disselections.” But this second interpretation leaves us wondering whether a sage really still traffics, in any humanly recognizable way, in the ebb and flow of daily life.¹⁹

One way to assuage concerns here is to combine the two interpretations. Rational caution, so interpreted, is not just be an abstract aversion to the possibility of future vice (“not having any of it,” so to speak), but wariness experienced precisely on those occasions that give rise to fear in others and cause them to buckle. It is a caution that warns a sage to steel himself against temptation in those circumstances where others succumb to fear of death, for example, or physical pain from torture.²⁰ In this sense, the sage is not somehow fully inured to the dread of torture, but is able to see it as a circumstance that calls forth caution against that very response that might make him yield to a torturer too fast, or on terms that don’t exercise as much agency as possible.

It is instructive to consider Philo again. His text concerns Sarah’s laughter when she, like Abraham, contemplates having a child at her ripe age (Gen 18.12-15). Philo says that her laugh catches her on the cusp of a transitional leap before achieving sage-like calm: “The mind, which was about to be filled with joy and divine laughter, had not yet been freed from sorrow, fear, sense pleasure and desire, by which it is shaken and compelled to stagger.” Once she does learn that more perfect joy, the joy will be like that of the “high priest,” who “rejoicing inwardly” is released from corporeal thoughts. (QGen 4.15 –16). True, she may still, on occasion, express an involuntary “protoemotion” of laughter, but this won’t count against her status. It will be more like an old scar than a fresh wound. Sage-like laughter is at play, again, in Philo’s On Abraham XXXVI. The context is the explanation of Isaac’s name and God’s command to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac:

This laughter is not understood to be that laughter of the body which is frequent in childish sport, but is the result of a settled happiness and rejoicing of the mind. This kind of laughter the wise man is appropriately said to offer as a sacrifice to God; showing thus, by a figure, that to rejoice does properly belong to God alone. For the human race is subject to sorrow and to
exceeding fear, from evils which are either present or expected, so that men are either grieved at unexpected evils actually pressing upon them, or are kept in suspense, and disquietude, and fear with respect to those which are impending. But the nature of God is free from grief, and exempt from fear, and enjoys an immunity from every kind of suffering, and is the only nature which possesses complete happiness and blessedness. 21

We may wonder about the appropriateness of laughter, divine or not, as a response to the demand to sacrifice a child. But that aside, what seems unequivocal is that torture is hardly the occasion for laughter. And so what of the normative position that a sage exhibit only equable, calm emotions, no fear or pain/distress, in enduring torture?

As we noted earlier, there is nothing in a sage’s moral psyche parallel to a nonsage’s regret, remorse, or shame. Moral distress, understood as a reaction to voluntary wrongdoing or the misuse in some way of one’s will, is simply not within the sage’s constitutional capacity. For as a part of his moral trajectory and achievement, he will have outgrown the capacity for wrongdoing and misuse. Obviously, this restricted conception of distress leaves to the side the wide swath of ordinary distress feelings that seem rightly to record moral outrage or anger in response to the wrongdoing of others and to the suffering of innocents. Equally, it leaves to the side a sense of pained pity and empathy at tragic suffering in general. The absence of these emotions sharpens the picture of the sage: He will not invest in what lies outside his rational will, or its exercise, or that is a clearly futile use of it. True, if there are things that he or others can do to ameliorate suffering or right injustice, then he will “rationally desire” them and this (boulēsis) will be the appropriate attitude informing and propelling such action.22 He will not require any extra “umph” from distress (which, in any event, by stipulation, he is not entitled to feel). And too, he will properly feel rational caution (labeia), warning him of any stray temptations that might lead to moral transgressions or prudential missteps along the way. Additionally, like Abraham and Sarah, he will likely feel rational joy (chara), even laughter, supervening on his goodness. But to the degree that proper distress has as its object one’s own abuse or misuse of practical reason, the sage will, by definition, experience none of that.

But this leaves us in the lurch about the case of torture. Is it plausible to assume that the most resilient torture victim’s profound dread of social isolation, of prolonged shackling and stress positions, of being made to feel as if drowning, will, in the case of a sage, fully resolve into something more manageable and agential—say, steadfast caution in these circumstances of allying with a torturer or of over-identifying with one’s body? Is it reasonable to assume that all other residue will just be the twinges or “scars,” as some of the texts say, of old emotional
habits manifest in involuntary preemotional expression? It is undoubtedly true that rational caution or vigilance are important to cultivate, especially, in circumstances, such as torture, where one is at peril of colluding against oneself and others to whom one is loyal. And it may be that the most resilient do cultivate that kind of wily vigilance. (Stockdale once described his POW mindset to me in the terms of Solzhenitsyn’s Ivan Denisovich—as a “slow moving cagery prisoner.” Another VN POW told me that he kept in his head a long list of dead baseball players and routinely gave out only those names when his captors demanded intelligence. But it is too quick to think that wily caution fully replaces (or we might say, sublimes) the expression of dread or pain when one is thoroughly vulnerable, i.e., helpless. What of ordinary fear about the state of one’s family at home, or anxiety about its means for livelihood? Will these, in the case of the sage, reasonably be restricted to only protoemotional phenomena, experiences beneath the threshold of proper emotions, of which one can then say, “to me I say they are nothing?”

Dread is anticipatory. What about feelings that are retrospective, such as shame that one has broken and revealed information, or shame that one has sought comfort in rapport with a torturer that leaves one vulnerable? What of shame that one has come to see oneself with contempt, through the eyes of the torturer? Surely, we want some instruction and, moreover, understanding about emotions that are responses to being caught in the helplessness of torture or cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment — of being forced to do things or experience things that are demeaning and that one profoundly disavows (as in a Muslim, chained to the floor, while a woman interrogator smears what appears to be menstrual blood on his face.)

In a provocative and insightful article on the genesis of shame, David Velleman argues that shame is the morally appropriate response to a sense of compromised self-presentation. Shame is a failure to control one’s public persona, “a compromise of efforts at self-presentation.” He explores, in part, why shame is connected to exposures of the private and argues that this has less to do with public disapproval or violation of norms than with a failure of efforts to control what one presents to the public. What is key for our purposes is that shame has to do with compromises of agency. To claim that a sage would never be in the position to express the emotions of such compromise seems to produce an ego ideal that has a limited use, ironically, in an exhortative philosophy that is, by and large, dedicated to the production of concrete moral exemplars via historical example and epistolary and meditative exercise. Seneca, certainly, is a letter writer and nightly meditator who reminds himself and his addressee that he is both the “doctor” and the “patient,” a progressor on the journey of moral enlightenment, but by no means, one who has or will ever arrive. And so we want lessons for the advanced progressor, even if the sage cannot offer them.
As in most of life, and here in the extreme, we want to know how to comply with norms in nonideal worlds. “There are no virgins here,” Stockdale once told a POW who felt tremendous shame for having broken when he “took the ropes.” Stockdale’s point was that this man’s shame was understandable, and a morally appropriate response to being coerced to do what he found ignominious. Stoicism may, of course, hold out suicide as the option in cases where one’s will is so restricted that meaningful autonomy is impossible (for Kant, suicide seems restricted to cases where the commission of grave iniquity against others is the only resort.) I cannot fully explore those themes here, except to note that one longs for some kind of Stoic discussion of tragic hamartia (error or misdeed) of the sort Aristotle offers in recognition of the fate of good persons in tragic circumstances.

3. Stoics on the Body in Pain

We tend to think of a Stoic sage as finding a sliver of meaningful agency even in the moment of the most abject helplessness. But there is a flip side to this, and that is that finding that modicum of agency requires stripping away everything that one can’t master. It requires drawing a bright stripe between what is and what is not within one’s power. And, so perhaps the Stoics would have us envision torture as less a case of vulnerable agency, than a case of involuntary experience, whether as prolonged protoemotions in response to stimuli that overwhelm the system or on some other model. The Stoic view of the body becomes critical to this picture. Perhaps we are to imagine the pain of physical and psychological torture as passive events. The agent becomes totally a patient, the recipient of another’s will, and in the extreme, a disembodied medium in which things happen.

The view seems counterintuitive. Pain is in my body; it is mine; it forces consciousness upon me; it disturbs, awakens one out of any passivity or calm. It forces me to heed it, to assuage it. It takes command and forces an agenda of what I can or will do to make it stop. And yet the also familiar view of pain as alienated experience focuses on an aspect of Stoic doctrine. The body is an indifferent. And while the sage would rather have a healthy body than a feeble or thoroughly broken one, and will select prudentially for those outcomes, bodily strength and physical well-being are not themselves elements of happiness. The body is not identified with the self or with one’s ultimate good. There is no sense of the Freudian bodily ego — a sense of “me” in my body and my body as the frontier of self:

When you wish your body to be sound, is it in your own power, or is it not? — ‘It is not.’ When you wish it to be healthy? — ‘Nor
theirs. When you wish it to be handsome? — ‘Nor this.’ And to live, or die? — ‘Nor this.’ Our body, then, is not our own, but subject to everything stronger than itself.29

The body is itself an external, which in virtue of its needs and desires, is encumbered by a further layer of externals. Hunger, thirst, and sexual urges direct us outward and make us dependent on what we find and lose:30

Is your poor body, then, enslaved or free?... Do you not know that it is a slave to fever, gout, eye-disease, dysentery; to a tyrant; of fire, and steel; to everything that is stronger than itself? –Yes, it is a slave. How then can anything belonging to the body be unhindered?31

You ought to treat your entire body like a poor, overburdened ass, as long as it is possible, as long as it is allowed you; but if it pressed into public service and a soldier should lay hold of it, let it go. Do not resist or mutter, otherwise you will get a beating, and lose your poor ass just the same. When this is the way in which you should conduct yourself with regard to the body, consider what is left for you to do about the things that are procured for the sake of the body. If the body be a little ass, those other things become bridle, packsaddles, shoes, barley, fodder for the ass. Let these go too; dismiss them more quickly and more cheerfully than the little ass itself.32

As bodies, we are little donkeys, weighted down by our worldly loads. We hold tight to those material loads, though they enslave as much as nurture. In essence, bodily well-being is excluded from happiness because it is not an unequivocal good. Reissuing a Platonic argument, the Stoics argue that goods like physical health and strength can be used for good or ill, in a way that genuine virtues cannot. So Epictetus asks, “Is health a good, and sickness an evil? No. What, then? Health is good when used well, and bad when used ill.”33

Cicero registers a blunt complaint about the view: The Stoics “show concern for nothing but the mind, as if human beings had no body.”34 “When it comes to a happy life,” the Stoics simply argue that “the amount of bodily advantage has no relevance at all.”35

The Stoics may be right to suggest that there are ways of making some experiences of trauma or pain, if not fully passive events, then tolerable, by spiritual or metaphysical transcendence and sublimation, (or less conscious psychological and hypnotic defenses of dissociation, splitting, and amnesia, or
the physiological anesthesia that pain may deliver as its own medicine). Women who have been raped often report a sense of dissociating from their bodies: It is not me who is being violated. The trauma of the “out of body experience” may become a trope for how other physical injuries become experienced, even when they are not violations of dignity, in the way that rape is. (So Wynona Ward, a lawyer and advocate for abused women and herself a victim of repeated sexual child abuse told me once that after a car accident in which she badly injured her leg, she reported to the doctor that she was experiencing no pain. Her leg did not even seem to be a part of her. She explained this to me as an attitude of disembodiment she had internalized after years of abuse by her father.)

But what is involved in many experiences of rape is the conflict that one is being forcibly and brutally acted upon, without consent or the possibility of retaliation and yet that one is a player in the drama, acquiescing, giving parts of one’s body to another for their use. The passivity/complicity poles can produce a sense of disgust and shame—disgust at the alienated and polluted body that can long retain the marks of a rapist’s will, and shame that through comportment, appearance, gesture, plan of route, one was an agent in the act, however compromised that agency. In other cases the shame is not so much about complicity as a failure (sometimes viewed by self as culpable) to block any sign or impression of complicity—e.g., as expressed in such thoughts as “one could have or should have been able to resist in some way.”

Torture can reveal a similar inner conflict. In addition to the physical and psychological pain of torture, there is the anguish of experiencing oneself as complicit in one’s own torture. One may view oneself as accepting the terms of that existence and at once a resister and a subscriber, or ally in one’s own torture. Here I think about the voice of a freed Guantanamo detainee from the UK, who explained (in a historic moment of actually hearing the voices of Guantanamo) the kind of actions that landed him in solitary isolation for a month. He had been punished for “hogging” an apple at mealtime — (he “hogged” it, he explained, because he thought he might become “peckish” later on). His choice of words is revealing. A schoolboy’s prank, hogging because you might become peckish, lands you, in this perverted world of Gitmo, in the soulless hell of solitary confinement. His sarcastic words mock the cruelty of the punishment. And yet those words betray some sense of culpability — that he knew the rules and took a costly risk when he could easily have subordinated his urges. He lives in two worlds, one in which he rebels against the perverted sense of justice in order to keep sane, another in which he is forced to accept its rules and regulate his wants, needs, and actions according to its logic.

Even successful resistance may stand at the edge of an experience of being free and complicit. As a victim of torture one structures one’s agenda and agency around reading and outsmarting the will of one’s tormentor and the Spartan
environment of one’s torture. As Timerman put it, I became a “blind architect”
of the world of my torment,39 “blind” in that he had to make sense both of its
overwhelming yet perverse and impoverished stimuli. There is participation in
the perverted world and possible mastery in it. But there is a flip side. When a
prisoner is kept for weeks in clothes caked with blood, reeking of the stench of
urine and feces, the disgust of the tormentor can become one’s own. Moreover,
for those deprived for months on end of meaningful human connection, the
connection with an interrogator, and his will, threatens to become the perverted
form of rapport. This is precisely what the interrogator aims to exploit.

These examples illustrate that resisting torture is not primarily or simply a
matter of dissociating from bodily (or psychological) pain. (Though a conception
of torture as just extreme pain is what the notorious Jay Bybee “torture memo”
to Alberto Gonzalez memo seems have suggested.)40 Torture is trauma, physical
and psychological, but not just trauma. It invokes one’s agency in the very
experience of helplessness. In this sense it is an environment, par excellence, in
which to be Stoic and show effort and mastery. But it is also an environment
of severely compromised agency, and of experiencing one’s very agency as both
internalizing the perverted governance and attitudes of one’s torturers and of
being frustrated in one’s independent resistance of them.

4. Torture and the will

In emphasizing detachment from the body and emotions, the Stoics seem to
minimize the potential risk of the torture victim in compromises of agency and
the concomitant emotions that are appropriate responses to that compromise. In
Stockdale’s own Stoic lab, he emphasizes the positive moments of mastery and
resistance: He did sit-ups in leg-irons, he commanded an active chain-of-command
within the cell block from solitary confinement, he devised ways to bloody himself
so he would not be paraded on TV as a propaganda item, he instructed others
on how to resist in similar ways — much of this conveyed through code tapped on
walls, swished in the sound of brushes against the inside of a “crap” bucket, and
so on. These are all acts of resistance, attempts to resist the collusion and rapport
that the torturer wants so desperately as the preferred method of conducting
business. Timerman similarly describes resisting the wished for omnipotence of a
torturer.41 Omnipotence manifests itself in the conversion of “dirty, dark, gloomy
places into a universe of spontaneous innovation,” with the unfettered torturer
the author of ever new ignominious forms of torture and degradation:

In some ways he needs to demonstrate to me and to himself
his capacity to grant things, to alter my world, my situation.
To demonstrate to me that I need things that are inaccessible
to me and which only he can provide .... One feels tempted to combat this tendency on the part of the torturers, to confront it as almost a unique possibility for feeling oneself to be alive; yet such futile battles lead to nought. It’s best to acknowledge and accept the torturers’ omnipotence in such unimportant matters. (41)

The implication is that some types of acquiescence to the torturer’s omnipotence will not be self-annihilating; others may. It is a matter of picking and choosing one’s battles.

But of course the choices aren’t always one’s own and some moments pick themselves and one colludes without particular caution or wariness. So Timerman tells of a guard passing in front of a Jewish male prisoner, standing naked, with his circumcised penis exposed to the torturers’ gaze:

A guard passes in front of an elderly Jew and makes a joke about his circumcised penis—his clipped prick. The Jew smiles, too, and blushes. As if apologizing. Or at least that’s how it strikes the guard, who dismisses it with a gesture. The old man looks at me, again blushes, and I have the sense that he is trying to explain things to me. (67)

Two successive glances, almost simultaneous. The guard imagines he’s being asked forgiveness. I imagine that I’m being implored to understand. The guard forgives him. I understand him. (67)

The glimpse is painful, though if lines can be drawn, this is more a scene of degradation than torture, by most definitions. It is not a scene of abject helplessness, neither in the face of violent physical abuse, nor in the face of extreme psychological stressors—as in being exposed to constant loud music or screaming, or short shackled to the floor with unmuzzled dogs barking at one’s face, or submerged in water and made to feel as if one is drowning. Rather, it is a scene in which an elderly man is publicly exposed, has no fig leaf to cover his naked appearance, and in this moment, takes on the guard’s view of his corporal depravity. He apologizes for his “clipped prick,” he asks for forgiveness, and then he asks his fellow Jew to understand his shame and betrayal.

We can imagine moments like this outside the context of torture. They are moments of shame and humiliation, more generally, moments, where, again to appeal to Velleman’s model, one has lost or been compromised in the ability adequately to control one’s public persona. In the case of torture, the means of self-presentation are thoroughly compromised. One is at the mercy of another’s
gaze, will, and power, in how one controls one’s body, its needs, its grooming and posture, one’s sleep pattern, ritual and religious practices, social contact, family ties and the like.⁴²

Here, the elderly Jew represents himself through the eyes of the guard, though he knows those eyes mercilessly distort. Nonetheless, he has come to measure himself through their gaze. He is ashamed of what he sees and that he sees through these distorted lens. He seeks forgiveness for how he sees and what he sees. And then is ashamed of his shame before his fellow Jew.

These examples are about the distress of having respect taken away through contempt and then an internalization of that contempt in self-contempt. They represent an undermining of rational agency not specific to torture but characteristic of some aspects of it. Consider a different kind of case — being prevented from exercising control of body functions that are typically loci of self-control. Again, from detainees just released from Guantanamo, I heard first hand of their ordeal of being “processed” by U. S. troops at Bagram air field base for eight to ten hours, skimpily dressed in freezing cold weather; of being made to walk in circles with bare feet on sand mixed with shards of glass without being allowed to use toilets; of urinating and defecating on themselves, and of then being shackled in stress positions for a 10 hour flight to Guantanamo Bay—hooded, eyes taped, and again without being allowed to relieve themselves except on themselves.

Peeing or shitting on oneself, because one is denied more decent forms of relief, is a salient form of experiencing oneself as an agent without agency—one lets oneself do it; the case is not like that of a toddler who has not yet mastered bladder or sphincter control or an infirm person who has lost it. This is actively doing it (and of willfully controlling it up to a certain point), and yet it is being made to do it on oneself. It is experiencing oneself as helpless in that agency. And it is humiliating.

Here what is vulnerable is the will and the psychological distress of using that will against oneself. Even if one is somehow dissociated from one’s body and its pain, as a Stoic may be, and identified, rather, with one’s will and affective attitude toward it, this is still an affront. It is a misuse of one’s will. One is an agent, but consigned to use that agency in a betrayal of what one knows, in principle, is still a matter of one’s control.

“The chair,” the latest device in forcefeeding hunger striking detainees, presents a slightly different case of force and collusion. A decision to go on hunger strike is itself a complicated matter, and depending on varying circumstances, may or may not be an autonomous or reflective choice. But assume a striker makes such a choice in a modestly reflective way and accepts, or better, acquiesces to the consequence, in the sense of not forcibly protesting, the anesthetized insertion of feeding tubes in one’s nose. In the current cases, one can imagine that what
the victim was unlikely to have accepted as part of the anticipated bargain, is that he would be strapped to a chair, prevented from movement or purging, force fed diuretics and laxatives, and then forced to urinate and defecate on oneself. Here the issue, again, is less about physical pain than a particular form of psychological anguish—namely, anguish directed at the perversion of one’s will experienced as if at one’s own hands. A cruel mockery is made of the victim’s attempt to take charge of his body by a hunger strike. Inserting a feeding tube is itself a way to undermine that agency. Making the victim then defecate on himself is a way of getting him to experience himself as colluding in the mockery. It is also a way to get hunger strikers to stop striking.

J. M. Coetzee gives insight into the phenomenon in his powerful fictional description of the old South African magistrate, who as punishment for consorting with a Barbarian woman, himself becomes tortured like the Barbarians:

In my suffering there is nothing ennobling. Little of what I call suffering is even pain. What I am made to undergo is subjection to the most rudimentary needs of my body: to drink, to relieve itself, to find the posture in which it is least sore. When Warrant Officer Mandel and his man first brought me back here and lit the lamp and closed the door, I wondered how much pain a plump comfortable old man would be able to endure in the name of his eccentric notions of how the Empire should conduct itself. But my torturers were not interested in degrees of pain. They were interested only in demonstrating to me what it meant to live in a body, as a body, a body which can entertain notions of justice only as long as it is whole and well, which very soon forgets them when its head is gripped and a pipe is pushed down its gullet and pints of salt water are poured into it till it coughs and retches and flails and voids itself. (Waiting for the Barbarians, 115; italics added.)

In Coetzee’s example of the torture victim, the body and experience of pain have become alien. Living in the body becomes a matter of giving up the body to the designs and caprice of the torturer’s ordeal—to being drowned in salt water and then flailing and voiding itself. The ordeal, from which there is no physical escape (and only possible psychological distance), is about dehumanization in the most basic areas of human control—“to drink, to relieve oneself, to find the posture in which one is least sore.” These are the vulnerabilities, burdens of a body, as Epictetus warns. His Stoic consolation is that we can learn to say, and come to believe, that “they are nothing to me.” In short, one can practice the indifference that trauma might induce. That indifference may be adaptive in enduring torture and ordeals. But it perverts a healthy sense of how we live in a body that we, and not an omnipotent tormentor, use to express our intentions.
emotions, and will.

5. Concluding Thoughts: Becoming a torturer

It would seem, then, that a broadly Stoic view still leaves a torture victim vulnerable to being forced to use one’s agency against oneself in the most degrading ways. (To claim that this is viable mastery, just because it is active use of one’s will, is a perversion of what mastery is about.) In this sense, Stoic armor has its limits. Perhaps not surprisingly, Stoicism’s more durable lesson may be in averting the temptation to inflict torture rather than in enduring it in a bulletproof way.

The point seems an obvious one. But in closing I want to say a few words. It might be argued, and has been argued, that a training in Stoicism where one learns to toughen oneself up (“suck it up”, to put it less politely) in the face of pain and deprivation is a good training ground for torture.45 In a contemporary version of the argument, some have claimed that training in torture resistance schools (of the sort many soldiers and special operations forces go through, such as at Fort Bragg’s SERE—“survival, evasion, resistance, escape”—school) is at once a training in becoming a torturer.46 It is easy to see the flaw in this argument, but it is worth pointing it out in Stoic terms.

Stoicism teaches toughening and detachment from the body not so that one can become indifferent to intentionally inflicting harm on others, but so that one can better endure one’s own frailty. Of course one may always use any skill for good or ill. This is a cornerstone of Socratic teaching.47 The Stoics are committed to the related thesis that indifferents are indifferents precisely because they are not unconditionally good or evil in their own right. Their goodness is conditional and must be regulated from outside by virtue or wisdom. The point is a general one. The skills of resistance in the hands of the wrong person can lead to torture. So too the medical science of trauma in the hands of a psychologist advising on torture can become a tool not of healing but of harming. The Stoics are far from simpleminded about the challenge of subordinating goods to the work of virtue. Indeed, here is where Stoic notions of the attitudes and emotions of virtue, the “equable” emotions, so to speak, may play their strongest role: A good person feels and registers the pull of institutional pressures and the forces of others’ evil. But for her, it is a moment to beware and to be wary, to take stock, rather than to be afraid or capitulate to those pressures. It is a moment to hold tight to one’s virtue. Still, the cost of standing one’s ground may be high. And the Stoics may indeed underestimate, as I have said in this paper, just what enduring others’ evil may involve, including how that evil may exploit one’s own will.

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Endnotes

1  *Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number*, NY: Knopf, 1981, 36; italics added.


3  For a very stimulating discussion of this, which very much inspires my own discussion, see David Sussman’s “What is Wrong with Torture,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 33:1 (January 2005), 1-33.

4  See Aristotle, NE I.7.


6  David Velleman used this felicitous phrase in a talk at Georgetown University.


10  So in *On Anger*, II.1, Seneca calls these phenomena *proludentia affectibus*.

11  Recall here Augustine’s problem of nighttime erections and seminal fluids. Is he in control or not? The Stoics, as with Aristotle in *De Motu Animalium*, would argue no, it is involuntary movement. But Augustine, notes Richard Sorabji, due to a misunderstanding of a text by Gellius Atticus, concluded that these were real
voluntary emotions and actions. And so follows much Christian teaching about male erections! Aquinas is clearer that the male nocturnal emissions, is only a first movement, an involuntary "preemotional" impulse. See Richard Sorabji, Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

12 Such as the U.S. SERE course at Fort Bragg.


14 Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery, New York: Basic, 1992, 33.


16 This move brings to mind Kant’s pathological emotions and their "practical" counterparts in the person of virtue.


18 Tusculan Disputations 3.77.

19 This is the concern of John Cooper in “The Emotional Life of the Wise,” available on his website, http://www.princeton.edu/~johncoop/Papers/Stoics-EmotionalLife12.04.pdf. I am grateful to him for correspondence on these questions.

20 See Cooper for a development of this notion. In this sense, it is a bit like Freud’s notion of signal anxiety—a warning signal to defend oneself against a possible conflict or temptation.


23 Most Holocaust survivors tell of how clever use of their skills and some moxi were factors that kept them alive. See Jean Améry on the predicament of the intellectual who does not have always have those concrete skills, At the Mind’s

On this view, shame is not, as it is traditionally understood, the failure to reach an image of self-perfection or ego ideal. Rather, it is about a failure of agency: “Threats to your standing as a self-presenting creature are thus a source of deep anxiety, and anxiety about the threatened loss of that standing is, in my view, what constitutes the emotion of shame.”

To be clear, the ordeal was not pretty: “They would start by clanging a big heavy iron bar down [about eighty or ninety pounds in weight], and then tie your feet to it so that you couldn’t lift it. Then they’d sit you up and jackknife you over and tighten the ropes around your arms. Next, they’d put you through extortions to the point that they would be pulling the rope so hard that the blood circulation in your upper chest would shut off.” At this point, the guard would then dig his heels into the back of your head and push your nose into the cement. With panic and claustrophobia setting in, the prisoners could be made to blurt out information, some of which would be false, but other bits of which would be true. The confession was followed by a “cold soak” —six or eight weeks of total isolation “to contemplate one’s crimes.” Still the evil that stuck in his mind years after, was losing one’s will to the torturer. This was the source of shame and showed up the bare limits of control of one’s agency. From an interview with Stockdale.

The latter is Kant’s restricted understanding of permissible suicide.


Ibid. 1.1.9.

Ibid. 3.22.40-41.

Ibid. 4.1.78-80.

Ibid. 3.20.4.

On Moral Ends, Woolf trans., Annas ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 4.36. Interestingly, from a metaphysical point of view, the Stoics were physicalists in their conception of what mind actually is; it is pneuma, or breath, an animating, fine material.
35 On Moral Ends 3.43.
36 From Wynona Ward, in conversation.
37 Hence, often the effectiveness of cognitive, behavioral therapy (CBT) in re-scripting just what one’s agency was.
41 Timerman, 40-1.
42 In a less extreme yet related way, Sandra Bartky has argued that women often experience shame about their inferior abilities, though they do not assent to the belief that they are inferior. The shame has at its core the experience of being complicit with a noxious view of oneself that is conveyed in tacit body presentation. In Bartky’s classroom example, women hand in their papers, with inferiority and deference written in their body language, though they reject the explicit belief of their inferiority. In Bartky, Feminity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression. New York: Routledge, 1990.
43 As given in an account by retired Brigadier General Stephen Xenakis, former commander of the Army and senior Army medical officer: “The Voices of Guantanamo,” GW Law School, March 20. 2006; covered on CSPAN.
44 So a detainee lawyer told me that her client, after hearing screaming in an adjoining cell from a detainee strapped to the chair, said “I won’t strike again if it amounts to torture.” From conversations with Kristine Huskey, March 24, 2006.
47 See Euthedemus 280b7-281e1; 281e3-5.