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Nigel B. Crowther
University of Western Ontario

Robert K. Barney
University of Western Ontario

Michael K. Heine
University of Western Ontario

Cesar R. Torres
The College at Brockport, crtorres@brockport.edu

Wanda Ellen Wakefield
The College at Brockport, wwakefie@brockport.edu

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The Bobsled Controversy and Squaw Valley’s Olympic Winter Games

Wanda Wakefield — USA

On February 15, 1959, Art Tyler piloted a four-man bobsled team from the United States to a World Championship at St. Moritz. Yet even as Tyler, the 1956 Olympic bronze medalist, celebrated his great victory with his teammates, he and they must surely have lamented the serious blow that the American bobsled program—and indeed the whole of sliding sports—had already suffered due to the decision by the Organizing Committee for the 1960 Olympic Winter Games at Squaw Valley not to build a bobsled run. Despite the promises proponents of the Squaw Valley Games made in 1955 to provide competition in each of the four major winter sports, in September, 1957, organizers asked for, and received, permission from the International Olympic Committee to abandon their plans to build a run. In doing so they set back the development of the sliding sports in the United States by two decades, and failed to take advantage of a growing desire by budding athletes to explore new sports. As John Morgan, Executive Producer for FIBT-TV, recently explained, “[having a bobsled track in California would have] launched the sport to those crazy Californians who were then surfing along with inventing skateboarding and in general, the first of extreme sports themes.”

That the sport of bobsled in the United States was specifically damaged by the failure to construct a new track in California for 1960, can be demonstrated by examining the American sliders’ results in the years before the Squaw Valley Games and after. For example, bobsledders from the United States had medaled numerous times in previous Olympics, including the 1956 Games at Cortina d’Ampezzo. No American bobsledders would win Olympic medals again until the 2002 Olympic Winter Games at Salt Lake City. Moreover, after the 1961 World Bobsled Championships, held at Lake Placid, only three other American bobsled teams would win medals in international competition again until 1996. That lack of international success cannot, of course, be attributed solely to the fact that no bobsled run was built on the West Coast. Bobsled and other sports, such as the sliding sport of luge, were also disadvantaged in international competition by the lack of financial and practical support from their American governing body, the AAU. Indeed, the lack of success of American athletes due to ongoing feuds between the NCAA and AAU over control of sports in the United States ultimately led to the enactment of the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, which required each individual sport to have its own, governing body.

In any event, the international bobsledding community protested the Squaw Valley decision in the strongest possible terms, and in a variety of venues, and fought for a year to have bobsled competitions restored to the 1960 Olympic program. Then, when that failed, they supported the effort by the village
of Lake Placid, which had a working bobsled run dating from the 1932 Olympics, to move the bobsled races to New York state. The IOC also rejected that idea and bobsledders remain bitter about the 1960 situation to this day.6

In 1957, the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee (SVOC) asked to eliminate bobsled due to what it said was the expense of construction and the likelihood that too few nations would enter sleds in the competition to justify the cost. The International Olympic Committee, headed by its President, Avery Brundage, and Chancellor, Otto Mayer, clearly accepted these arguments. They also, in the years between 1957 and 1960, refused to entertain ideas for alternative venues in which the competitions might have been held. Why did they do so? Was there something specific about bobsled that earned their scorn? Was there something about the winter sports in general to which Brundage and Mayer objected? And would the decision to eliminate bobsled races at the 1960 Olympic Winter Games have been different if the bob run had been another field on which to fight the Cold War? The purpose of this paper is to suggest answers to these questions.

In the spring of 1955, Squaw Valley was awarded the 1960 Olympic Winter Games by a 32-30 vote over a strong bid from Innsbruck, Austria.7 At that time, the SVOC pledged that they would be able to build up their proposed venue from a “picnic ground” to a world-class sports destination, which would provide facilities for the four major winter sports on time and within their proposed budget.8 In later years, bobsled supporters involved with the IOC would argue that they would never have supported the California bid without the assurance that sliding would be included on the program. And, indeed, at first no one had any reason to doubt that that would be so. On October 4, 1955, Alexander Cushing, who shortly would be forced out of his position as head of the Squaw Valley organizing committee, advised IOC President Brundage that preliminary plans for the bobsled track had already been approved by the Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et Tobogganing (FIBT).9 And at the end of the year, in an article in the Nevada State-Journal describing the state of Olympic Planning, IOC Chancellor Otto Mayer explained that the French designer, Louis Saint-Cailbre had been contacted to draw up plans for the bobsled track.10

The following year most of those interested in the sliding sports would have continued to believe that they were going to have an opportunity for world-class competition at Squaw Valley. On February 3, 1956, Avery Brundage wrote to Count Rene de Fregeolierie, President of the International Bobsled Federation, about various technical specifications for the bob run.11 Meanwhile, the new head of the Squaw Valley committee, Prentis Hale, advised Otto Mayer that Saint-Cailbre was proceeding with his designs.12 Finally, in October, 1956, both Count de Fregeolierie and Albert Mayer, Vice President of the FIBT, were invited to join the leaders of other international sports organizations to tour the Squaw Valley site.13

The following year Squaw Valley planners continued to prepare for bobsled competitions. With regard to the dates for the 1960 Olympic Winter Games, Alan Bartholemy, Secretary of the SVOC, wrote to Marc Hodler of the FIS, that starting later in February, 1960 would be better for the proposed refrigerated bob track.14 And, on March 19, 1957, apparently anticipating no change in plans, Otto Mayer assured Bartholemy that representatives from Squaw Valley did not need to attend the upcoming IOC meetings in Sofia, Bulgaria.15

Nevertheless, there are indications that bobsled was already being considered for elimination from the program by the IOC. In 1954, the IOC voted to replace skeleton (which had been contested only at St. Moritz) with luge as an Olympic sport. Luge then split from FIBT with the establishment of a new
governing body, the Fédération Internationale de Luge de Course (FIL). Apparently, Otto Mayer and Avery Brundage began to wonder about the inclusion of luge in the 1960 program almost immediately thereafter. In a series of letters from Mayer to Brundage in April, 1957, Mayer described the large number of Europeans participating in luge, emphasized the amateur status of those athletes and suggested the addition of luge. Although, in those letters, Mayer never suggested that bobsled be replaced by luge, his emphasis on the large number of competitive luge athletes must surely have been intended to catch Brundage’s attention, as during the subsequent fight with bobsled over its exclusion from the Olympic program, Brundage consistently argued that there were simply too few bobsledders in the world to justify the sport’s continuation as an Olympic sport.

On June 17, 1957, Otto Mayer contacted Alan Bartholmey, and, despite his earlier advice, now urged that Bartholemy or another Squaw Valley representative make the trip to Sofia. Bartholemy responded that there was no money in the budget for such a trip. Two weeks later, on July 1, 1957 Bartholemy provided the proposed 1960 competition schedule to Count de Fregeolière. As of August 13, 1957, a tentative program for Squaw Valley also included the dates for bobsled racing.

Then, with no apparent advance notice, during the IOC meetings at Sofia from September 23 to September 28, the Squaw Valley committee received the IOC’s permission to abandon their plans to build a bobsled run. The minutes of that Sofia meeting show that the IOC considered a number of matters relevant to the upcoming Olympic Winter Games. They gave provisional permission to participation by athletes from North Korea, so long as they competed as part of a joint Korean team—a plan similar to that followed with regard to German Olympic athletes who competed as part of a unified team until 1968. The IOC also accepted the promise by the United States government that athletes and officials from every nation would be admitted to the country in February, 1960, even if they represented a country with which the United States had no diplomatic relations. Furthermore, those athletes and officials would be exempted from any fingerprinting requirements.

The IOC members then proceeded to consider the elimination or addition of sports in future Olympic games. They accepted the request by the Italian Olympic Committee to eliminate running deer from shooting competitions for the Summer Games scheduled for Rome in 1960. And “on the recommendation of the Organizing Committee and in agreement with Mr. Albert Mayer, Vice-President of the Bobsleigh International Federation” they decided to exclude bobsled while reserving the right to reconsider the matter should 12 national federations advise the Olympic organizers that they would like to race at Squaw Valley.

During the discussion about eliminating certain sports, Avery Brundage explained his own feelings about the matter. According to Brundage, since sports such as football, cycling, basketball and water polo did not follow the rules of amateurism they should be removed from the summer games. Similarly, in his view, figure skating was irreparably tarnished with professionalism and should be eliminated. Brundage also said that a sport that has been consistently mismanaged should be considered for elimination. Significantly, at Sofia, in explaining why he believed certain sports should be removed from the Olympic program, and immediately following the decision to exclude bobsled, Brundage did not cite the reasons for not providing a bobsled competition—that building the track would be too expensive, and that few countries proposed to send sleds—in explaining why he believed certain sports should be taken off the Olympic program.
In subsequent months, representatives of the FIBT, trying to restore the bobsled competition, struggled to counter the constantly shifting justifications for the Sofia decision, while responding to Brundage’s concerns about professionalism and mismanagement in Olympic sports.

When the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee approached the IOC in September, 1957, asking that their obligation to build a bobsled track be waived, they cited the results of a survey allegedly sent to the National Olympic committees of those countries in the past, which had participated in bobsled competitions. They reported to the IOC that of those countries surveyed, only two, the United States and Romania, had said that they would definitely participate in 1960.25 Almost immediately representatives of bobsledding interests in various European nations began to counter the idea that they were not planning to send sleds to the Olympics. As Otto Mayer reported to Prentis Hale in October, the Italian, Swiss and German Olympic committees were all quite angry at the decision. Moreover, on October 9, 1957, Giordano B. Fabjan, of the Italian Olympic Committee wrote to Prentis Hale that Italy had totally misunderstood the significance of the survey—which he admitted they had received. Fabjan asserted that in responding to the Squaw Valley questionnaire, they had assumed that Squaw Valley merely wanted to know the number of sleds that would be entered in the competition, not whether Italy would participate at all. Since the Italians did not know for sure in 1957 whether they would be entering only one or two sleds in both the two and four man bob races, they had answered only that they would “probably” be racing in 1960.27

Certainly, the Squaw Valley organizers had an interest in knowing how many sleds any individual country might send as they were in the process of deciding how large to make the sled storage shed. However, it was not at all clear at the time what the Olympic rules required in terms of country/team participation for an event to go forward—nor was it clear that the rules applying to the summer sports should apply to the Winter Games. The IOC had established a Rule 30, which required a minimum number of 12 participants, but that rule had not been followed in Melbourne—or, for that matter, at Cortina where neither hockey nor figure skating met the minimum number of participating countries required of bobsled.28 Because the Rule was apparently not working to define an appropriate level of entrants to any competition, the IOC Executive Board at its June, 1957 meeting in Evian, France, discussed revising the rule while maintaining its purpose.29 As revised, that rule limited inclusion in the Olympics to only those sports “widely practiced” in 25 or more countries.30 Even assuming “wide practice” or a “minimum of 12 countries” was necessary for competition in an individual sport to be held at the Olympics, as Godfrey Dewey, President of the 1932 Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, noted, team sports had never been required to meet that number. And bobsled was certainly a team sport. Moreover, as Dewey reminded Brundage, “The arbitrary requirement of virtual commitments from 12 nations two years in advance of the Games as a condition for requiring the Organizing Committee to keep faith seems to me to be totally unrealistic as well as unreasonable.”31

As various European bobsledders fought the Sofia decision, the AAU, governing body for bobsled in the United States, also began to look for ways to ensure the presence of the sliding sports on the 1960 program. The AAU’s secretary, Dan Ferris, first asked Otto Mayer to consider moving the races to Lake Placid. He also asked whether the 12 nation standard applied to bobsledding because it was a team sport. Mayer replied that there would be no bobsledding in New York in 1960, and that the IOC’s Sofia decision required the participation of 12 countries, not teams.32 However, Ferris was apparently convinced that if the FIBT could provide Squaw Valley with the names of twelve nations sworn to compete,
the organizers would still be able to build a bobsled run before the Games began. Douglas F. Roby, Vice President of the U.S. Olympic committee, also spoke out, advising Alan Bartholemy in December of 1957 not to consider the matter closed just yet. Unfortunately, the arguments of both Ferris and Roby were rejected by Brundage who wrote Roby at the end of the year that there simply were not enough bobsledders in the world to make bobsledding an Olympic sport. Brundage also rejected the complaints by Count de Fregeolière that there was something “underhanded” in the relationship between the IOC and Squaw Valley concerning the bobsled situation.

Meanwhile the FIBT prepared for its annual meeting in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, scheduled for January, 1958. At that point the Federation knew that construction on the bobsled run had not begun. They also knew that the IOC had imposed a requirement that they get assurances from 12 countries that they would definitely come to Squaw Valley. During the meeting, the FIBT and John E. Morgan, from the AAU bobsled committee, determined that at least 10 countries wished to participate, including the traditional powers Italy, Switzerland, Austria and Germany. The FIBT also decided at that meeting to help the Squaw Valley committee reduce the cost of construction by agreeing that the Olympic races could be conducted at night, eliminating the need to refrigerate the track. Apparently, Alan Bartholemy was pleased with the FIBT's offer to hold night races because he wrote to Louis Saint-Caillbre in March that he would need to make modifications in his plans to allow for an unrefrigerated track.

In the meantime, the FIBT also asked national Olympic organizing committees to let Squaw Valley know that they intended to come to the Games. The Italians did so in October, 1957, and were joined by the Swiss and the Germans by the middle of April the following year. The British, too, sent a letter to the organizers explaining that they could not say for certain that they would send sleds, but only because the committee governing the 1960 British Olympic teams would not be established until 1959. However, Belgium formally said they would not participate, and Brundage reported to Prentis Hale in April that he had heard the Canadians would not be sliding.

At their Tokyo meeting, in May of 1958, the IOC honored their 1957 Sofia agreement to revisit their decision to exclude bobsled. A Squaw Valley representative reported, once more, that too few nations had replied positively to their query to justify the construction of the bob run. But at that meeting the French delegate announced that he had been authorized by his national committee to say that France, as well, wanted to compete in bobsled. That would have meant that at least six nations were positively on board for the Games, with Britain most likely to compete. But clearly the FIBT had not been able to find 12 nations willing to formally commit to bobsledding in 1960, and referring back to the old Rule 30, the IOC confirmed its Sofia decision.

After that vote there was virtually no chance that Squaw Valley could host an Olympic bobsled competition in 1960, but the argument about who was responsible for that result continued. Count de Fregeolière wrote Brundage on June 3, 1958, reminding him of how the FIBT had agreed at Garmisch to forgo a pre-Olympic test event and to have the races at night on an unrefrigerated track. Given that unprecedented willingness to cooperate with the organizing committee’s need to limit costs, the Count wondered why bobsled alone had to meet standards that other Olympic sports did not. Later in 1958 he wrote Brundage that he and the FIBT would certainly never have supported Squaw Valley’s bid had they not had assurance that there would be bobsledding in 1960. And the Count challenged Brundage to explain why he had acquiesced in the matter at Sofia—was he merely a “servile factotum” for the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee? Certainly Brundage rejected the notion that he was a servile
factotum. He also suggested to the Count that all of his complaints were without merit given the fact that the FIBT's own Vice President, Albert Mayer, had been at Sofia and had supported the decision. After that particular exchange of letters the Count de Fregeolière apparently left further negotiations about Olympic bobsled in the hands of others.

One group still trying to provide for bobsledding in 1960 was located in Lake Placid. Under the leadership of Godfrey Dewey they reminded Brundage that they had a perfectly good bob run in use since World War II—at least once for a World Championships. The former bobsledding World Champion Stanley Benham queried the bobsledding nations if they would come to Lake Placid in 1960 to race if they were assured those races would count as “Olympic.” Benham announced in March, 1959, that he had obtained promises from nine nations that they would come to Lake Placid under those circumstances, and five other countries were likely to send sleds. Nevertheless, Brundage remained firm in his opinion that there was simply too little support for bobsled in the United States and around the world for its inclusion on the 1960 program. Furthermore, Otto Mayer argued that despite the fact that in 1956 the equestrian events had been held in Stockholm, Sweden, rather than Melbourne, Australia, no precedent was created for dividing responsibility for conducting Olympic competitions among two or more cities. Nor had the recent decision to move the 1960 yachting events from Rome to Naples changed his mind. Rather both Brundage and Mayer believed that these exceptions did not alter the basic rule that all events in any Olympiad must be conducted within the bid winning community.

So, there was to be no bobsled in 1960. But why? Clearly the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee remained committed to its theory that the cost would be prohibitive and that too few nations would be likely to compete were a bob run to be constructed. Yet asking the IOC at Sofia to cancel the competition based on that explanation seems inadequate. Were there other factors that played into the IOC’s decision? Apparently so.

As Avery Brundage was quick to point out on many occasions, the Olympic Winter Games themselves had been almost an afterthought, which had never had the support of the Count Pierre de Coubertin. As Brundage noted, de Coubertin’s Olympic vision presupposed competitions in sports that were—or had the potential to be—widely practiced. Moreover, de Coubertin consistently supported the idea that Olympians should be strictly amateurs—a principle to which Brundage adhered until the end of his life. Therefore, as Brundage argued as early as 1936, including “professional” figure skaters on an Olympic program violated the basic ideals of the Movement. Brundage even argued that Sonia Henie should be barred from competition at Garmisch because it was “well-known” that she was supporting her parents with her skating—and this before Henie went to Hollywood to begin a prosperous film career. Brundage continued to fight the presence of professional athletes in the Olympic Winter Games until 1972, supporting the decision to ban the Austrian skier Karl Schranz from the Games at Sapporo for accepting sponsorship money from the manufacturer of his skis. Since Brundage was convinced that the four major winter sports of the 1950s (bobsled, skating, skiing and hockey) were in violation of the amateur rules, then it seems possible that he and Chancellor Mayer seized on the chance to eliminate the least professionalized winter sport from the program as a means toward eliminating the Olympic Winter Games altogether. As Marc Hodler, President of the FIS, told the Zurich newspaper, Sport, he had been told by Otto Mayer that if the international winter sports federations were to ask for the abolition of the Olympic Winter Games, the IOC would be “delighted.” Later, Brundage expressed the hope that the 1972 Games in Sapporo would be the last as with regard to the Olympic Winter Games,
“I doubt very much that they will remain.”\(^5\) Finally, Brundage agreed with David, Marquess of Exeter, in his 1971 assessment that bobsled at the very least should be an optional part of the Olympic program because bobsled “clearly cannot claim to rank as an Olympic event… I should have thought that the guillotine would have fallen on it in any event under our latest change of rules.”\(^5\)

Beyond the IOC’s desire to destroy the Olympic Winter Games, international bobsled officials had a special political challenge to face in 1960. Since the return of the Soviet Union to Olympic competition in 1952, the success of their athletes had been pointed to as proof of the superiority of their system. With the Cold War growing ever more intense during the decade, the United States and its allies also began to see athletic success as one key to winning the hearts and minds of the people of countries, which had not yet chosen a side in the ongoing conflict. In other words, the Olympic Games became another zone where the conflict could be fought in relative peace. Thus, Hungarian anger and frustration at the Soviets for putting down their 1956 rebellion was expressed in the water polo pool in Melbourne after it was no longer safe to do so on the streets of Budapest. Similarly, the Soviet hockey team’s success at Cortina provided another indication that the Communist state was capable of producing a strong set of players in a very short time should they choose to do so.\(^5\)

In the years leading up to Squaw Valley, the organizers struggled to accommodate the demands of U.S. foreign policy with their responsibility to open Olympic competition to everyone. Alexander Cushing had promised during the 1955 bid process that all athletes, whether or not they came from a country with which the United States had diplomatic relations, would be welcomed onto American shores. His successors on the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee reiterated that pledge and used their political influence to gain the State Department’s agreement to facilitate the visa process in 1960.\(^5\) And when the Games ended, most Americans saw the U.S. hockey team’s victory over the favored Soviets as evidence that their country was number one.

The political problem for bobsled in this Cold War climate was that the Soviet Union had yet to develop a sliding sports program. Indeed, the USSR Bobsledding Federation would not be created until 1969.\(^5\) With no Soviet bobsled team in the picture, the Cold War might still have been significant had the two Germanies been competing separately. However, both the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic of Germany were committed to sending a joint team to Squaw Valley.\(^5\) Therefore, when the Germans advised that they would like to compete in the bobsled in 1960, there was no chance that a German success could be construed as evidence of the excellence of the GDR’s system. In other words, when the IOC decided to eliminate bobsled there was no effort by the Eastern Bloc states to change that decision because they simply had no reason to care. On the other hand, had Squaw Valley tried to eliminate the new sport of biathlon from the program there would surely have been major complaints and serious political pressure exerted by the Soviet Union and its allies to prevent that as they expected to do well on the skiing and shooting range in 1960.

Although only nine countries sent competitors to the 1960 Olympic biathlon competition, biathlon was safe from Olympic elimination because the Soviet Union would never have chosen to give up the chance for Olympic medals.\(^5\) Although other Olympic sports had in the past had fewer than 12 nations competing they, too, were safe in 1960 from being removed from the program. In the end only bobsled was charged with being too costly and having too few athletes to justify its inclusion on the Olympic program. Constructing a bobrun in Squaw Valley might have seemed to be too expensive in 1960, but the long-term costs to the sliding sports are incalculable. Had the FIBT been able to change the Sofia de-
cision to eliminate the sport surely more athletes and more money would have been invested in bobsled. But the FIBT was unable to do so because of the long-running desire by Avery Brundage to eliminate the Olympic Winter Games altogether and because, when the IOC made its decision, the FIBT was unable to rely on the Cold War support of the Soviet bloc.

Endnotes


2 http://www.olympic.org/uk/athletes/results/search-r-uk.asp, July 13, 2006

3 For purposes of the 1960 Olympic Winter Games the four major sports were bobsledding, skating (figure and speed), skiing (Nordic and Alpine), and hockey. In 1960, biathlon would make its first appearance on the Olympic program, which would grow over the years with the addition of sports such as snowboarding and curling.

4 E-mail from John F. Morgan to Wanda Ellen Wakefield, June 5, 2006.


6 As John F. Morgan put it, “it was the biggest detriment to the sport of the 20th century.”

7 Minutes, Meetings, IOC, 50th Session, Paris, 4/13-18,55, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 77, Avery Brundage Collection (hereafter ABC), University of Illinois Archives, 40.

8 The phrase “picnic ground” was used by Avery Brundage in a letter to Alexander Cushing, October 20, 1955, where he expressed the concern that the Squaw Valley situation would be similar to that of Melbourne, where a year out from the Games, all was in chaos according to Brundage. Avery Brundage to Alexander C. Cushing, October 20, 1955, Folder “VIII Winter Games-Squaw Valley, 1960, General 1956-1957” Record Series 26/20/27, Box 106, ABC.

9 FIBT = Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et Toboggan.

10 “Austria Hopes Dashed During IOC Interview,” Nevada State Journal, December 24, 1955, “Newspaper Clippings Envelopes #1,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.

11 Avery Brundage to Count Rene de Fregeoliere, February 3, 1956, Folder “Fédération Internationale de luge (tobaganning) 1957-1960, 1965-69,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 211, ABC.

12 Prentis Hale to Otto Mayer, July 12, 1956, Folder “VIII Winter Olympics Squaw Valley, 1960, Organizing Committee, 1955-1956,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.

13 Prentis Hale to Count Rene de Fregeolierie, August 15, 1956, Folder, “VIII Winter Olympics Squaw Valley, 1960, Organizing Committee, 1955-1956,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.

14 Alan Bartholmey to Marc Hodler, February 14, 1957, Folder “VIII Winter Games, Squaw Valley, 1960 Organizing committee, 1957,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.
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15 Otto Mayer to Alan Bartholemy, March 19, 1957, Folder “VIII Winter Games, Squaw Valley, 1960 – organizing committee, 1957,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.

16 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, April 5, 1957, Folder “Fédération Internationale de luge (tobaggingan) 1957-1960, 1965-69,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 211, ABC.

17 Otto Mayer to Avery Brundage, April 3, 1957, Folder “Fédération Internationale de luge (tobaggingan) 1957-1960, 1965-69,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 211, ABC.

18 Otto Mayer to Alan Bartholemy, June 17, 1957, Folder “VIII Winter Games, Squaw Valley, 1960 – organizing committee, 1957,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.

19 Alan Bartholemy to Otto Mayer, June 26, 1957, Folder, “VIII Winter Games, Squaw Valley, 1960 – organizing committee, 1957,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC. See also Alan Bartholemy to Count Rene de Fregeolière, July 1, 1957.

20 There is a gap in the record in Avery Brundage’s papers from August 13 to September 23, leaving the question of what role Brundage played in the matter obscure. However, Godfrey Dewey apparently believed that the IOC had been unfair to the FIBT by not giving them advance notice of the plan to ask for the elimination of bobsled at Sofia. See Godfrey Dewey to Avery Brundage, January 10, 1958, Folder “VIII Winter Games, Squaw Valley, 1960 – Organizing Committee, 1958,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.

21 Minutes of the 53rd Session International Olympic Committee, Sofia-Hotel Balkan, September 23 to September 28, 1957,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 78, ABC, 4.

22 “Minutes,” 5.

23 “Minutes,” 6.

24 “Minutes,” 7.


26 Otto Mayer to Prentis Hale, October 7, 1957, Folder “VIII Winter Games, Squaw Valley, 1960 – Organizing Committee, 1957,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.

27 Giordano B. Fabjan to Prentis Hale, October 9, 1957, Folder “VIII Winter Games, Squaw Valley, 1960 - Organizing Committee, 1957,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.

28 Count Rene de Frageolière to Brundage, July 29, 1958, Folder “Federation Internationale de Luge & Tobagganig 1957-1960 – 1965-69,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 211, ABC.

29 “Minutes Conference of the Executive Board of the IOC, June 3rd & 4th, 1957, Evian,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 91, ABC, 1.

30 Brundage himself backed away from the 25 nation rule with regard to the Winter sports, writing to Godfrey Dewey on February 8, 1958, that “even so, the bobsled sport is in a very weak position.” Avery Brundage to Godfrey Dewey, February 8, 1958, Folder “VIII Winter Games, Squaw Valley, 1960 – Organizing Committee, 1958,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.

31 Godfrey Dewey to Avery Brundage, September 8, 1958, Folder “Fédération Internationale de luge (tobaggingan) 1957-1960-1965-69,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 211, ABC.

32 Otto Mayer to Daniel Ferris, October 25, 1957, Folder “VIII Winter Games, Squaw Valley, 1960 - Organizing Committee, 1957,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.

33 Douglas F. Roby to Avery Brundage, December 20, 1957, Folder “VIII Winter Games, Squaw Valley, 1960 - Organizing committee, 1957,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.
34 Avery Brundage to Douglas F. Roby, December 31, 1957, “Folder, Squaw Valley, 1960 – Organizing Committee, 1957,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.
35 Prentis Hale to Robert L. King, General Secretary of the Squaw Valley Organizing Committee, February 6, 1958, Folder “VIII Winter Games, Squaw Valley, 1960 – Organizing Committee, 1958,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.
36 Alan Bartholemy to Louis Saint-Cailbre, March 1, 1958, Folder “VIII Winter Games, Squaw Valley, 1960 – Organizing Committee, 1958,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.
37 See letter from British Olympic Committee, April 2, 1958 saying they would probably compete, from Swiss Olympic Committee, April 3, 1958, confirming their plans to compete in the 2 and 4 man bobsled events, undated letter from German Olympic Committee saying they would compete and letter from Belgian Olympic Committee, April 3, 1958, saying they would not be sending sleds to Squaw Valley. Folder “VIII Winter Games Squaw Valley, 1960 – Organizing Committee, 1958,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.
38 Letter, Great Britain Olympic Committee, April 2, 1958, Folder “Fédération Internationale de luge (tobag-ganing) 1957-1960, 1965-69,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 211, ABC.
39 There was no copy of the communication to Brundage from the Canadians that would confirm this.
40 Minutes of the 54th Session of the International Olympic Committee and of the Meeting of the Executive Board of the IOC with the Delegates of the National Olympic Committees, Tokyo, May 14-16, 1958, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 91, ABC.
41 Count Rene de Fregeolière to Avery Brundage, June 3, 1958, Folder “Fédération Internationale de Bob-sleigh et de Tobannanning [sic], 1946, 1953-1955,” Record Series, 26/20/37/ Box 211, ABC.
42 Count Rene de Fregeolière to Avery Brundage, September 5, 1958, Folder “Federation Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobannanning [sic], 1946, 1953-1955,” Record Series, 26/20/37/ Box 211, ABC.
43 Avery Brundage to Count Rene de Fregeoliere, December 31, 1957, Folder “Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobannanning [sic], 1946, 1953-1955,” Record Series, 26/20/37/ Box 211, ABC.
45 See letters from Otto Mayer to Count Rene de Fregeolière, February 24, 1959 and June 9, 1959, Folder “Fédération Internationale de Bobsleigh et de Tobannanning [sic], 1946, 1953-1955,” Record Series, 26/20/37, Box 211, ABC.
46 Squaw Valley budget figures show, for example, that projected salaries for a track crew at bobsled would, at $18,000, be exactly the same as the salaries for a track crew at the slalom and giant slalom venues. “Operational Expense Account – Estimated Operational Budget Detail [Expenses]” Squaw Valley Organizing Committee, March 7, 1957, Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC. Moreover the proj-ect construction cost of the bob run ($489,000) was not out of line with the projections for construction at the ice arena.
48 Avery Brundage to Ulrich Salchow, President ISU, March 19, 1936, Folder “IV Winter Games, 1936 Garmisch-Partenkirchen – General,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 152, ABC.
50 Marc Hodler, Sport, no month or day, 1959, Folder, “Winter Games,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 114, ABC.
51 Interview with Avery Brundage, marked “Received April 17, 1972,” Folder “Winter Games,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 114, ABC.

52 David, Marquess of Exeter, to Avery Brundage, October 11, 1971, Folder “Bobsleigh & Tobagganing, 1970-1972,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 211, ABC.


54 See, for example, Marguerite Higgins, “Red Ban Menaces Winter Olympics at California Site, Brundage Says,” Chicago SunTimes, July 3, 1957, “U.S. Waives Restrictions on Olympians,” Chicago Daily Tribune, September 18, 1957, in “Newspaper Clippings Envelope #1,” Record Series 26/20/37, Box 166, ABC.


A Persistent Desire: An Account of Buenos Aires’ Efforts to Host the Olympic Games

Cesar R. Torres — USA

Throughout the twentieth century, Argentine elites have attempted to prove that their country has adopted the tenets of modern civilization. Their attempts included projecting an image of Buenos Aires as a South American enclave in which Western ideals flourished. It is no coincidence then that despite Argentina’s troubled history of serious political, economic and social crises, those elites coveted hosting the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires on many occasions. The last concerted effort was the bid for the 2004 Olympics, ultimately awarded to and successfully staged by Athens. Buenos Aires was the only South American city among the five finalists, a fact that many porteños took as a testament to the distinctiveness of their city. During the weeks before the election of the host for the 2004 Olympics in September 1997, the prospect of an Olympic Buenos Aires was a recurrent topic of discussion in Argentine society. The history of Buenos Aires’ attempts to host the Olympic Games, however, was hardly mentioned.

Given that officials on the Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee frequently advanced that Argentina has a long and distinguished record of involvement in the Olympic Movement, including several efforts to bring the Olympic Games to Buenos Aires, the absence of reference to these efforts was all the more intriguing. A close inspection of the Buenos Aires 2004 bid materials reveals that the emphasis on Argentina’s Olympic past included broad and vague statements regarding Buenos Aires’ efforts to host the Olympic Games. For example, although one bid document stated, “Buenos Aires applies for the fifth time,” no details of these applications were provided. The press replicated this kind of statement. For instance, the daily La Nación wrote in June 1997, “The enthusiasm to be the host of the Games and the tradition of loyalty to the Olympic Movement has become evident in the four previous bids.” On the other hand, a mid-1970s International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) publication stated that Buenos Aires had already bid for the Olympic Games five times. Confusingly, a Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee official claimed after the bid failed that the city had sought to organize the Olympic Games only four times.

The absence of specifics regarding the city’s efforts to host the Olympic Games in the Buenos Aires 2004 bid materials might have arisen from the confusion surrounding them and not from a dismissal of Olympic history. After all, officials in the Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee did not fail to mention that an Argentine José B. Zubiaur was among those chosen by Pierre de Coubertin to form the original IOC in 1894. These officials knew that although the historical arguments offered little help in securing their bid, the politics of nostalgia and Olympic romanticism warranted the trumpeting of Argentina’s
role in regional and global Olympic affairs since Zubiaur’s days. The lacuna surrounding Buenos Aires’ attempts to host the Olympic Games begs for historical attention; at the very least to set the record straight. More important than merely setting the record straight, the study of these attempts illuminates the evolving character of the relationship between politics, sport, and Olympic matters in Argentina throughout the twentieth century.

The examination of Buenos Aires’ multiple failed attempts to host the Olympic Games underscores complex political processes at play. In doing so, it not only ascertains how many times Buenos Aires actually bid to host the Olympic Games but also clarifies the logic, conditions, and forces that prompted sport and governmental officials as well as civic leaders to consider the city as a potentially successful host and to articulate efforts for an Olympic Buenos Aires. To comprehend the drive behind the efforts for an Olympic Buenos Aires requires the evaluation of the way in which Olympic proponents constructed legitimating narratives at both the domestic and international levels to project particular representations of Buenos Aires and Argentina. The study of Buenos Aires’ bids also helps explain why these efforts eventually failed and assists in discussing whether the city could be an Olympic host in the near future.

**Early Expressions of Interest**

Interest in the Olympic Movement arose in Argentina just a decade after Coubertin in 1894 named Zubiaur a founding member of the IOC. However, it was not Zubiaur, who considered sport an educational tool, but the aristocratic porteños, a group that saw sport participation as a distinctive attribute of gentlemen, who promoted Coubertin’s Games and ideology in their country. During the early stage of Olympic diffusion in Argentina, the idea to bring the Olympic Games to the nation’s capital first found expression. A year after the proposal advanced by elite Argentine sporting circles that the government subsidize what would have been the first official Olympic delegation to the 1908 London Olympics was rejected by Congress, a senator declared his dream that Buenos Aires host the Olympic Games in the future. Manifesting his admiration for physical exercises, Joaquín V. Gonzalez declared to a session of the Senate that

> …their necessity is evident, given the increasing development of these healthy exercises, so prestigious in the contemporary world, for they have originated the beautiful institution of the universal olympic games, that someday must take place in the city of Buenos Aires, thus fulfilling a national wish that, evidently, is inclined to Games of this kind that will influence so much the future of the Nation and the race.

Gonzalez’s vision of Olympic Games in Buenos Aires came while informing the Senate about a proposed bill that established the festivities projected to commemorate the May 1910 centenary of Argentina’s revolution for national independence. He lauded the civic virtues of physical exercises, their embrace by the Argentine people, and the hope that Buenos Aires one day would serve as host to the Olympic Games to justify the construction of “a model house for the practice of physical exercises” that would be given to the Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires Gymnastic and Fencing Club). Although the bill passed, the gymnasium-like building was not built. However, the centennial festivities included an extensive program of international competitions modeled after the Olympic Games commonly regarded as the Juegos Olimpicos del Centenario (Centennial Olympic Games). Coubertin, ever the sentinel of everything Olympic, argued that Manuel Quintana, who had replaced
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Zubiaur in the IOC in 1907, “had used the term ‘Olympic Games’ improperly for personal publicity” and expelled him from the committee shortly after the closing ceremony of the Juegos Olímpicos del Centenario. Even if this sport festival was a sign of Argentine commitment to the Olympic Movement it did not warrant, at least in Coubertin’s mind, the label Olympic. That word was exclusively reserved for his “true” Olympic Games.

After the expulsion of Quintana in 1910, even though he was not replaced until 1922 by a future Argentine President, Marcelo T. de Alvear, Argentine sport officials tried—unsuccessfully—to send teams to the 1912 and 1920 Olympic Games. Early in the 1920s this failure divided the Argentine sport community inciting complex and problematic attempts to establish an Argentine National Olympic Committee (NOC) and to secure control and access to sport. The creation of a definitive NOC in late 1923, orchestrated by Alvear and Ricardo C. Aldao, a distinguished sport official associated with Alvear’s ruling party, did not appease all the confrontations raging in Argentine sport but did help dispatch the first official Argentine delegation to the 1924 Paris Olympics. This precarious stability prompted local Olympic officials to renew their hopes to organize the “true” Olympic Games. These hopes were once again linked to the construction of sport facilities in the premises of the Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires.

Aldao, who was the President of both the Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires and the recently created Comité Olímpico Argentino (Argentine Olympic Committee), and had become the nation’s second IOC member in 1923, fervently expressed to his IOC colleagues the Argentine desire to organize the Olympic Games. He did so the very first time he took part in an IOC session. While leading the Argentine team to the 1924 Paris Olympics, Aldao reported about the state of sport in his nation and gave details of the sport facilities to be erected in his club, which he considered the “oldest and most important [institution] of our country.” He reported that the Argentine Congress, the government, and the municipality of Buenos Aires had agreed to finance a Champ des sports that would include a stadium for 100,000 spectators. After elucidating the specifics of the financial arrangements, presenting the plans, and even distributing pictures of the works already in progress to the IOC assembly, Aldao grandiloquently proclaimed:

*By having this considerable and inexhaustible financial resource at its disposal, totally used to build the Stadium and its annexes, Argentina will very soon be in a position to accept without hesitation, the honor that the Games of one of the next Olympiads be celebrated in Buenos Aires.*

The Argentine press replicated Aldao’s announcement. According to La Nación, Aldao went even further and declared that the stadium “will soon allow Argentina to be the theater of future Olympic Games.” Interviewed by the same daily, Coubertin, who in all probability had been apprised of the stadium by future IOC President Henri de Baillet-Latour the year before, declared that he was:

*amazed by the goodness and grandiosity of the project. It will be the most complete sport facility in the world, an ideal endeavor, my dream for many years. Dr. Aldao has invited me to attend its inauguration, in the year 1928; if nothing prevents it, it will be a real pleasure to go to Buenos Aires, to be present in that transcendental act and closely appreciate the magnificent progress of the Argentine people in the area of sports.*

As much as Coubertin praised the Champ des sports and its stadium, the IOC President did not make even the feeblest remark to kindle Aldao’s hope that Buenos Aires would soon organize the Olympic
Games. In spite of this indicative silence and that the promised massive stadium was nowhere in sight in the Buenos Aires’ topography, four years after Coubertin’s remarks Argentine Olympic officials renewed their proposal to bring the Olympic Games to Argentina’s capital. Rather than a general announcement, this time their project had a specific date, the 1936 Olympics. Apparently, the Argentines did not need much international encouragement for their Olympic dreams.

The Bid for the 1936 Games

According to IOC records, Buenos Aires had already made clear its intention to bid for the 1936 Olympics as early as 1925, but the city did not have plans nor economic guarantees. Two years later, the city was no longer among the list of candidates, presumably because it was not supported by its government. This warning signal was noted in Argentina. In late June of 1928, when the Amsterdam Olympics was about to get underway, Aldao wrote to Baillet-Latour on his and President Alvear’s, behalf indicating that they wished to nominate Buenos Aires to host the 1936 Olympics. The stadium was a recurrent issue, mentioned yet again as one of the main attraction of the proposal. For instance, in his letter Aldao insisted:

> For this period, our Capital will be in a position to count with the Camp de Jeux currently being built, an important part of which is already functional. We will then have at our disposition a stadium that can host 100,000 spectators.

By then, however, Aldao and Alvear had learned, perhaps from having witnessed for a few years how the IOC conducted its affairs regarding future Olympic hosts, that a high-profile stadium was not the only element needed to impress the committee’s members. This time the Argentine Olympic hopefuls assured Baillet-Latour that if the IOC accepted their proposal the Argentine government would take the necessary measures “to expedite the requirements of the Delegates and Sportsmen with respect to their travel and their stay in Argentina.” Baillet-Latour was delighted with such a generous offer coming directly from Argentina’s President. The IOC President acknowledged receipt of the bid while Aldao was informed that no decision would be made before 1931. However, early in 1929, Aldao insisted that the IOC considers his earlier proposal if that year’s IOC session would take up the host of the 1936 Olympics, noting that “all necessary elements for the celebration of the XIth. Olympiad will be available by then” in Buenos Aires. Anxious for a sign, Aldao indicated to Baillet-Latour once again in April of 1929 that Buenos Aires wanted to host those Games and remarked that the grand stadium would be ready in 1932. He also mentioned that whatever the transportation difficulties from Europe to Argentina, they would be taken care of by the Comité Olímpico Argentino (Argentine Olympic Committee), which was backed by the Argentine government. Although Alvear’s presidential term expired in 1928, Hipólito Yrigoyen, a member of his party, won the election to succeed him, which presumably provided political continuity for the project.

When the IOC met in Berlin for its annual session in May of 1930, Buenos Aires was among the candidates to host the 1936 Olympics. Aldao attended the session. Despite seeing Buenos Aires as a candidate for the Games, he was disturbed by what he experienced in Germany. He was displeased with the policy adopted by the IOC regarding amateurism that opposed the principle of “broken time.” However, he was even more enraged with the method that the IOC leadership had used to approve it. Aldao claimed that IOC members were forced to vote the way the ruling cabal wanted and that he was not given the floor to state his ideas. Predictably, Baillet-Latour disagreed with Aldao’s views. After the
1930 IOC session, both Aldao and Alvear resigned from the committee. Their action severed the link between the Argentines and the IOC leadership and put Buenos Aires’ bid to host the 1936 Olympics on the back burner. When the time to choose such a host came at the April 1931 IOC session held in Barcelona, Buenos Aires was not on the list of candidates. In the postal vote of Mexican IOC member Miguel de Beistegui, Buenos Aires did appear as a possible candidate. Even more paradoxically, Baillet-Latour asked Aldao and Alvear to cable their votes. This might have been a friendly gesture indicating that they were welcomed back in the Olympic fold. Ultimately, Berlin was awarded the 1936 Olympics, and only Alvear refused to rejoin the IOC. Alvear’s decision had more to do with the political developments in Argentina that forced him into exile, preventing him from serving the IOC well, than with Aldao’s complaints.

If the dispute Aldao and Alvear had opened with the IOC leadership had already negatively influenced any chance that Buenos Aires had in the race for the 1936 Olympics, a major political crisis obliterated the city’s hopes. In September 1930, José F. Uriburu overthrew the democratically elected government of President Yrigoyen, becoming Argentina’s first de facto President. Argentina’s political institutions were forever affected and life in the nation changed dramatically after the coup. In spite of the political changes, it was during the first few months of Uriburu’s reign that the Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires Gymnastic and Fencing Club) officially opened some facilities of its Champ des sports—but not the grand stadium. During the inauguration, attended by Uriburu, Aldao thanked a former democratically elected President but not Alvear. He also insisted that a 100,000-seat stadium was planned, announcing that it would promptly go to a public bidding process and adding that the money available allowed it to be built in twenty months.

Shortly after these announcements, influential French IOC member Melchior de Polignac visited Buenos Aires and praised the work of the Argentine Olympic advocates. Polignac remembered visiting “the magnificent grounds of the ‘Club de gimnasia y esgrima’ which are probably the best in the world,” adding that “This is the perfect model and Mr. Aldao, who has brought this admirable work to fruition, merits the thanks of all sportsmen.” Polignac’s accolades, like Coubertin’s before, failed to mention any prospect of future Olympic Games in Buenos Aires. At the time of Polignac’s visit, the colossal stadium, the centerpiece of the project, was still a dream. Unfortunately, it remained so.

The Bid for the 1940 Games

By the time of the 1932 Los Angeles Olympics, the discord between the Argentine IOC members and the IOC had dissolved. Aldao was once again active in Olympic matters, Alvear had been replaced by Horacio Bustos Morón, then President of the Comité Olímpico Argentino, and Argentina sent a robust team to Los Angeles. While athletes competed for Olympic glory under the Californian sun, the IOC held its annual session. During IOC deliberations, Baillet-Latour announced the cities wishing to organize the 1940 Olympics. Buenos Aires made the list. Oddly, all were unofficial candidates. Three years later, in the IOC session held in Oslo, the South American metropolis remained a candidate. However, it seems that the candidacy was not followed up on in Argentina. In a letter written to Baillet-Latour two weeks after the Oslo session, Bustos Morón, who did not attend the session, said that he and Aldao had voted in favor of Tokyo for the 1940 Olympics. A year later, Bustos Morón reminded the IOC President that he favored Tokyo. In these interactions, Buenos Aires was not even mentioned. Given his silence regarding the city, his position in Argentine sport, and the fact that he occupied several governmental posts, it
seems highly unlikely that Bustos Morón was unaware of any Buenos Aires bid. The 1940 Games were eventually awarded to Tokyo.

In July of 1938, the Japanese, involved in a quest for military conquest, relinquished their bid for Tokyo as the site of the 1940 Olympics. The Games were first transferred to Helsinki, which had also bid for the Games, and ultimately cancelled because of World War II. Fearing the cancellation, the Comité Olímpico Argentino saw an opportunity to take the lead in Olympic matters. Shortly after Adolf Hitler’s Germany invaded Poland, new Comité President, Juan Carlos Palacios, wrote to F. W. Rubien, secretary of the American Olympic Association, proposing:

_In view of the probable suspension of the XII Olympic Games in Finland, due to European situation, this Argentinian Olympic Committee believes that the efforts of the nations of America . . . could be applied in the meantime through a tournament to be effected based on the sports included in the mentioned Games._

Originally, Palacios referred to the tournament as the “Pan-American Olympic Tournament” and then simply as the “Pan-American Games.” The event would take place only if plans for the 1940 Olympics were abandoned. The Argentines proposed to host a congress in Buenos Aires to organize hemispheric sport matters in February 1940 and subsequently the competitions in November. To accommodate the greatest number of national delegates, the congress was first postponed to April and then to August. The First Pan-American Congress established the Pan-American Sports Committee and decided to host Pan-American Games every four years, starting in Buenos Aires in 1942.

The Argentines immediately started to work in favor of the Games. They established the Games’ organizing committee and set the festival from November 21 to December 6. Argentine President, Roberto Ortiz, and Buenos Aires mayor, Carlos Pueyrredon, were named respectively honorary President and vice-President of the organizing committee. The impressive plans included an “Olympic city” and “a stadium with a capacity for 75,000 spectators.” The organizing committee expected to welcome “not less than 2,000 athletes.” Everything seemed to fall in place until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, which prompted the United States to enter the war. With the expansion of the conflict into the Western Hemisphere, many nations declined to participate in the 1942 Pan-American Games. The Argentines postponed the Games several times in the hope of saving the project but to no avail; the war, and the harsh political, economic, and social conditions it imposed proved an insurmountable challenge for Olympic enthusiasts. In spite of the setback, the Argentine post-war political environment would soon help renovate hopes of staging the first Pan-American Games in Buenos Aires. Argentines even dreamed of bringing the 1956 Olympics to their city.

**The Bid for the 1956 Games**

The rise of Juan D. Perón to the presidency of Argentina in 1946 marked a dramatic shift in national politics. Attempting to break with the past, Perón promised the masses “a ‘New Argentina’ based on “social justice, political sovereignty, and economic independence.” His concept of social justice included an innovative array of benefits and services for the working class. Broad access to sport and physical education was a centerpiece among those innovations. Likewise, Perón did not spare resources to advance elite sport. Neither the emphasis placed on popular and elite sport by Perón nor the political return he expected from it had precedent in Argentina. In this regard, political scientist Raanan Rein has observed, “no Argentine government prior to Perón . . . invested as much effort and as many resources in
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both the development and encouragement of sport and in the effort to earn political dividends from this policy.” In the context of Perón’s “New Argentina,” the hope to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires was not only rekindled but received a degree of state commitment never seen before in Argentina.

On January 20, 1948, a year and a half into Perón’s first term in office, the Comité Olímpico Argentino sent a cable and a letter to the IOC announcing that Buenos Aires wanted to organize the 1956 Olympics. A week later, IOC member Bustos Morón cabled the IOC backing up the city’s candidacy. Aldao was also on board. Before the end of the month, Ricardo Sanchez de Bustamante, then presiding over the Comité, wrote to Sigfrid Edstrøm, who had replaced Baillet-Latour as IOC President, a ten-page letter detailing the rationale for Buenos Aires’ bid. For the Argentine Olympic official, Buenos Aires was suited to host the 1956 Olympics because of the Comité’s dedication to the Olympic Movement since its creation in 1923, the national sport organization and the extended practice of sport in Argentina, and the governmental support to sport. On the other hand, the government had pledged all necessary moral and material support for the success of the event, including a national stadium, an Olympic village, and other required facilities. Finally, there was a question of principle: since no South American city had hosted the Games, Argentina deserved that privilege. For the Comité, if the IOC voted for Buenos Aires, it would “satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the government of His Excellency the President General Juan D. Perón and that of the sportmen of the continent.” At least in Argentine rhetoric, bringing the Games to Buenos Aires fulfilled both a national and a South American desire.

According to Argentine Olympic officials, General Santos V. Rossi, President of the Consejo Nacional de Educación Física (National Council of Physical Education), created under the auspices of Perón, instructed the Comité Olímpico Argentino to communicate to the IOC that Buenos Aires wanted to host the 1956 Olympics. Undoubtedly, the matter was of utmost importance to the government’s highest echelon. Indeed, the Comité later admitted that the bid simply materialized the explicit desire of Perón. In June of 1948, Aldao and Bustos Morón remitted to their peers in the IOC a letter they had sent to Edstrom detailing Buenos Aires’ bid. The Argentines affirmed, “we have every reason to expect that the Argentine Government would grant the necessary support to permit the Organizing Committee of the XVI OLYMPIAD to successfully carry out its work.” They concluded by asking for IOC consent, stating, “we sincerely hope our Colleagues and Friends will support this initiative and vote in its favour when the time arrives to do so.” Informing the full IOC membership about Perón’s patronage of the project was a wise diplomatic move—the timing was not coincidental. When Buenos Aires appeared as a registered candidate for the 1956 Olympics at the next IOC session held during 1948 London Olympics, no one should have been surprised. That Buenos Aires received the right to host the first Pan-American Games during the Second Pan-American Congress also held while athletes competed in London was not surprising either. The bidding campaign was in full swing.

While Buenos Aires established itself as a candidate for the 1956 Olympics in the international arena, Perón continued to build support for his sport policy at home, a strategy intimately connected to his political project. When the Argentine delegation to the 1948 Olympics returned home, a rally was held at the Club Atlético, River Plate’s stadium. In his address, Perón linked the athletic work and triumphs of the nation’s athletes to the recreation of Argentina by proclaiming:

Let this be our tribute to the glories of sports, to the champions, to all the athletes who are constructing the New Argentina we yearned for, an Argentina of healthy men, sturdy men, and strong men; because only healthy, tough peoples make great nations.
Against a background of unparalleled governmental sustenance of sport, the success of their athletes in the 1948 Olympics, and the plans for the first Pan-American Games scheduled for 1951 underway, the Argentines move ahead quickly with Buenos Aires’ bid to host the 1956 Olympics. Despite the national sport effervescence, Aldao, vigilant of Olympic principles, cautioned Edstrøm in late 1948 that some of his government’s deeds in sport were on the verge of transgressing those principles. Certainly, Perón and his allies established “a centralized supervisory system overseeing all sports,” including the appointment of political cronies in sport federations and organizations. However, Aldao’s cautionary communication did not mention any irregularities with Buenos Aires’ bid. In March of 1949, Rodolfo G. Valenzuela, a close associate of Perón who was the new President of the Comité Olímpico Argentino, and Rossi wrote to the IOC repeating their wish to organize the 1956 Olympics. The long letter replicated the merits of the candidacy, insisting that Buenos Aires “has all the characteristics of the great capitals of the world” and that it “is considered one of the better built capitals of America.” The Argentines also produced for the IOC a lavish book about Argentina that worked as a sort of “formal invitation to celebrate the Olympic Games of 1956 in this city [Buenos Aires].” In the book, Perón and the city’s mayor expressed their support for the bid. Buenos Aires officially sent the IOC a good deal of additional information about Argentine sports. The IOC acknowledged receipt of all material and confirmed the dates of the decisive next IOC session that would take place in Rome.

On April 28, 1949, officials representing the cities bidding for the 1956 Olympics appeared before the IOC. They made final attempts to convince IOC members that their city was the best suited to host the Games. Argentina was represented by Rafael Ocampo Giménez, Argentine ambassador to Italy, Mario L. Negri, future IOC member, Aldao, and Bustos Morón. The latter lobbied his colleagues to gain their support. Buenos Aires’ campaign achieved some success in Latin America. For instance, days before the election, the Uruguayan Olympic Committee cabled the IOC that it supported Buenos Aires. But the support was not unanimous; the Brazilian IOC members cabled their votes for Detroit. In spite of the delegation’s effort, Buenos Aires’ bid fell one vote short. Melbourne beat Buenos Aires in the fourth round by a vote of 21-20, garnering the right to organize the 1956 Olympics. The Comité Olímpico Argentino turned the close defeat into a victory. The one vote difference “comforts the spirit and satisfies the highest Argentine desires, for all what it means for our Nation and Argentine sports.” Besides the alleged comfort, the defeat did not discourage a new bid. After all, if Perón demanded so much perseverance from his athletes to build the “New Argentina,” he could not desist bidding for the Games at the first hindrance he faced. Immediately after Melbourne was awarded the 1956 Olympics, the Comité and the Consejo Nacional de Educación Física agreed to bid for the 1960 Olympics. Bustos Morón promptly expressed his hope that Buenos Aires would host the Games in the near future.

To show the renewed Argentine commitment to the Olympic Movement, Rossi offered to organize the 1950 IOC session in Buenos Aires. Since that session was already scheduled for Copenhagen, Buenos Aires was considered for the following meeting. In Copenhagen, Buenos Aires appeared on lists as both a candidate for the 1960 Olympics and for the May 1951 IOC session. Buenos Aires was turned down for the latter; the IOC chose Vienna. A May 1951 IOC session in Buenos Aires would have been great timing and publicity to boost the 1960 Olympic project. The first Pan-American Games held in Buenos Aires from February 25 to March 8 was not only well-organized but also designated as a tremendous success of the Peronist regime. Argentine athletes dominated the medal count. An exultant Perón declared that the accomplishment was “a new victory that the peronist movement deposits in the
altar of the Nation.” Shortly after the Games, a confident Bustos Morón told Edstrøm that if the 1956 Olympics could not be held in Melbourne, Buenos Aires would be willing to take over.76 The regime’s sport successes and Perón’s dream of Olympic glory in Buenos Aires, as well as his political edifice, did not last long. In September 1955, the Revolución Libertadora (Liberating Revolution) ousted Perón from the presidency. His enemies “sought to eradicate every vestige of Peronism from national life, and one of its first move was to ‘de-Peronize’ sports.”77 Little wonder that bringing the Olympics to Buenos Aires was not one of the revolution’s priorities.

The Bid for the 1968 Games

The Revolución Libertadora’s crusade against all things Peronist had an immediate impact on the Argentine Olympic Movement. Not only was an Olympic Buenos Aires not prominent on the new authorities’ agenda, but also their actions severely jeopardized the prospect of sending a national delegation to the 1956 Olympics. The provisional government named General Fernando I. Huergo as supervisor of the Comité Olímpico Argentino in order to oversee and reorganize it. This situation disturbed Avery Brundage, a rabid apostle of amateurism and the Olympic doctrine of strict separation between sport and politics—something Perón certainly did not practice—who had become IOC President in 1952. In April 1956, Brundage warned Argentine officials, “As the matter stands it seems that no team from the Argentine can be entered in the Melbourne Games.”78 What the IOC wanted was “sport to be ruled by sportsmen and not politicians,” as specified in the Olympic rules.79 Internationally pressured, the government decreed in August the conclusion of Huergo’s supervision of the Comité with elections for new officials taking place the following month. Predictably, when Huergo was elected President of the reorganized Comité, Peronist sport advocates were nowhere in sight. Given the election of the Comité’s new administration, the IOC considered the matter resolved, which allowed Argentine athletes to compete in Melbourne.80 However, Argentine Olympic participation did not entice the Revolución Libertadora to revive the project to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires.

The prospect of an Olympic Buenos Aires was heard once more only when the Revolución Libertadora withdrew from power. In 1958 the revolution allowed elections but the ban on Peronism was not lifted. Arturo Frondizi’s ticket, secretly endorsed by Perón from the exile, emerged as the winner. Midway into Frondizi’s term, José Oriani, then presiding over the Comité Olímpico Argentino, expressed to the IOC its “hopes as regards the site of the Olympic Games of 1968.”81 These hopes endured and survived a convoluted period of Argentine politics in a way that no politician of the time could. In 1962 Frondizi, defying the Army, lifted the ban on Peronism, whose candidates swept the March gubernatorial elections. When Frondizi refused to annul the elections, the Army deposed him. José María Guido, President of the Senate, replaced Frondizi. Guido’s was a puppet regime controlled by the military, which preferred the pretense of legality to openly seize power.82

Soon afterwards, a plan to continue with the Buenos Aires 1968 bid was announced. In June of 1962, a short two months after Guido took the oath of office, Hernán Giralt, mayor of Buenos Aires, sent to the IOC an “official application . . . requesting that our City be awarded the honour of staging the Olympic Games to be held in 1968.”83 Days later, Oriani, made explicit that the “application is endorsed and supported by the Argentine Olympic Committee . . . as well as by those of millions of sportsmen of our country.” Oriani framed the bid in historical terms. He argued:
that in several opportunities we made every possible effort in order to be entrusted the
holding of the greatest of all sport events. You remember that in the course of the 43rd.
Session of the I.O.C., held in Rome in 1949, Buenos Aires lost by one vote they right to
be chosen, and from that moment on we have not abandon our intention of staging the
Games, not only because we consider it a legitimate purpose but also because we are sure
that we shall be able to organize them maintaining and even endeavouring to surpass the
brightness and splendor they have always had.84

The argument that the Games had never been held in South America was also mentioned.85 To strengthen Buenos Aires’ bid, in August 1962 the Comité Olímpico Argentino produced a book. In addition to recounting Argentine Olympic history and describing the amenities that Buenos Aires had to offer, Argentine Olympic hopefuls clarified that the government decidedly supported their negotiations.86 The book highlighted the support to the bid from Olympic notable Carl Diem, described as “the spiritual successor of Baron de Coubertin,” who after a visit to the city declared, “It seems to us that the moment has come for the Argentine to offer the world an Olympic festival.”87

In spite of local and international encouragement, misgivings regarding the Buenos Aires’ bid ran high both in Argentina—even within the Comité Olímpico Argentino—and abroad. Jorge N. Parsons, a Comité’s vice-President, expressed his qualms to the IOC chancellor stating, “we are having so many difficulties here that one hesitates to decide.” Bearing in mind that Parsons thought that Buenos Aires was so well equipped that only the Olympic village would have to be constructed, his worries had to be political. Adding to domestic second-guessing was the IOC’s position on the bid. IOC chancellor, Otto Mayer, had warned Parsons that Brundage opposed the bid of Buenos Aires.88

Whether the dissent was kept among a small group of people or not taken into consideration, local Olympic officials continued with Buenos Aires’ bid. Perhaps they followed up just to save face. Starting with the 1960 Olympics, the IOC required that all candidate cities answer a questionnaire addressing their technical and logistical capabilities to host the event.89 In February 1963, the Comité Olímpico Argentino returned its questionnaire to the IOC. Alberto Prebisch, who had been appointed mayor of Buenos Aires, fully supported the bid.90 While the bid went on its way, internal dissent in the military allowed for another attempt at democracy, and elections were scheduled for July 1963. Arturo U. Illia was victorious—and Peronism was still banned. The following month, President-elect, Illia, assured Oriani that if the IOC chose Buenos Aires for 1968, “I can promise the most extensive support of the people and government, definitively united, in their efforts to coat the Olympic Games with a splendour according to its precedents.”91 With Illia’s endorsement, Oriani and Prebisch launched a last effort to convince IOC members to give the Games to Buenos Aires. Oriani affirmed that “Our country…following democratic principles pointed by our National Constitution, is ready to carry on its progress till the final recovery.”92 He surely forecasted the apprehension that the Argentine recent political history might have caused in the IOC.

The IOC session that selected the city for the 1968 Olympics met late in October 1963 in Baden-Baden; Illia had already been sworn into office. Illia’s and Oriani’s promises of national unity were totally unconvincing. Equally unpersuasive were the three Argentine delegates that delivered a presentation on behalf of the nation’s capital. It appeared that for the IOC members Buenos Aires’ bid did not even exist. In a landslide, Mexico City was granted the right to host the 1968 Olympics, while Buenos Aires received a meager two votes, one presumably from the lone Argentine IOC member. The result was a
disaster when compared to the city’s bid for the 1956 Olympics. That Buenos Aires’ bid survived such domestic political turmoil could be seen as a sign that Argentine politicians—Peronist or not—understood the uses to which sport and the Olympic Games could be subjected. However, that survival, as impressive as it was, did not pass muster with the IOC. Ultimately, the IOC’s disregard for Buenos Aires was not unwise. In June of 1966, President Illia’s fate was sealed by another coup. Although the nation hosted the football (soccer) FIFA World Cup in 1978, the dream of an Olympic Buenos Aires entered a long interregnum.

The Bid for the 2004 Games

The project of an Olympic Buenos Aires was dusted off in the 1990s by a Peronist government. During his presidential campaign, Carlos S. Menem promised a litany of traditional Peronist populist policies. However, soon after assuming the presidency in 1989, Menem replaced his party’s conventional economic platform with a neoliberal, market-oriented program focused on the liberalization, deregulation, and privatization of the economy. The dramatic shift in economic policy produced a strong macroeconomic performance between 1991 and 1997. Argentina’s successful story of reform became the darling of the economic international establishment. With domestic and international credibility on the rise, in 1994 Menem pushed a constitutional reform that would allow him to seek his reelection. The manipulation of institutions to his advantage was typical of Menem’s style of government, which did not help consolidate the fragile democratic system.93 Beyond merits and shortcomings, it was precisely during this period of radical reforms that Menem’s government articulated its bid for the 2004 Olympics. Although the election of the host city was scheduled for September 1997, Menem’s reelection for the 1995-1999 period allowed him to witness his Olympic campaign from start to finish.

According to politicians in his party, the idea of bidding for the 2004 Olympics originated with Menem himself.94 In regards to sport, Menem followed a traditionally-oriented Peronist policy. Even his critics acknowledged that Menem’s sport policy was the only area in which he proved to be a legitimate Peronist.95 The government support for sport was made evident in the funds poured into the organization of the 1995 Pan-American Games held in the coastal city of Mar del Plata. By the time of this event, it was quite clear in the Olympic Movement that Buenos Aires intended to bid for the 2004 Olympics. In mid-1994, Menem signed an executive decree creating the bid committee, led by Francisco A. Mayorga, state secretary of tourism and sports. The committee had a U.S. $6 million budget.96 Due to concerns about the expenditures of cities bidding for the Olympic Games, the work involved in the process, and the large number of cities interested in the 2004 Olympics, the IOC decided to implement a two-tiered selection process. In the first phase, an IOC evaluation commission would scrutinize the eleven cities’ bids and prepare a report. Based on the evaluation commission’s report, a selection college would choose five finalists on March 7, 1997. The second phase, which allowed IOC members to visit the five finalists, would involve the election of the host city during the IOC session held in Lausanne on September 5, 1997. Knowing the election process, Mayorga’s committee set out a comprehensive bidding plan.97

The Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee produced an impressive dossier. The three–volume tome started by describing a long and distinguished Argentine Olympic history, the close defeat of the bid for the 1956 Olympics, the grandeur of Buenos Aires, and the city’s love of sport, all of which gave the committee the “hope, strength and determination to struggle for the honor of hosting the Olympic Games in
South America for the first time in history."98 The historical arguments used by previous city’s bids had not been forgotten. However, knowing that history and claims of justice are relevant but hardly enough to gain the endorsement of the IOC, the Buenos Aires 2004 bid committee composed a comprehensive technical blueprint for the Games. The centerpiece was an “Olympic corridor,” a combination of three major avenues along which there were existing and projected sport facilities. These facilities would have permitted the staging of 24 of the 28 sport planned in a tight geographical area. The “Olympic corridor,” which included the Olympic stadium, village, and media center, promised convenient access and transportation to and between competition venues. According to the dossier, 75 percent of the venues were already in place, and the impact of the whole project on the city’s environment would be minimal. The improvement of urban infrastructure and the legacy of the Games were as much emphasized as the cultural programs projected.99

While the bid was amply supported in Argentina, Mayorga and his team traveled the world to make its details known to the Olympic family. Late in 1996, the IOC evaluation commission visited Buenos Aires and in February 1997 sent all eleven bidding cities individualized technical reports. In the case of Buenos Aires, the evaluation commission lauded the “Olympic corridor,” among other features of the blueprint. Although there were some criticisms the report was altogether positive. Mayorga informed Menem at once. The leader of the bid committee was confident that Buenos Aires would pass the selection college cut on March 7, 1997 to become one of the five finalists.100 He was right. A month later IOC member Marc Hodler announced in Lausanne that Buenos Aires had made the cut, becoming the only South American city left in the race for the 2004 Olympics. Menem was ecstatic. From then on, the key to the success of the bid was to convince IOC members that Buenos Aires was the best city for the Games. More than seventy IOC members accepted the invitation to visit Buenos Aires, most of whom were allegedly impressed with the city’s project.101 However, according to the media, some IOC members were wary of the local organizational aptitude as well as of the honesty of some Argentine officials.102

The days before the early September 1997 election, Buenos Aires’ bid was a major topic of discussion in Argentine society. In the meantime, bid officials as well as politicians—including Menem—, sport administrators, civic leaders, and businesspeople traveled to Lausanne for the election. The bid committee made a carefully prepared final presentation. Everybody knew that it was a long shot for Buenos Aires but given the praise received by the bid, there were reasonably high expectations that the city would at least make a very good showing. Some might have believed that a huge surprise was possible. Hugo Porta, then state secretary of sports, declared: “I had the hope to win in Lausanne, although I knew that we were not the candidates.”103 The hopes proved to be totally groundless. Buenos Aires tied with Cape Town in the first round with the fewest votes–16. In the run-off that determined which of the two cities would be eliminated, Cape Town won 62-44. It was a bitter pill for Argentine officials to accept that Buenos Aires did not pass the first round. After the election many in Argentina suggested possible reasons for the defeat, absence of Argentine sport administrators at the international level, weak sport and urban infrastructure, infrequent organization of premier international sport events, poor athletic performances in previous Olympic Games, inadequate state support for athletes, among others. As reasonable as they were, these observations did not address the viability of the Games in the face of the larger Argentine political and economic context. Perhaps the IOC did pay close attention to Argentina’s conditions in the 1990s and, more broadly, to its persistent and widespread political and economic instability.
Although the 1983 democratic transition put an end to more than fifty years of military intervention on Argentine politics, the nation was still vulnerable and the subject of institutional crises. Indeed, Menem’s inauguration took place six months earlier than scheduled because Raúl Alfonsín, his predecessor, resigned amidst a chaotic economic situation. Menem finished his second mandate in 1999 and transferred power to Fernando De la Rúa, but his economic policies generated an extraordinary degree of social exclusion and inequality. In 1998, the Argentine economy entered into a long recession. Added to De la Rúa’s own inabilities, this unpleasant legacy eventually led to a remarkable economic turn down and political crisis. De la Rúa resigned on December 20, 2001. His vice-President, displeased with the administration’s reaction to a corruption scandal, had resigned earlier. The interim President chosen by Congress resigned on December 31, 2001. The following day, Congress appointed another interim President, who called for elections in 2003. On January 25, 2002, Jacques Rogge, President of the IOC, referring to the Argentine crisis, declared, “Look what happens today in that country and imagine what would have occurred had we finally granted them the Olympic Games.” Rogge added that the IOC would award the Olympic Games to an emergent country only if it enjoys political, economic, and social stability, otherwise it “is a risk, as the current crisis in Argentina demonstrates.”

Given that so much rides for the Olympic Movement on celebrating successful Games, IOC member Richard W. Pound has contended, “it is easy to see that what is more important for the IOC is not necessarily to make the right choice for a particular city but to avoid making the wrong decision.” For Pound, a wrong decision is to “choose a city that proves to be incapable of organizing good Games.” In this case, the IOC did not make such a mistake. After the failed Buenos Aires bid for the 2004 Olympics, some Argentines expressed interest in renewing the Olympic dream. Those heard before the 2001 political and economic crisis rapidly dissipated; those heard afterwards are quietly starting to repeat the old aspirations. Their target seems to be 2016.

**Interpreting Buenos Aires’ Efforts to Host the Olympic Games**

Argentine politicians, sport administrators, and Olympic officials have shown interest in hosting the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires at various times in the twentieth century. Expressions of interest intensified after the creation in 1923 of the Comité Olímpico Argentino. Although Argentine Olympic officials have evidently perceived the attempts to bring the Olympic Games to Buenos Aires as an important aspect in their role as promoters of the Olympic Movement in their nation, some of their claims about the status of several of these attempts are, as indicated in the introduction of this paper, less evident. Some of the confusion regarding Buenos Aires’ efforts might stem from the fact that during the first half century of the IOC, it was not always clear what amounted to an “official” bid. Before the 1950s, applying for the Olympic Games was “a much less standardized and detail oriented bidding and selection process” than what it would become.

Even if the bidding and selection process was not developed and structured until the 1950s, it seems clear that early claims to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires were unsubstantiated. Both Senator Gonzalez’s comments in 1909 and Aldao’s in 1924 did not amount to more than amorphous manifestations of desire that one day Buenos Aires would host the Olympic Games. Although their comments indicate enthusiasm for the Olympic Movement, they did not include any comprehensive plan. Aldao’s promise of a Champ des sports, including a massive national stadium, to be built in his Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires (Buenos Aires Gymnastic and Fencing Club), can hardly be considered a plan.
Having presided over the Argentine Olympic delegation to the 1924 Paris Olympics, he must have realized that a Champ des sports was important but by no means the only requirement to host the Olympic Games. Perhaps his comments were meant to convey the Argentine commitment to the Olympic Movement following the creation of the Comité Olímpico Argentino. In spite of hypothetical governmental support, the Champ des sports never materialized.

The attempt to bring the Olympic Games to Buenos Aires in 1936 is more difficult to analyze and classify. Initial communications between local Olympic officials and the IOC indicate a somewhat stronger pledge to organize the event than Aldao’s 1924 promises. After the IOC manifested skepticism about Buenos Aires’ project, Aldao announced that whatever was needed for the Games would be finished before 1936, including the colossal stadium. Aldao even made vague promises related to assistance with travel and accommodation for visiting delegations. According to him, the government supported the effort of the Comité Olímpico Argentino. Aldao’s reassurance made the IOC change its mind and Buenos Aires was listed as a candidate in 1930. However, the city was not considered in the 1931 election. Running afoul of IOC politics, Aldao and Alvear resigned from the organization in 1930. If the wrangle between them and the IOC leadership was not enough to destroy the chances of Buenos Aires, the September 1930 overthrow of President Yrigoyen’s government killed the city’s hopes. Resignations from the IOC combined with political turmoil was too much instability for the IOC. After Aldao’s and Alvear’s resignations, the bid was more likely seen as imprudent even within Argentina.

Whether local or international officials withdrew Buenos Aires from the contest, the city did not reach the election. After the Argentine IOC members resigned from the IOC, there were no more strong indications that Buenos Aires was still interested in the Games. It is also likely that for the coup authorities bringing the Games to Buenos Aires was not important. For whatever reasons, the prospect of a 1936 Olympic Buenos Aires was abandoned both at home and abroad, which suggests that despite its initial strength, the project never reached any significant degree of maturity. Failure to reach the election stage for the 1936 Olympics did not discourage Argentine Olympic officials from wanting the 1940 Olympics, although comments were not accompanied with any plans and they quickly evaporated. Similarly, the idea to host the Games in Buenos Aires in 1960 was never developed. Those brief efforts, while showing commitment to an old hope and to the Olympic Movement, were merely informal expressions of interest.

The first attempt to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires that can be considered a full bid was the effort put forward for the 1956 Olympics. Fully embraced by Perón’s government, the bid was tied to the enormous importance that sport played in his political program and ambitions. In addition to arguing that Buenos Aires was a splendid city, that sport was wildly popular in Argentina, and that the Games had never been awarded to South America, Perón promised all kind of resources to host the event. Considering the ostentation displayed during the first Pan-American Games held in 1951 during his first presidency, it is likely that Perón would have fulfilled his promise. The bid rallied tremendous support in the IOC, eventually losing to Melbourne by one vote—the closest election ever for a bid. However, as pointed out, not all of South America was behind Buenos Aires’ bid. Rio de Janeiro had also long aspired to be the first regional city to host the Games. It is not improbable that the contest for this “first” worked against the election of Buenos Aires. Opposition to Perón’s autocratic regime also negatively influenced the outcome of the bid. Regardless of the reasons for the loss, the IOC must have been reassured with its decision when it learned that Perón had been ousted by a coup a year before
the 1956 Olympics. The mere thought of the countless uncertainties that would have arisen had the Games been awarded to Buenos Aires, must have been unsettling.

The second full bid was the attempt to host the 1968 Olympics in Buenos Aires. The Comité Olímpico Argentino repeated the arguments advanced in the race for the 1956 Olympics. The loss by one vote to Melbourne was constructed as a sign of unrequited Olympic commitment and used along with the claim saying that the Games had never been celebrated in South America as a sort of moral appeal. But the bid, which in the course of over two years endured and survived one coup and two democratically elected Presidents, generated anxieties in Argentina and abroad. There were doubts within the Comité, and IOC President Brundage was opposed to Buenos Aires for 1968. The problems were not technical but political. Facing domestic political instability and opposed by the IOC President himself, the bid did not have any future. At the time of the election, it received two solitary votes. In all probability, South American IOC members rallied behind the bid of Mexico City, which became the first Latin American city to host the Games in a landslide vote. The meager IOC support for Buenos Aires 1968 did not worry its members as much when President Illia was overthrown in 1966.

The last attempt to date to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires was the bid for the 2004 Olympics. It was the best Buenos Aires bid ever presented. The usual historic arguments claimed the Games on moral ground. In addition, the bid dossier included a comprehensive technical blueprint to host the Games, whose highlight was the praised “Olympic corridor.” The bid gathered strong domestic support and international attention. Consistent with President Menem’s market-oriented reforms, the bid was seen as a catalyst to showcase the progress of Argentina in the 1990s. However, local officials failed to assess or incorporate in their bid analyses and predictions the larger political and economic forces at play in Argentina. Encouraged by the economic boom, they could not, or did not want to, perceive those forces. This blindness reveals a poor understanding of IOC dynamics. The IOC, an institution with conservative lineaments, did not fail to locate the bid in the larger domestic and international context. Although it praised the technical aspects of the bid, the IOC doubted the viability of what was promised. A fragile political system, whose central feature is instability and an irregularly performing economy, was not the ideal framework for the IOC. The elimination of Buenos Aires in the first round was not by any means what Argentine officials imagined. But the IOC was right. The crash of the economy and the political disaster of late 2001 confirmed the acumen of the IOC’s customary position to elect host cities: prioritize stability, even if it means postponing the materialization of the universal values of the Games.

The protracted interest in hosting the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires sheds lights on the role and importance that Argentina has imagined for itself in the Olympic Movement. The expressions of interest and bids studied have usually been portrayed as a measure of continuity in the Argentine commitment to the Olympic Movement since its creation in 1894, as well as a sign of regional leadership in the diffusion of its ideals. Indeed, it has been a recurrent theme in the bids to maintain that Buenos Aires was carrying not only the aspirations of the Argentine people but also that of all South Americans. The hosting of the Games in Buenos Aires has also been predicted as an event that would take national and regional sport to new and unprecedented heights. Along with the rationale of strong historical leadership, Argentine Olympic hopefuls have insisted that the universalism inherent in the Olympic ideals merits bringing the Games to South America and that Buenos Aires is ideally suited for the challenge. This argument found even more vitality after Buenos Aires lost the 1956 Olympics to Melbourne by one
vote. Locally, this close election and the fact that Buenos Aires was a finalist for the 2004 Olympics have been thought as an indication of the distinctive position Argentina enjoys in the Olympic Movement.

In addition to the self-appointed leadership role in regional Olympic matters, Buenos Aires’ attempts to host the Olympic Games reveal an intention to situate the city among the great capitals of the world. This, of course, was intimately connected with the portrayal of Argentina as a vibrant nation at the “New World” center of Western civilization. The bids’ narratives told a story of Buenos Aires as a dynamic metropolis possessing the charm and the qualities essential to host the greatest of all sport events. This is consistent with the purposeful portrayal, domestically and internationally, by Argentine elites throughout the twentieth century of Buenos Aires as the Paris of South America. In the minds of many porteños as well as foreigners, Buenos Aires has such a Parisian character, which arguably makes it so different from all other South American cities. Seen as a European enclave, an Olympic Buenos Aires felt much closer to the Eurocentric project started by Coubertin in the early 1890s. The quest to garner the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires has cemented the Argentine own self-determined place in Latin America.

The continuities in the legitimating narratives constructed by Buenos Aires’ Olympic campaigns to project certain representations of the role, and the importance of Argentina in the Olympic Movement, as well as of Buenos Aires and Argentina in the Western world, have been accompanied by some fractures that show the changing relationship among politics, sport, and Olympic matters in Argentina. The earlier designs to host the Games in Buenos Aires were articulated at a time in which “sporting activity in Argentina was largely a private effort by various sport associations, while the state was conspicuous by its absence or apathy.” That is why Aldao’s Club de Gimnasia y Esgrima de Buenos Aires, along with the Comité Olímpico Argentino, was at the center of those efforts. The state was, of course, present, but its role was merely supportive. The actors carrying the work forward, albeit connected with the government, were in the private realm. This was quite visible in the preparations for the failed 1942 Pan-American Games. The structure changed with Perón. The state became conspicuously active in sport politics. In the bid for the 1956 Olympics, the government through its control of the sport and Olympic spheres became the main actor. After Perón, governments were never again apathetic about sport, but their involvement was not always so focused and centralized. Starting with the bid for the 1956 Olympics, the more the state apparatus controlled sport, the more the bids were tied to partisan political programs.

Even though failure has been the common denominator of the now nearly century-long aspiration to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires, there is much to learn from the continuities and fractures that is the history, of these attempts. The legitimating narratives constructed around Buenos Aires’ efforts constitute a fascinating entry to analyze the entangled connections of politics, sport, and the Olympic Movement in Argentina. In the attempt to construct an Olympic Buenos Aires, Argentines have, to use Benedict Anderson’s terminology, told themselves stories about who they are and who they want to become. After the relative stillness that followed the failed bid for the 2004 Olympics, the old Olympic hope is gradually being revived. The success of Argentine athletes in Athens, who won the nation’s first gold medal in more than fifty years, as well as the recent economic recovery, might be the forces behind the move. Whether or not Buenos Aires bids in the near future, the debate itself is forcing the Argentine people to ponder once again who they are and who they want to become.
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A Brief Excursus into the Future

Few months ago the Pan-American Sport Organization (PASO) held its general assembly in Buenos Aires. The occasion drew Olympic and sport leaders from the Western hemisphere and beyond. Indeed, Rogge made the long trip to Buenos Aires. As is customary for this kind of sport events, the gathering was also visited by a number of local politicians. The Comité Olímpico Argentino’s set up in the Hotel Panamericano was impeccable. Although the PASO general assembly was to discuss hemispheric sport affairs, for some the temptation to resuscitate the dream of Olympic Games in Buenos Aires was impossible to abandon. After all, it was a gathering of the hemispheric Olympic family and it was in all places in Buenos Aires. Opening the general assembly, Argentine Vice-President, Daniel Scioli, declared, “The city of Buenos Aires can be the host of the Olympic Games in 2016. From the current recovery of our country we have to work towards this objective that, without a doubt, we can achieve.” Scioli went on to say that the Games provides ample opportunity to develop industries such as sport and tourism. Rogge and Mario Vázquez Raña, President of PASO, were supportive of the idea. While the former thought that Buenos Aires had the necessary conditions to bid, the latter believed that it has the capacity to organize the Olympic Games.

However, the renewed prospect of an Olympic Buenos Aires did not entice all local political and sport leaders. Without contradicting either Scioli or influential Olympic actors, Claudio Morresi, state secretary of sports, warned, “That is a dream of everyone, but we must be cautious.” Some journalists were more emphatic against a bid. Mariano Ryan, writing for the Buenos Aires daily Clarín, affirmed that in spite of the recent economic recovery, a country with the levels of unemployment, poverty, and insecurity of Argentina couldn’t aspire to host the Games in the near future. He also mentioned that the South American Games, a rather humble operation compared to the Olympic Games, scheduled to take place in Buenos Aires in November of this year, is giving headaches to the city’s organizers. It is worth mentioning that late in 2001 Córdoba, a city in the center of Argentina, bailed out from organizing the 2002 South American Games—an embarrassing defeat for a nation with Olympic aspirations. The organization of the 2006 South American Games in Buenos Aires is locally portrayed as another measure of the country’s recovery.

Critics of a future bid to host the Olympic Games in Buenos Aires rightly point out the social exclusion and inequality raging in Argentina. This does not deny the stabilization and growth of the economy in the last three years but indicates the necessity to debate whether the nation should even consider bidding for the Games in such a social environment. What the critics only imply tangentially, since the economic and social spheres are always intimately interwoven with it, is the political viability to bring the Games to Buenos Aires. Given Argentina’s long history of institutional instability and lack of credibility, this seems to be the crucial point. Things might be changing on this front too. Political scientists Steven Levitsky and María Victoria Murillo believe, “If institutional instability remains a central feature of contemporary Argentine politics, however, the scope of that instability may be narrowing.” The democratic institutions established in the 1980s and the market-oriented institutions created in the 1990s have survived several political and economic crises. The prospect of renewed military intervention seems to have faded. For Levitsky and Murillo this core institutional stability constitutes a significant break with earlier patterns, and it permits a measure of optimism about Argentina’s political future, even as the country struggles to recover from the devastating crises of the not-too-distant past.
Political and economic institutions take a long time and a great deal of effort to solidify. Until that mild optimism materializes in stable, credible, and predictable institutions, the dream of an Olympic Buenos Aires remains fragile. In the meantime, Argentina should attend to its pressing social needs and demands so that everyone in the nation can have Olympic dreams. However, if Buenos Aires articulates a bid in the near future, one has to pay close attention; for, as Pound has observed, the IOC’s results in terms of selecting host cities “are often astonishing, and have been known to defy subsequent analysis.” With the IOC one never knows for sure.

Endnotes

1 Natives of Buenos Aires are known as porteños in Spanish.
3 See, for example, La Nación (Buenos Aires) (hereafter La Nación), 9 June 1997, Suplemento especially, p. 3.
5 Simón Silvestrini has argued this point in an unpublished manuscript entitled “Juegos Olímpicos de 1896 al 2008. Estadísticas. Candidaturas y sedes. Ciudades, países, continentes.” In his account, Silvestrini included the attempt to host the 1956 equestrian competitions that could not be organized in Melbourne.
9 Joaquin V. Gonzalez, Obras Completas (Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de La Plata, 1935), pp. 9, 344.
10 Ibid.
13 For an account of this period’s struggles, see Torres, “Tribulations and Achievements;” idem, “‘If We Had Had Our Argentine Team Here!’ Football and the 1924 Argentine Olympic Team,” Journal of Sport History 30/1 (2003), pp. 1-24; and idem, “A Time of Conflict: Argentine Sports and the 1924 Olympic Team,” in Kevin B. Wamsley, Robert K. Barney and Scott G. Martyn (eds.), The Global Nexus Engaged: Past,
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15 Ibid., pp. 6-8.
16 Ibid., p. 8.
23 Ibid.
24 Anon. to Ricardo C. Aldao, 10 August 1928, “JO Ete 1936,” IOC Archives.
26 Ricardo C. Aldao to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 3 April 1929, “JO Ete 1936,” IOC Archives. In 1927 Alvear dissolved the *Comité Olímpico Argentino* and conferred to the *Confederación Argentina de Deportes* (Argentine Confederation of Sports) the attributes of the former. Because this organization functioned as the National Olympic Committee, it was referred to as *Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Argentino* (CADCBA) until 1956, at which point the *Comité Olímpico Argentino* and the *Confederación Argentina de Deportes* once again became separate entities. Despite the period in which the CADCBA functioned as the Olympic authority in Argentina, for simplicity’s sake and to avoid confusion, I will use *Comité Olímpico Argentino* throughout the text.

32 Miguel de Beistegui to A. G. Berdez, 30 April 1931, “JO Ete 1936,” IOC Archives.


43 Juan Carlos Palacios to F. W. Rubien, 27 September 1939, “Record Series 26/20/37, Box 202” (hereafter “Box 202”), Avery Brundage Collection, 1908-1982 (hereafter Avery Brundage Collection), University of Illinois Archives.

44 See, for example, ibid; and Juan Carlos Palacios and Oscar J. Camilión to Henri de Baillet-Latour, 5 December 1939, “Argentine. Correspondance. 1907-1965” (hereafter “Argentine”), IOC Archives.

45 Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 12 January 1940; and Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 15 July 1940, “Box 202,” Avery Brundage Collection.

46 See First Panamerican Congress, ca. August 1940; and Panamerican Sports Committee, ca. August 1940, “Box 202,” Avery Brundage Collection. This committee was the precursor to what is now the Pan-American Sports Organization (PASO). See also Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Argentino, Memoria y balance general-inventario. Periodo: 1 de octubre de 1939 al 30 de septiembre de 1940 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1940), pp. 15-29.

47 See also Confederación Argentina de Deportes-Comité Olímpico Argentino, Memoria y balance general-inventario. Periodo: 1 de octubre de 1940 al 30 de septiembre de 1941 (Buenos Aires: n.p., 1941), pp. 17-36.

48 Boletín de los deportes. Publicación oficial del comité organizador 1, (January 1941), p. 3.

49 Ibid.
50 See Juan Carlos Palacios to Avery Brundage, 16 September 1942, “Box 202,” Avery Brundage Collection.
61 Quoted in Rein, “‘El Primer Deportista’: The Political Use and Abuse of Sport in Peronist Argentina,” p. 69. Ibid, 56. In 1951 the Comité Olímpico Argentino modified its bylaws establishing that the government would appoint the Comité’s President.
62 Arnaldo Guinle to Sigfrid Edström, 21 April 1949; Antônio Prado Jr. to Sigfrid Edström, 23 April 1949; and José Ferreira Santos to Sigfrid Edström, 27 April 1949, “JO Ete 1956,” IOC Archives.
63 See the material in the folder “JO Ete 1956,” IOC Archives.
64 Comité Olímpico Uruguaiano to Comité Olímpico Internacional, 19 April 1949, “JO Ete 1956,” IOC Archives.
Ibid., p. 24.

Ibid.


Avery Brundage to Enrique Alberdi, 28 April 1956, “Argentine,” IOC Archives.


The government did not support some athletes who swore allegiance to Perón. For details of the government’s action see the copious correspondence written by the IOC President, the IOC chancellor, the Argentine IOC members, and several Argentine Olympic officials in this regard in “Argentine,” IOC Archives.


Ibid.

Buenos Aires aspira a los Juegos Olímpicos de 1968, p. 54.

Ibid., p. 55.


See Alberto Prebisch to Avery Brundage, 11 February 1963; José Oriani and Alberto P. Petrolini to Avery Brundage, 15 February 1963; and Replies to the Questionnaire to be Answered in Presenting Buenos Aires as Site for the XIX Olympic Games 1968, “JO Ete 1968,” IOC Archives.


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97 The IOC has subsequently developed a two-stage process. Cities are first “applicants” and only after passing an initial evaluation, they advance to the second stage and become “candidates.”


104 For an analysis of De la Rúa’s government, the causes of the crisis, and the crisis itself see Romero, *A history of Argentina in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 333-349.


107 Ibid.


111 Rein, “‘El Primer Deportista’: The Political Use and Abuse of Sport in Peronist Argentina,” p. 56.


Mariano Ryan, “Por ahora, imposible,” Clarín, 29 May 2006, http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/05/29/deportes/d-02601.htm (accessed 15 July 2006). The 2006 South American Games were originally awarded to La Paz, Bolivia. However, because of domestic instability in that country, in June 2005 this decision was declared void. In August of that year, Buenos Aires was elected to host the event.

After Buenos Aires and Bogotá, Colombia proved incapable of hosting the event, the 2002 South American Games were finally held in four Brazilian cities, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, Curitiba and Belém.


Pound, Inside the Olympics, p. 200.