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Mass Art, High Art, and the Avant-Garde: A Response to David Novitz
Noël Carroll

David Novitz’s very lively response to my theory of mass art comes in three parts: 1) a rejection of my characterization of the view that he purposed in his article “Ways of Artmaking: The High and the Popular in Art”; 2) an attack on the positive theory that I propounded in my article “The Nature of Mass Art”; and 3) a proposal of his own theory of mass art. In what follows I will take up each of these issues in turn.

1. Carroll’s Interpretation of Novitz

In “The Nature of Mass Art,” I attributed to Novitz what I called the “Elimination Theory of Mass Art.” This is the view that “there really is no such thing as mass art, apart from the role certain objects play in reinforcing pre-existing social class distinctions and identities.” Novitz denies that he holds such a view. Rather, he maintains that his essay was intended to explain how we happen to have the distinction between popular art and high art. Moreover, he asserts that the reinforcing of class distinctions is no part of his explanation.

Now it seems to me that there is some ambiguity in Novitz’s original essay about what he takes himself to be explaining. Explaining how we happen to have the distinction between popular art and high art can be thought to involve at least: 1) how the distinction emerged historically; or, 2) how it continues to thrive in our society. I would have thought that Novitz’s original essay had answers to both these questions, though in his response he now claims to have offered only an answer to the first question.

His explanation of the emergence of the distinction is a fairly well known one, advanced by, for example, Peter Burger, among others, in his Theory of the Avant-Garde in the early seventies. It is that “serious” artists in the nineteenth century reached for aesthetic separatism — in a way that cleaved popular art from high art — as a means to prevent art from being subsumed under the dominant category of, broadly speaking, utilitarian-market value. Whether this explanation is successful, of course, depends upon its ability to deal with certain incongruous facts — viz., that anti-aesthetic high art, which also sustained an animus to what was thought of as popular art, arose quickly on the heels of aestheticism — and upon its ability to deal with certain rival theories — e.g., that the aesthetic separat-
ism to which Novitz alludes really emerged in the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, it is true that Novitz does offer the aforesaid explanation of the emergence of the distinction between popular art and high art.

However, even if Novitz's explanation of the emergence of the distinction is persuasive, that still leaves open the question of why the distinction still has any force. Of course, one explanation might be that the considerations that first brought the distinction into being still compel us. Yet, not only does this seem unlikely, but Novitz himself seems to deny it. Rather, he maintains that the distinction was, as we say nowadays, "co-opted." He writes: "art for art's sake, and the formalism that was part of it, floated to the 'top' of the society, to a cultured elite who saw themselves as a cut above the vulgar, the popular, arts. What begins to emerge is that the distinction between high art and popular art does not merely distinguish different types of art, but, much more than this, it actually accentuates and reinforces traditional class divisions with capitalist society." And later he maintains that "the distinction between the high arts and the popular arts is a social one...."

Now I submit that if we ask what the basis of the continued force of this social distinction is, in the context of Novitz's essay, a natural, unstrained reading produces the obvious answer that it is the reinforcement of traditional class divisions. I do not see how Novitz can deny that this is implied by his essay. On the other hand, if we grant the author the perogative to have the final say in this matter, then I think that there is a problem with Novitz's essay that I did not remark upon in "The Nature of Mass Art," viz., it is not an adequate social explanation of the distinction between high art and popular art. For it does not explain the continued existence of the distinction. As I see it, Novitz is now faced with a dilemma: either he admits to the reinforcement hypothesis or there is an explanatory lacuna in his theory. Taking the former horn of the dilemma indicates that he does buy into the Elimination Theory (as I have defined it), while taking the latter horn of the dilemma gives him a less convincing theory than the one that I attributed to him.

Novitz maintains that he is not a proponent of the Elimination Theory because social facts are real. Thus, he believes that popular art really exists. Here, I believe that our apparent differences are purely verbal. I wrote, as Novitz himself confirms by quotation, that the Elimination Theorist holds that "there really is no such thing as popular or mass art, apart from the role certain objects play in reinforcing pre-existing social class distinctions and identities" (emphasis added).

Notice that the italicized qualification in this characterization of the Elimination Theory allows that the elimination theorist may grant that the distinction is a real one, but only at the social level. My point, as the preceding quotation indicates, relied upon enlisting the ordinary language contrast between "really" versus "conventionally." If Novitz wants to reject this contrast on the grounds that conventions are real, I am happy to go
along with this, and to rephrase the characterization as "Elimination Theorists do not think that the high art/popular art distinction exists except as a convention" (specifically as a convention motivated by class interests).

There is not much difference, as I see it, between this and what I originally wrote, and I believe that both formulations capture the view expressed in "Ways of Artmaking." If Novitz’s problem is with the label "Elimination Theory," then let us change it to "The Social Reduction Theory" — where it is understood that the relevant reduction is to social facts. That will still be enough for me to run my argument.

Lastly, Novitz criticizes my characterization of his view on the grounds that I illicitly inferred from his social reduction theory of popular art that he held a social reduction theory of mass art. The ground for my original inference is simple. At the time that I wrote my essay, Novitz drew no distinction between popular art and mass art. Now, in the face of my criticism, he has drawn one. That is, he has produced a theory of mass art. Thus, at this stage in the dialectic, whether my inference was illicit is a less pressing question than whether Novitz’s new, rival theory of mass art is superior to my own. I will turn to this issue in the last section of my rebuttal. But before engaging that topic, let me address Novitz’s criticisms of my positive theory of mass art.

2. Novitz’s Criticisms

In reviewing Novitz’s objections to my theory, I have the recurrent sense that he has misconstrued my project. It was my intention to offer an analysis of mass art in the contemporary world. However, I do announce that my theory will also pertain to certain works from earlier periods; indeed, I explicitly admit that the novel is one important, potential source of mass art which predates our current age of mass culture. Thus, it comes as somewhat of a surprise to me that Novitz’s major counterexamples to my theory are nineteenth century novels. For insofar as I acknowledge that novels are apt to be covered by the theory, it is difficult to see how, in principle, they constitute counterexamples. Indeed, I would count most eighteenth century novels of the Gothic variety as mass art. And, of course, I will count pulp novels of any vintage as mass art. Thus, why novels — "drawn from a hat" in the manner Novitz does — should weigh against my theory is a mystery.

Of course, I would question whether a novel like James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake is an instance of mass art. But that is an avant-garde novel. I am committed to the view that avant-garde novels are not mass art. But none of Novitz’s putative counterexamples are avant-garde novels.

Novitz places a great deal of emphasis on the fact that my theory may count works from earlier centuries as mass art. I certainly concede this
more than once in my essay; and with certain cases, I am more than ready to bite the bullet and agree that they are mass art — for example, I mention Japanese woodcuts (see "The Nature of Mass Art," footnote 41). Novitz seems to think that this is a problem, but I don't. Rather, it is to be expected when one is analyzing the concept of an historical phenomenon that emerges over time.

When Marx analyses the concept of the commodity which was and remains central to capitalist exchange, he admits that the account may apply to pre-capitalist objects. Indeed, this is what we would anticipate of a form that evolved over a historical process. But his account is not compromised by this. His analysis is no less instructive. Similarly, when I analyse the notion of the mass art objects that are central to contemporary mass culture, the fact that my analysis picks out historical forebears should not problematize my analysis.

Speaking broadly, the biggest worry that Novitz has about my theory is that he believes that it precludes the possibility of high art being mass art. But here I believe that he has simply misread me. I never claim that high art as such cannot be mass art. Rather, I maintain that avant-garde art — which, I assert, "has the best claim to being the high art of our epoch" — cannot be mass art. Though I may be historically wrong in regarding avant-garde art as the high art of our times, from a logical point of view, I have not precluded the possibility that some high art is mass art. If *Oliver Twist* is high art, it may very well be mass art as well. Moreover, since most of Novitz's counterexamples are motivated by his misperception that I am committed to the view that in principle high art cannot be mass art, many of his objections miss their mark before they even get off the ground.

My theory of mass art states three conditions which are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for something to count as mass art. To iterate: *x* is a mass artwork if and only if 1) *x* is an artwork 2) *x* is produced and distributed by a mass delivery technology 3) which is intentionally designed to gravitate in its structural choices toward those choices which promise accessibility for the largest number of untutored (or relatively untutored) audiences. Novitz leaves the first condition unquestioned, and he lavishes his attention on the second and third conditions.

Novitz's attack on the second condition — the mass technology condition — is strange in several respects. On the one hand, he advances certain counterexamples against this condition, like trinkets, as if this condition alone was necessary and sufficient for counting something as mass art. But, of course, since this condition is only a necessary condition, it should come as no surprise that non-mass art objects might share this feature with mass art objects and yet not count as mass art since they are precluded by the other conditions in the theory. For example, trinkets may not count as mass art because they fail to meet the first condition — i.e., they may not be art. (I say "may," here, because in some instances certain so-called trinkets may be art; what is needed to make this discussion
fruitful would be a concrete, historical case of a sort that Novitz fails to provide).

On the other hand, a second jarring feature of Novitz's attack on the mass technology condition is that despite his objections to it, he appears to take it up unrevised when he comes to advancing his own theory of mass art. One must wonder why if the mass technology condition is as filmsy as Novitz advert, he later embraces it.

One of Novitz's counterexamples to my theory is a recording of a piece by Mozart. This example is ambiguous. It blurs the distinction between the artwork as composition and the artwork as performance. Surely, Mozart's original composition is not a mass artwork. So we must be talking about some performance, where the performance in question is an electronically constructed one, rather than a mere recording. Is this a counterexample to my theory of mass art?

I think not. For I do not preclude that a work that we think of as high art can be a work of mass art. I only deny that a work of avant-garde art can be mass art. And Mozart's music is not avant-garde. So a Mozart recording of the sort in question may be a work of mass art depending upon whether it meets my other criteria – notably the third condition which we may call the accessibility condition. My hunch is that such a performance will not meet the accessibility condition, but I could be wrong here. And, if I am wrong, I am nevertheless willing to live with consequence that part of the contemporary recording industry's production of what is called classical music belongs to mass culture.

Again, I doubt that I will be driven to this conclusion in any way that I should find embarrassing once we attend to particular cases. For I predict that most of the relevant classical music will fail to meet my accessibility condition. Of course, there is what might be labeled the "Boston Pops/Hollywood Bowl phenomena": classical music that has been doctored, edited or taken out of context in order to make it accessible. Recordings of this sort might plausibly count as mass art, or, perhaps more accurately, middle-brow art (see "The Nature of Mass Art," footnote 32). But the existence of such recordings does not compromise the distinction that I am out to draw between contemporary mass art and avant-garde art (i.e., contemporary high art) that, in addition, is produced and delivered by a mass technology.

Undoubtedly, Novitz would attempt to block the move I attempted to make two paragraphs ago when I denied that Mozart's compositions were mass art. For Novitz has a very expansive view of mass technology. For him, very few works of art do not involve a mass delivery technology. Among these mass technologies he includes paper and pencil, inked quills and vellum, fountain pens and sketch books. So if Mozart had access to a pen and a piece of paper, then he had access to a mass delivery technology.

However, I think that it strains our ordinary sense of English to regard a pen and a piece of paper as a mass delivery technology. Indeed, I think
that in ordinary English, it is bizarre to call pen and ink a “technology.”

Doesn’t the relevant sense of “technology” have connotations of industrial production? I stipulated that a mass delivery technology was a technology with the capacity to deliver the same performance or object to more than one reception site simultaneously. And, I not only question whether Mozart could write fast enough to do this; I also wonder whether pencil and paper constitutes a technology in any natural understanding of that word.

Novitz also claims that the belly of a violin is a mass technology according to my stipulation, since it can deliver a sound to more than one reception site at the same time. However, here he overlooks my observation (see “The Nature of Mass Art,” footnote 37) that in discriminating discrete reception sites, we will need to seek guidance from ordinary language where, of course, it is not customary to regard the front and the back of a concert hall as discrete reception sites.

In disputing the mass technology condition of my theory of mass art, Novitz raises the case of Steven Spielberg thinking up the plot of his next movie. This is supposed to count against the requirement that mass artworks be produced and distributed by a mass delivery technology. I don’t see why. If Steven Spielberg fails to make that plot into a film by means of the mass technology of the movies, his musings hardly comprise a mass artwork, or even part of one. Any Hollywood contract lawyer will support me on this one. Of course, I never maintained that a mass technology was the only ingredient in the production of a mass artwork, but that it was simply a necessary ingredient. On the other hand, doesn’t Novitz’s Spielberg example begin to insinuate a commitment to a rather suspicious tenet of Idealism?

In my view, the most interesting condition in my theory is the third condition which we can refer to as the accessibility condition. This condition distinguishes mass art from avant-garde art – i.e., the high art of our time – and, therefore, distinguishes mass art from avant-garde art that is produced and distributed via a mass delivery technology. However, it is the accessibility condition that Novitz appears to regard as the least palatable element in my theory.

According to the accessibility condition, what we refer to as mass art in our culture must be such that it is designed to gravitate in its structural and stylistic choices (and perhaps even in its content) towards choices that are easily accessible to mass untutored audiences. What is called mass art in our culture has a function – to elicit and to engage mass audiences. In order to do this it must be designed in a way that is accessible to mass audiences. This, in turn, broadly determines or constrains the structures, styles and even subjects it tends to deploy. Specifically, it gravitates to those structural and stylistic choices that best realize its function, viz., ones that are easily accessible, virtually on first exposure, to masses of untutored audiences.
Novitz questions the notion of untutored audiences that I invoke in the accessibility condition. He thinks that if a specimen of mass art involves the use of a natural language, then the audiences must at least be tutored in the language in question. In order to understand an English-speaking film, one needs to understand English. And the acquisition of English requires tutoring.

First, it is not clear that following an English-speaking film like Alien 3 or Mad Max always does require facility in English (and my account of mass art helps explain why this should be so). But even granting that much mass art may require facility in a relevant natural language, this does not cut against my claims about untutored audiences. For in my sense of tutored, the tutoring at issue involves training in specialized background knowledge, including training in deciphering erudite codes, cues, implications, and allusions. But one does not need specialized training in order to understand mass artworks in one's own language; one already knows one's own language. No special tutoring is required.

Moreover, the English speaker who watches a Hong Kong film does not require special tutorials to follow the mass art structures deployed in a Jackie Chan movie. And in order to deal with whatever language difficulties these films may present, mass film distributors most frequently resort to dubbing such films into languages the relevant audiences already speak, or, less frequently, they resort to subtitles in languages the relevant audiences already read. Indeed, the preference for dubbing over subtitles confirms the tendency in the mass arts to gravitate toward choices that presuppose the least amount of uncommon knowledge across the targeted mass audiences.

Novitz finds my claims about untutored audiences unconvincing because he thinks that audiences need background knowledge about the law, about mental illness, parody, human foibles, and so on in order to follow L.A. Law and Twin Peaks. Now I'm not sure you need to know anything about mental illness in order to follow Twin Peaks. The background information relevant here would be better found in horror films than in medical journals; while most of the required legal "knowledge" required by L.A. Law that is not supplied directly (and accessibly) by the narration itself probably comes to the viewer from having been exposed to previous law shows. That is, if these TV programs require any background training, it comes from the province of mass art itself, which, as my theory contends, tutors its audience to a limited extent through formulaic repetition. Thus, neither Twin Peaks nor L.A. Law confound what I say about untutored audiences.

Novitz fears that the notion of accessibility that I employ is dubious. For what is accessible to one person may not be accessible to another. Some people may find Mozart and Shakespeare more accessible than rap. Granted. But this misses the issue. The question is about what masses of untutored people find easily accessible. It does not seem plausible to suppose that masses of untutored people find The Tempest more accessible.
than “Fight the Power.” Novitz may respond that masses of people could be trained so that they find *The Tempest* accessible. But then they would not be untutored. Nor would their newfound access to *The Tempest* diminish their grasp of “Fight the Power.”

Novitz notes that accessibility may change over time. I wouldn’t want to dispute this. But that does not challenge my theory. My theory maintains that mass art has a function which predisposes it to search out easily accessible structures. At time $t_5$, mass art gravitates toward the most easily accessible structures available at time $t_5$. At time $t_{15}$, a mass artwork of that vintage will seek out the most easily accessible structure available at $t_{15}$. Needless to say, the most easily accessible structures available at $t_{15}$ may differ from those at $t_5$. Iris shots, for example, may be later replaced by close-ups.

Thus, that degrees of accessibility may change with history does not challenge the claim that mass art gravitates toward what is most accessible. Mass art tends in the direction of accessibility, specifically in terms of what is accessible in the context of its production, even though what counts as accessible at one point in time may undergo mutation later.

My third condition — the accessibility condition — is a functional-structural requirement for mass art. That the function in question might be realized by different structures at different times does not contravene the requirement in question. Marx claimed that the forces of production gravitate toward maximizing productivity. This generalization, though perhaps false, is not undermined by noting that at one point in history the forces of production are steam-driven and at another point they are electrically powered. Likewise, mass art, given its function, gravitates toward accessible structures — i.e., accessible in context. This is a structural requirement even if, given the historical circumstances, the specific structures in question vary somewhat.

Nor is this concession to history on my part something that should astound Novitz. I advertise that I am dealing with historical phenomena throughout my essay. I only deny that exclusively historical considerations can provide an account of mass art. I never contend that history should have no role to play in our understanding of mass art. Whether I invoke history in the application of my theory does not undercut my view despite what Novitz suggests at the end of the second section of his essay. I would have given up the game only if I had been forced to admit that my theory involves only historical considerations. But Novitz’s objections have not compelled me to that admission.

Novitz’s leading counterexample to my accessibility condition is *Sense and Sensibility*. Presumably it is art; I won’t quibble with that. And, it is certainly distributed by means of a mass delivery technology: the printing press. Is it mass art? On my view that depends upon whether it meets the accessibility condition. Whether it does requires a careful inspection of the novel in question and its historical context. Unfortunately, Novitz
provides us with neither. So I am unsure about how we should categorize *Sense and Sensibility*.

But whether, once scrutinized, it is categorized as mass art, my theory is not threatened, since I countenance some (indeed, many) widely marketed novels — including not only pulps but well-written ones as well — as mass artworks. On the other hand, if, upon close examination, *Sense and Sensibility* turns out not to be mass art because it is not easily accessible to mass untutored audiences, that’s okay too, since I agree that some novels are not mass art. In any case, *Sense and Sensibility* will not present a clear-cut counterexample to anything I’ve claimed until Novitz tells us more about it, or, at least, more about what he thinks about it.

Actually, I have to confess that I’m really not sure what Novitz intends to prove by means of *Sense and Sensibility*. Is it that he thinks that it is mass art, but my theory unjustifiably excludes it? Or, is it that he thinks that it is not mass art, but that my theory fails to exclude it, as he, Novitz, thinks my theory should? The text, unpromisingly, suggests each of these problems in different places. First, Novitz says that Austen did design her works to be accessible, which suggests the former objection, but later he says that her works were not so designed, which suggests the latter objection. But these objections cancel each other out. Novitz can’t have it both ways.

A charitable interpretation of Novitz’s understanding of *Sense and Sensibility* is probably that Austen intended her novels to be accessible to her readership, but not to be accessible to mass untutored audiences — where “her readership” and “mass untutored audiences” are not co-extensive. Of course, whether Austen designed *Sense and Sensibility* to be accessible to her readership is irrelevant to whether it is mass art in my sense of the category; Stockhausen undoubtedly designed his works to be accessible to his (rather specialized) audience. Thus, if Novitz in his role as literary historian is right — of course, I am not agreeing that he is — and Austen did not design *Sense and Sensibility* for easy accessibility by mass untutored audiences, then on my theory it would not count as mass art. Yet in his conclusion Novitz claims to have shown that on my theory, Jane Austen’s novels are mass art. Of course, this conclusion will not upset my applecart for reasons I’ve already rehearsed. However, I cannot refrain from remarking that this surmise on Novitz’s part contradicts what seems to me the most charitable interpretation of his earlier, already conflicting remarks.

**Novitz’s Theory of Mass Art**

Novitz concludes his disagreement with my theory of mass art by propounding a view of his own. On Novitz’s view, “a mass work of art is 1) a work of art 2) whose production or delivery involves the use of mass technology 3) with the intention thereby a delivering the work to as many
people as possible.” The major difference between my theory and Novitz’s is that his theory is not committed to the view that mass artworks are always designed to be understood by large numbers of viewers: they need only be intended to be delivered to lots of people.

According to Novitz there are two senses of mass art. The first sense of mass art pertains to items produced and delivered by a technology capable of delivering it to two reception sites simultaneously. The second sense of mass art pertains to items designed to be understood by large numbers of untutored people. Novitz says that I run these two senses together. I wouldn’t have thought that I conflated these two senses: I constructed an account of mass art where each of these discriminable senses plays a role as a necessary condition of mass art. Is that a matter of running the two senses together? Or, is it a matter of constructing a third, more adequate sense of the term?

Novitz also claims that I have given no argument for my “running together” of these conditions. Specifically, Novitz is leary of my invocation of the accessibility condition. But despite Novitz’s accusation, I thought that I offered a number of arguments in favor of this move. The first was that it did a better job than rival accounts of tracking the notion of mass art as that term has been used in our common discourse throughout this century. When someone like Dwight Macdonald excoriates mass culture and its products, what he is talking about are putative artworks that are not only mass produced but which are designed for easy consumption by mass audiences.

Novitz believes that his theory only emphasizes the first sense of mass art. But the first sense of mass art is not enough. In ordinary discourse, most of us would hesitate to call the films of Stan Brakhage mass art, though they are produced and distributed by a mass technology. My theory of mass art is sensitive to that hesitancy. My theory tracks usage better than a view of mass art that relies primarily on Novitz’s first sense of the term. And, that is a dialectical argument in favor of the way I build my theory.

Second, I maintain that my theory of mass art has useful explanatory consequences for the empirical study of mass art. For one can derive an instructive explanatory hypothesis from the accessibility condition of my theory. Indeed, my third condition might be read as informing a broad research program, viz., if one wishes to isolate the key features of what in our culture we refer to as mass art, look for those structures, stylistic choices and even narrative themes that enhance the accessibility of the objects in question for mass untutored audiences. That is, investigate the structures of the items that we pretheoretically think of as mass art in terms of their capacity to engage mass untutored audiences. Therein lies an important part of an account of their emergence, their popularity and their continued existence. That my theory of mass art promises explanatory advantages for empirical research represents yet another consideration
in favor of the way in which I construct my theory.

On the other hand, Novitz says that his theory emphasizes the first sense of mass art noted above — the technology sense. I am not sure why Novitz is so relaxed about this given the pummeling to which he subjected my technology condition in the second section of his rebuttal of my theory. Perhaps by his conclusion, he feels that he has learned to live with my technology condition. But I think that it is obvious that one cannot hope to proffer a theory of what we call mass art that places primary emphasis on the technology sense of mass art. That simply ignores too much avant-garde art of the sort that is produced and distributed by means of mass technology.

According to Novitz’s theory, something is a mass artwork when it is a work of art, involving the use of a mass delivery system with the intention to deliver the work to as many people as possible. Thus, if a group of avant-gardists commandeered a network television frequency in order to present a highly hermetic drama for the express purpose of not only outraging the bourgeoisie, but of confounding just about everyone else, that would count as a work of mass art on Novitz’s view. That is, our avant-gardists intend to deliver their production to as many people as possible while at the same time they intend to dumbfound that audience in a gesture of artistic contempt. But is this the sort of phenomenon that people have in mind when they talk about mass art?

Novitz thinks that an advantage of his theory over mine is that he can count a BBC production as mass art whereas I do not. But I am not so sure that the issue is so clear cut. If the BBC production is designed to be accessible to mass untutored audiences — layered with explanatory interludes, parsed by a barrage of cinematic techniques and edited for TV — such a production might be mass art on my view. On the other hand, if the performance is intentionally designed in a way that renders it still inaccessible to a mass audience, I see no problem in treating it on a par with avant-garde art that is produced and delivered by means of a mass technology. Surely it cannot count as an advantage of Novitz’s theory that it can regard esoteric art as mass art.

Clearly, the major bone of contention between Novitz and myself is that I see our reigning concept of mass art as bound up in large part with a contrast between it and esoteric, avant-garde art. Though these two art practices do not exhaust the full range of the art of our time, they are the most conspicuous and the most dominant art practices in our culture — practices that define themselves in large measure in opposition to each other. That my theory tracks this distinction — which is reflected in our continuing, common discourse about mass art — and that Novitz’s theory erases this opposition counts in favor of my theory and against Novitz’s. That my theory suggests a plausible empirical research program with informative results also, I submit, makes my theory more attractive than Novitz’s.
Of course, in a certain sense, Novitz is free to stipulate any sense of mass art that he wishes. However, the advisability of Novitz’s stipulation must be weighed against the advantages of a rival theory like mine which a) does a better job tracking ordinary usage, b) sharply marks the central conceptual and historic contrast between mass art and the avant-garde, and which c) abets a robust empirical research program.

Notes

