2000

“Gaps” in Intelligence Communications

Donald V. McGuire

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"GAPS" IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS

by

Donald V. McGuire

A Thesis

Submitted to the Department of English of the State University of New York, College at Brockport, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS

2000
"GAPS" IN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNICATIONS

by Donald V. McGuire

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INTRODUCTION

For America, the practice of military intelligence is crucial. In a world replete with terrorism, military instability, and clashing ideologies, intelligence provides key decision-makers with the vital information they need on the capabilities and intentions of other nations. As a result, intelligence officers' support to policymakers and military leaders remains a critical aspect of the US government's ability to successfully project power throughout the world. This means that intelligence officers must be adept at warning officials of crises threatening the immediate interests of the nation or US citizens (Who We Are). I, as an Intelligence Operations Officer (IOO), recognize and understand the significant nature of the duties I perform on a day-to-day basis, both during peacetime and operational situations. In the following chapters, I will provide an analysis of the communication relationships encountered when training the primary users of intelligence information: Commander, Aircrew, and other intelligence personnel. The information gained from this study can be utilized by other IOOs as they are faced with similar communication problems related to the audiences above. Revised briefing checklists will also be included to guide personnel when preparing intelligence products in the future.

As an IOO with the United States Air Force (USAF)/107 Air Refueling Wing (ARW) for approximately five years, my responsibility is to inform groups and individuals on intelligence matters affecting Wing operations. My audiences include the Wing/Group Commanders, Aircrew, ground personnel, and other intelligence personnel. An IOO serves as the only source of intelligence support for the 107 ARW, so it is essential that products are professional and reliable. Due to my constant need to inform and instruct, I have developed effective written or spoken research and presentation skills. This ability is imperative to an IOO's success. If an audience does not rely on an IOO's information,
this will affect the Wing’s ability to accomplish its mission. The problems occurring from an IOO’s inability to communicate well and its influence on Wing operations will be discussed throughout this paper.

There are communication problems in the Intelligence–audience relationships affecting the successful understanding of intelligence products. To help correct this, an examination was done identifying and analyzing relationships intelligence personnel encounter. Primarily, I approached this paper by “stepping back” and observing my work as an IOO; this allowed me to recognize elements of the relationship not typically apparent. I identified functional elements (style, information content/direction, etc.) of the Intelligence–audience relationship, and, with this information, I was able to understand their impact on the problems each group experiences. Also, I conducted research focusing on the “model(s)” of each communication relationship. Given that each relationship exhibits model-like components particular to it and also shared with others, I was able to analyze each relationship’s communication process independently and comparatively. This allowed me to identify problems within the present intelligence training program and how it affects communication. By taking this approach, I was able to understand the composition and qualities of each audience; as a result, resolution of these problems by improved training aids such as checklists could be accomplished.

Air Force intelligence, along with other elements of the Intelligence Community, has one mission or goal: Whether in peacetime or war, intelligence must have the ability to attain information superiority while denying an adversary the ability to do so. The ability to provide rapid and reliable intelligence when and where it is needed is essential (Air Force Intelligence). This brief but comprehensive description focuses on what the USAF intelligence cadre’s mission is at both the strategic (national) and tactical (wing) level.
As an IOO, the information I provide is focused on tactical intelligence; to do this, IOOs utilize resources and products provided by national agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to inform military personnel who may be placed in operational settings; an operational setting differs from training because it involves combat activity threatening USAF resources and personnel. There are two primary communication methods to convey this information: Briefings and Point Papers.

Briefings have always been the primary method intelligence personnel use to inform audiences. While IOOs in years past relied on paper message traffic, markers for writing, and transparencies to project information, recent technological advances have given a new “face” to the intelligence field. Today, personnel rely on computer systems and networks to receive and transfer an abundant amount of information that has been researched, processed, and analyzed. The voluminous quantity of intelligence material received often causes “information overload,” so the success of an IOO to process a massive but valuable amount of information is dependent on training. A training plan exhibiting specific objectives will help personnel in their ability to conduct effective briefings.

The main purpose of training is common to all audiences receiving intelligence support, and the overall intent and result of training is written in AMCPAM 14-104, *Intelligence Cookbook*. “The design of a training program is to enhance and further expand professional knowledge and technical qualifications. You must carefully plan, select, and arrange your resources to best train your people. The quality of your planning will have much to do with the quality of your results” (35). The success of a comprehensive, well-developed training plan can be measured by the ability of an IOO to
perform briefings instructing an audience on a particular intelligence topic. Correspondingly, successful training provided to Aircrew and the Commander can be measured by their ability to make decisions allowing them to perform in peacetime and operational situations. While these are result-based indicators signifying the success of training, the overall validity of a training program is established by intelligence personnel’s ability to determine communication problems inhibiting audiences’ understanding. In summary, the task of the IOO is to develop communication delivery assisting the Commander, Aircrew, and other intelligence personnel to better comprehend the mass of information, when and where it is needed.

Communication problems frequently impede the passing of relevant and timely intelligence information to an audience. Many of these problems are similar to those seen in relations among other professions, to include other military interactions; however, the difficulties experienced within an IOO’s communications are unique because of the varied requirements of each audience and the significance intelligence support has to the USAF. This will be more apparent through audience-specific material provided in subsequent chapters. Regarding an IOO’s relationships, most problems are common to the Commander, Aircrew, and internal relationships; the first problem is the knowledge-level that varies according to the subject. Simply put, some audience members know more about a subject than others do. Recognizing a knowledge disparity is imperative so the scope and depth of information can be tailored to each audience’s needs. Second, in certain settings, such as briefing the commanders, personnel come from varying career fields and use intelligence information for different purposes to support operations. This has to be recognized so the intelligence product is focused to ensure extraneous, irrelevant information does not detract from the information conveyed.
Third, probably the most difficult communication problem to overcome is attempting to brief audiences whose interest levels are low. This problem can be evident among all audiences; however, it is most prevalent with Aircrew. A good portion of my briefings takes place before Aircrew members whose primary interest is to fly aircraft. The ability to “sell my product” becomes of primary importance when information could impact the success of an operation, and, most importantly, affects the lives of the people briefed.

Finally, the success of overcoming these communication obstacles is dependent on the skills and ability of intelligence personnel instructing these audiences. To ensure a process is in place for each type of briefing given, we, in the intelligence operations community, have established checklists, pamphlets, and training aids intended to standardize how and what information is conveyed. Some of the key aids I routinely reference will be analyzed in this paper to determine their current suitability.

The problems mentioned above are influenced by and a result of two prime factors. First, the skill of intelligence personnel to train effectively directly impacts the ability of audiences to learn. Second, the characteristic of each audience and its members influences the success of communication. Because such emphasis is placed on the receivers of intelligence information, it is important to identify an audience and what qualities they bring to the Intelligence–audience communication relationship. The composition of these audiences is described below.

The personnel who receive intelligence support are the Commander, Aircrew, internal intelligence personnel, and other ground personnel. The Commander is responsible for the overall operation of the 107 Air Refueling Wing. His primary duties do not entail flying operations, but instead involve overseeing every element of the Wing’s activities. This requirement causes the Commander to receive an abundant, continuous amount of
intelligence information that must be understood. Secondarily, intelligence personnel
must also provide information for group, squadron and flight commanders throughout the
Wing. These commanders supervise smaller numbers of personnel than the Wing
Commander, but their need for timely and relevant information is equally necessary.
Intelligence personnel interact with these commanders frequently, and encounter
communication problems as a result. In chapter one, these problems will be examined in
an attempt to improve the Intelligence-Commander communication relationship.

Aircrew is the audience who receives intelligence information in an operational setting
most frequently. The members of this group consist of some who hold this position on a
full-time basis, but most individuals are “part-timers” who fly the Wing’s aircraft,
KC-135, approximately three to five times each month. Because of the United States
military’s necessity for refueling and transport support, KC-135s are often deployed to
various locations throughout the world. These circumstances—infrequent flying and
deployments to diverse locations—require Aircrew to be properly trained in multiple
subject areas pertaining to air defense threats and current intelligence matters. This is
both a difficult task for the IOO who provides training and the Aircrew member who is
required to learn and retain intelligence information. The difficulties inherent in this
association will be identified in chapter two.

The internal audience is also comprised of full-time and part-time intelligence
personnel. Similar to the Commander and Aircrew audiences, intelligence personnel
currently assigned to the Wing are diverse in their knowledge and experience levels.
This diversity is caused by previous intelligence experience and civilian occupations in
intelligence-related and non-related fields. While intelligence personnel’s diversity
provides an assortment of knowledge for audiences, it also creates a situation where
communication problems are present. These problems will be addressed in chapter three of this paper.

It is necessary to describe an audience, ground personnel, who increasingly receives intelligence support. Compared to the audiences above, ground personnel receive the least amount of daily intelligence support; however, the USAF has begun sending individuals to multiple areas of operation, and this manning requirement is expected to increase in the future. Ground personnel such as Civil Engineers, Aircraft Maintenance, and Security Forces are routinely sent worldwide, independent of Wing operations. While the Commander and Aircrew often possess some knowledge regarding intelligence matters, ground personnel do not receive the same initial and recurring training. This, coupled with diverse experience levels, adds a considerable challenge for intelligence personnel when informational briefings must be provided in support of deploying ground personnel. Though ground personnel are increasingly receiving intelligence support, I have not dedicated a chapter to the study of this group because limited data makes it difficult to satisfy the research requirements of this paper.

I have chosen to examine the above groups because of their regular communication interactions with intelligence personnel. While the frequency varies by audience, each relies on a level of intelligence information to perform their “wartime” roles, and, as a result, time and resources must be dedicated to support each group. This factor--level of support--has also affected the order in which I have addressed each group throughout this paper. In chapter one, I explain the problems in the Intelligence–Commander relationship because an IOO supports the Commander most frequently. It is also in this position because the Commander’s problems pose the greatest challenges. Though Aircrew receives significant operational intelligence support through monthly training,
the daily support given to them is less than what is provided to the other groups; consequently, it is addressed in chapter two. Finally, the internal audience is described in chapter three because the reader should first understand that many Commander and Aircrew problems also exist within the internal training program. Recognition of problems provided in chapters one and two assists the reader, prior to encountering them in chapter three.

Before I describe the communication problems in the Intelligence–audience relationships, it is important to address some administrative elements affecting this paper. The following paragraphs review research sources and limiting factors affecting my findings.

Throughout the DoD and USAF in particular, it is mandatory for individuals and organizations to adhere to regulations/instructions. These documents are designed to guide personnel on procedures pertaining to their career field. As an outcome, checklists and other aids are routinely developed to assist personnel in doing their job appropriately; the Intelligence Community has prepared some briefing and training aids to satisfy this need. In this paper, I have reviewed several DoD/USAF documents utilized by intelligence personnel when conducting training and preparing products. Specifically, AMCPAM 14-104 has been evaluated because it is the document intelligence personnel reference regarding training and operational matters, and, most importantly, it provides checklist “shells” required when preparing intelligence products. In the past, checklists lacking detail were a communication problem for IOOs because they did not provide enough guidance. A well-developed checklist should direct personnel to intelligence sources and provoke critical thought throughout the briefing preparation process. As a result, I have revised checklists found in chapter four to satisfy this requirement. The
validity of these checklists has been measured by the evaluative verbal responses from other IOOs. In addition, the critique sheet on page 62 has been provided to audiences receiving intelligence support. Positive and negative feedback have been received which enabled me to revise the checklists' design, content, and purpose. The continued use of the critique sheet will guide future revisions as changes in intelligence requirements continue. With the information provided, I have been able to revise preliminary drafts of checklists so "finished" documents can be created.

Finally, I have referred to other regulations/instructions, AMCI 14-101, Unit Intelligence Management, and AFI 36-2201, Developing, Managing, and Conducting Training, which focus on intelligence management and training matters. By utilizing these documents as sources, a reader can understand the foundation of the intelligence field and objectives surrounding it.

I have limited the amount of military-related source material in support of this paper to ensure its purpose focused on my daily functions as an IOO. While there is an abundant amount of DoD and USAF training instructions/regulations available, I have not referred to sources pertaining to national-level intelligence operations, but only those concentrating on intelligence operations at the wing-level; these sources have been more applicable in relation to tactical intelligence operations.

I have also referred to non-military, scholarly sources addressing communication studies. These documents have helped me identify each audience's components and understand how they affect inherent communication problems. The information in these publications provided a theoretical perspective to issues in each relationship contrasting to the practical approach offered by the DoD/USAF documents. Most importantly, these sources allowed me to understand elements (message, source, receiver, etc.) within
communication situations and their application to my relationships as an IOO. Selection of these sources has allowed me to perform a comprehensive, critical analysis of audiences. While these sources are referenced throughout, the intent and purpose of this paper is to provide a practical, professional introspection for IOOs, culminating with an improvement in training aids for the intelligence field. Also, in its practical application, this study can be used as a resource document to collect information about intelligence audiences; consequently, some audience-specific material is intentionally repeated throughout this paper to remind IOOs where pertinent information can be found.

In review, each audience requires timely and accurate intelligence support. Dissemination of this information can only be done if communication problems are minimized or overcome completely. In the following chapters, I will address important characteristics when interacting with the Commander, Aircrew, and internal personnel. This will include identification of problems and the solutions enabling IOOs to overcome them.
CHAPTER ONE: THE COMMANDER

Of the audiences I encounter as an Intelligence Operations Officer, the Intelligence-Commander relationship poses the greatest challenges because of communication problems. Muriel Saville-Troike writes, "Since a communicative event is a bounded entity of some kind, recognizing what the boundaries are is essential for their identification" (19). Fortunately, intelligence personnel and the Commander’s communication relationship contains components of a “bounded entity of some kind,” so the task of identifying and analyzing its problems is achievable. Saville-Troike further describes what components must be present in order to analyze a communication relationship: “Analysis of a communicative event begins with a description of the components which are likely to be salient.” Of the components she describes, the “scene (genre, topic, purpose/function, setting), participants, message form/content, act sequence, rules of interaction, and norms of interpretation” (20-21) are routinely present during briefings. Their presence is the basis for the three elements focused on throughout this chapter:

a. Identifying the components of this model.

b. Identifying the elements leading to communication difficulties.

c. Improving the related training material.

Like any communication event, the success of intelligence briefings relies on a speaker’s ability to collect, analyze, and disseminate information to an audience. Dissemination of information can be a problematic task for an IOO due to a speaker’s lack of professional, educational, and personal credibility. The audience, because of a speaker’s credibility, can become less receptive to the message and therefore miss important parts of a presentation. While someone reading a passage can review it
repeatedly, the listener may not have this same opportunity, so gaining the audience’s attention initially and ensuring comprehension is crucial (Andeweg and de Jong 271). Credibility will lay a foundation the IOO can build upon throughout the officer’s relationship with the Commander. If the credibility of a speaker is diminished, challenged, or never established at all, then the Commander may think the intelligence information is unreliable and, therefore, unusable.

At this point, I would like to establish and address the elements in the Intelligence-Commander relationship: source, message, channel, and receiver. Recognition of these elements will allow an adequate content analysis of material so problems and solutions can be addressed later in the chapter. Regarding the content analysis/analyst, Richard W. Budd, Robert K. Thorp, and Lewis Donohew write, “...[the speaker] taps into the process through the message to gain his primary information about the communication situation. With this information, he can give a detailed account of the communication and make limited predictions about the source and perhaps the receiver” (2-3). Other than a slight variation regarding the type and content of the briefing given (message), the other elements (source, channel, and receivers) remain relatively static and isolated. The next several pages will analyze the qualities of the relationship so a better understanding of problems and solutions will develop.

The communication style in the Intelligence-Commander relationship is influenced by the reasons for which information is given. The Commander is briefed for two purposes: Instructional and Informational. Each drives the content and goal of briefings, and, consequently, causes different problems to arise in the communication relationship.

Instructional briefings are designed for the purpose of allowing the Commander to develop a knowledge base. If a solid base of knowledge is not present, subsequent work
becomes more difficult if not impossible (Brown 389). The Commander within a military organization is, by definition, a "decision-maker." So that knowledgeable decisions can be made, the Commander relies on intelligence personnel to provide information on matters affecting Wing operations. Due to world events changing, the process of education is ongoing and must continually address current intelligence matters. Primarily, the Commander utilizes political, military, and terrorist-related information to make decisions. An IOO assesses the importance of this information and provides relevant, timely instruction. For example, if intelligence estimates indicate a terrorist group poses a future threat to Wing personnel, personnel brief the Commander to facilitate educated decisions. Information such as the terrorists' background, methods of operation, and future activities will be provided to the Commander. Specifically, established terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hizballah operate in locations where Wing personnel often deploy.

The Commander must know the operational similarities and difference of terrorist groups to determine if deployed personnel are threatened. With this information, the Commander can determine if it is judicious to deploy Wing personnel to areas where a terrorist "footprint" is present. Background or instructional material such as this is required to preclude having to educate the Commander during time-sensitive informational briefings. The revised Situation and Current Intelligence Briefings in chapter four compel the IOO to address this anti-terrorism issue.

As stated above, informational briefings given to the Commander face potential time-related limitations and pressure. The effectiveness of informational briefings is dependent on the success of prior instructional briefings. While instructional briefings are designed to enhance the Commander's knowledge, the primary purpose of
informational briefings is to educate the Commander about the Wing's current area of responsibility. Deficiencies in the success of these briefings occur when adequate informational briefings have not been provided. Again referring to the example above regarding a potential terrorist threat, valuable time could be wasted if intelligence personnel during a Situation Briefing (a briefing given during a crisis) must address background information such as ideology and methods of operation of a terrorist group. Problems arise because the entire audience or certain individuals must be instructed on the group's characteristics, taking up time needed to direct mission-related actions.

The style of the relationship also affects the communication model between intelligence personnel and the Commander. While intelligence personnel's relationship internally and with Aircrew tends to be informal, briefings given to the Commander are traditionally formal. This formality creates characteristics not present in other intelligence relationships, and, as a result, causes problems requiring attention to ensure effective communication. Primarily, the direction or "flow" of information is affected by the style of the Intelligence-Commander relationship. Figure 1 illustrates how communication between an IOO and the Commander routinely operates in a one-way or linear direction, with limited feedback from the audience:

![Intelligence - Commander Communication Relationship](Fig. 1)

The direction of information would adhere to the model, existent since Aristotle, that communication often flows from one person to another and stops. This places a
significant responsibility on the source of the communication: the speaker or IOO. The speaker, as the source of information, controls the overall success of the "communication being done" to the receiver (Emmert and Donaghy 30). The burden placed on intelligence personnel by the linear nature of communication creates problems requiring attention.

However, on occasion, the information flow is sender-receiver-sender; as expected, this relieves the responsibility of communication success or failure on intelligence personnel, and lessens the problems needing to be overcome for effective communication. Intelligence personnel sometimes encounter receiver feedback/questions when they are requested to provide additional information or amplification on briefings. Additional information can be immediately necessary, or it can require intelligence personnel to perform ongoing research and an update of the initial briefing. When this happens, especially when information must be provided immediately, it creates a situation where the flow of information is dynamic because of its two-way nature. Emmert and Donaghy describe this communication process as Stimulus-Response Perspective: "Too much evidence suggests that the person who receives the message has almost as much effect (if not as much) on the person sending the message as the person sending the message has on the receiver." And they continue, "In fact, it is hard to tell who is 'sending' and who is 'receiving' in any given communication situation" (30).

Whether the information flow is one-way or two-way, the impact on the relationship is affected because intelligence personnel must prepare and react to the communication model during a briefing. The questions offered by the revised checklists facilitate both styles, one-way and two-way, by prompting IOOs to prepare for potential audience feedback. Problems related to the model require intelligence personnel to tailor their
style ensuring effective information dissemination. So relevant and reliable briefings can be prepared for the Commander, it is important personnel fully understand the intelligence information conveyed. Knowledge of this material allows for better recognition of inherent problems.

The types of information provided to the Commander, and the modes (types of briefings) in which it is communicated, differentiate it from other audiences for whom intelligence personnel provide briefings. While Aircrew and intelligence personnel’s internal briefings are “tactical” in scope and depth, the commanders are strategically briefed so they see the “big picture.” Because of this, the information given allows decisions to move downward impacting squadron/flight levels. Understanding how this information is relevant to the Wing, squadron, and flight operations allows personnel to tailor briefings as necessary.

Intelligence information impacts several combinations of Wing personnel. Briefings given to the Commander could affect the entire Wing or a single individual who may be deploying, so the purpose of information determines the content, organization, and type of briefing. To satisfy this requirement, intelligence personnel employ three standard means to communicate information to the Commander: Current Intelligence Briefings, Situation Briefings, and Talking/Point Papers. Each of these modes has specific purposes and is designed to satisfy a particular requirement.

Current Intelligence Briefings (CIBs), the most common intelligence briefings given, has the greatest educational value to the Commander. CIBs disseminate general information pertaining to political, economic, and military-related matters affecting Wing operations and personnel; the CIB checklist on page 56 illustrates critical information required to satisfy the Commander’s training and operational needs. In general, this type
of briefing is usually given on a weekly basis but can be performed more frequently at the request of the Commander. Because of its recurring nature, it provides a "build-up" of information likely provided later in Situation Briefings, so, consequently, CIBs are the most instructional briefings given.

Situation Briefings are not designed to provide information that should have been given to the Commander during a CIB; they are, in short, an extension of knowledge gained from a CIB. Instead, Situation Briefings are meant to provide amplifying information during a short-notice and crisis situation. Situation Briefings are, at times, the most dynamic of all intelligence briefings because of the likelihood of a rapidly changing political and/or military situation. As a result, they are demanding on intelligence personnel because of their quick development and frequency for a period of time. These qualities are addressed in the revised Situation Briefing located on page 52; the questions posed in the checklist solicit an IOO's concentration on immediate, short-term threats requiring analysis. Ultimately, the success of a Situation Briefing is dependent on CIBs and other forms of instructional briefings building knowledge for the Commander.

Because a topic might need amplification so it is understandable, the Commander often needs a supplemental source of information requiring IOOs to communicate effectively in writing. A Talking/Point Paper is prepared for this purpose. These papers are short, usually one page, quick-reference outlines providing key background information about a subject. While a Talking Paper acts as a reference document during a briefing, a Point Paper is provided as an aid independent of a briefing. However, a Point Paper requires intelligence personnel to conduct an especially careful analysis of the paper's purpose and audience because it will be reviewed without an IOO present and
not allow immediate responses to questions. IOOs can alleviate the risk of miscommunication by anticipating potential questions and providing clear, well-reasoned points for review throughout these documents.

I have spent the first part of this chapter describing characteristics in the Intelligence–Commander relationship. As written, intelligence personnel must develop briefings and other products recognizing the Commander’s mission requirements and ensuring they are satisfied. The complexity of being able to do this poses challenges intelligence personnel encounter and must overcome on a daily basis. First, language problems arise affecting the Commander’s ability to receive and utilize much of the intelligence information provided. Second, because the Commander may not have an adequate level of knowledge, personnel must adjust their training to accommodate this problem. Finally, the Commander’s lack of interest in a particular intelligence subject has the potential to affect an IOO’s ability to convey information effectively. The remainder of this chapter will discuss these problems and their solutions in greater detail.

As in every profession, language is relied upon to communicate ideas and thoughts to an audience. Misunderstandings or “breakdowns” in the language between the speaker and audience will likely render communication ineffective. However, communication in the military becomes more complicated than other professions due to the abundance of acronyms, brevity codes (combination of letters pronounced letter by letter), and job-specific language. These obstacles concerning language require a speaker–audience relationship recognizing each person’s requirements and limitations.

Intelligence personnel’s language in briefings sometimes causes one or more members of the group to misunderstand what is being said. There are several reasons this occurs. First, in most briefings given to the Commander, intelligence personnel are the only
individuals with intelligence-related training and experience. This causes a communication obstacle regarding the ability to understand intelligence-specific language or "intel-speak." For example, the Commander will not understand an abbreviation such as DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) that intelligence personnel use routinely. To ensure this communication obstacle does not hamper the overall effectiveness of a briefing, intelligence personnel should provide the audience with either a graphical, oral, or written explanation of common intelligence-specific abbreviations: a Talking Paper is well-suited for this purpose. Often, because of new members of the group, intelligence personnel must explain unfamiliar language at each briefing.

Aviation-specific language can cause problems when commanders for whom intelligence personnel provide briefings consist of both Aircrew and non-Aircrew members. Often commanders, including the Wing Commander, who are Aircrew members, are familiar with language describing flying operations. However, others whose positions are not specifically related to flying operations might not recognize much of it, for example, the abbreviation SAM (Surface-to-Air Missile). Intelligence personnel must clarify the meaning of Aircrew-specific language to ensure the entire group is able to understand the message. To assist IOOs, the revised CIB and Situation Briefing checklists, pages 56 and 52 respectively, seek to remedy this problem by reminding a briefer to clarify abbreviations and acronyms. This, coupled with direct questions designed to produce specific answers, will help develop intelligence products with minimal unclear language.

Recently in the Intelligence Community, computer-based activities called Information Operations (IO) have become more common because of their reliance to conduct daily operations. Consequently, intelligence personnel are required to provide more briefings
and other products about IO. Because of its newness, IO language is unfamiliar to the Commander and also to some intelligence personnel briefing this material.

As in all communication, language must be decoded so receivers can understand a message. In its most basic terms, the coding of messages relies on signs (e.g., letters of the English alphabet), often reversible, where agreement in meaning must be reached by sender and receiver (Cherry 15). Often, in the absence of established and logical coding, the result is unclear language that confuses the receiver. Intelligence personnel tasked to provide an understandable message to the Commander must use language common to all audiences. Finally, by bridging the gap between familiar and unfamiliar language, instructors of a subject demonstrate an understanding of student concern and an ability to communicate effectively (Brown 390).

Similar to what was addressed earlier regarding language problems, a lack of experience causes some commanders to misunderstand information given during a briefing. For example, commanders who are also Aircrew members understand material involving air defense threats and other matters involving flying operations; however, a commander without this experience may not understand. Understandably, this individual requires a detailed, instructional description of the material. Intelligence personnel must also provide briefings for commanders who serve in support roles. This makes communication effectiveness difficult because many support commanders lack knowledge of aviation and IO matters. Intelligence briefings must address limited knowledge support commanders might have by gearing training to correct this. Conversely, the Wing Commander, who is an Aircrew member and whose experience has involved flying operations, must have a “working knowledge” of all operations mentioned above. Through training provided by intelligence personnel, the Wing
Commander must develop a general understanding enabling this officer to make informed decisions regarding all Wing operations. Intelligence personnel must recognize the Commander’s knowledge requirement but ensure the depth of information is not overwhelming.

Traditional Guardsman commanders present yet other communication problems. Because these commanders work one weekend per month and fifteen training days per year, intelligence personnel must adjust their briefings to those not entirely familiar with current Wing operations. Thus, intelligence personnel must be prepared to amplify their material for them. Training aids such as Talking/Point Papers and other one-on-one explanations usually overcome this potential difficulty.

To enhance the commanders’ limited understanding of a subject, intelligence personnel must provide instructional briefings when “operations tempo” allows. Again, this is to minimize the amount of training-like material during informational briefings. This is better accomplished if intelligence personnel recognize the commanders’ knowledge, and, as a result, tailor the scope of the material as needed. Finally, if intelligence personnel do not address this problem, the direction of information can be affected, thus worsening the flow of communication between sender and receiver.

Just as the commanders’ diverse positions cause communication difficulties regarding language and knowledge, this can also affect the degree of interest toward a briefing. Commanders possess different Air Force Specialty Codes (positions) and have different mission requirements to satisfy; therefore, certain information might not pertain to their organization, thus lessening interest in the subject. Intelligence personnel are able to overcome this problem by ensuring the commanders recognize the potential relevance of information to their organization at a later time. This is an important requirement so
information conveyed earlier does not have to be continually reviewed in subsequent briefings. While this has been a significant area of concern in the past, recent emphasis by personnel has focused on providing relevant material addressing the potential diversity of commanders.

As an IOO, I have encountered situations when the communication problems discussed above have affected my ability to perform my work. Most significantly, I have experienced problems while supporting Balkan operations on several occasions. Balkan operations are those supporting NATO military forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. While serving during these operations, I have been tasked with providing intelligence briefings for commanders who I had no experience supporting. This caused difficulties because I was unaware of their knowledge and the requirements for which intelligence products were being provided. Because I knew of the operation/mission being supported, I was able to focus my briefings.

However, the communications setting was complicated further because commanders from the 107 ARW were also present. Thus, I had my familiar 107 ARW audience who needed information rather than instruction. To ensure everyone understood the briefings, I provided detailed graphical explanations of material I would otherwise assume my audience had knowledge. Once the "new" commanders learned topics such as abbreviations of "warring" groups and organizations involved in the Balkans, future briefings were more informational than instructional. The lessons learned above have practical application to other IOOs who may experience similar situations while supporting Balkan operations.

Communication problems and solutions have also happened during USAF inspections. USAF inspections are designed to gauge personnel's ability to support the Wing's
wartime capabilities. During an exercise, a large amount of intelligence information is received, analyzed, and disseminated to the Commander through Situation Briefings. These conditions challenge the Commander’s ability to make informed decisions by recalling all material taught. Because of the time restrictions inherent in Situation Briefings, intelligence personnel introduced informational supplements to overcome language and knowledge obstacles. To accomplish this, Talking/Point Papers and one-on-one training were used to help the Commander understand material better. In the future, the revised Situation Briefing checklist on page 52 should assist IOOs in addressing political and military activity significant to the Commander’s exercise and wartime needs.

While intelligence personnel primarily convey information orally, briefings are enhanced by the quality of the supporting written checklists. Since the USAF has minimum content requirements for intelligence briefings, intelligence personnel are allowed to tailor them for their Wing. They are further shaped by the Commander’s objectives (e.g., Current Intelligence Briefings and Situation Briefings checklists in chapter four). In addition, the primary goal of intelligence support is to have knowledgeable personnel familiar with current political and military affairs (AMC 14-104 47). To better assist intelligence personnel, the revised checklists are helpful because they direct intelligence personnel to applicable resources required to prepare these briefings. Also, I have added assessment questions to stimulate an IOO’s critical thinking skills for future activity. Most importantly, these re-designed checklists can be further modified made by intelligence personnel. This will allow continual improvement to these checklists. To date, the revised Situation and Current Intelligence Briefing checklists have improved the briefing preparation process for IOOs. The
checklists' focus has reduced the time personnel must research and develop a briefing, and, in turn, created a more useful intelligence product for the Commander.

In this chapter, I have described the Intelligence–Commander communication relationship. I have also identified the communication style, components of this model, and elements leading to communication trouble. With this information, the reader can recognize communication problems and how intelligence personnel overcome them. The following chapter will address the difficulties found between IOOs and Aircrew. This will reveal both similar and dissimilar characteristics between the Commander and Aircrew audiences allowing the reader to understand the differences among an IOO's primary audiences.
CHAPTER TWO: AIRCREW

In the USAF, Aircrew is the group who will likely be involved in operational missions and, consequently, require instructional and informational information in this setting. While instructional briefings train Aircrew, informational briefings are routinely provided for operational purposes. Relevant and effective products are increasingly required because of Aircrew’s participation in combat operations throughout the world. This factor—combat operations—requires IOOs to approach their relationship with Aircrew differently from how the Commander is supported. Primarily, Aircrew’s frequent requirement for time-sensitive data drives the need for training focusing on current threats in areas where flying operation are likely to occur.

AMCI 14-101, Unit Intelligence Management, notes three training goals: “(1) Educate crews on air defense threat identification and capabilities, (2) Educate crews on the debriefing and reporting process, and (3) Educate crews on the roles, missions and capabilities of Intel” (19). While establishing the goals of a unit’s Aircrew Intelligence Training (AIT) program, AMCI 14-101 does not address how IOOs will carry them out. As a result, the IOO has to solve several communication problems to properly train Aircrew.

This chapter, similar in format to the previous one, will identify and analyze the communication model in the Intelligence–Aircrew relationship. Specifically, I will outline the type of material intelligence personnel are required to provide to Aircrew members and the style/format in which it is conveyed. Finally, I will discuss what distinct communication needs shape the transmissions between the IOO and the Aircrew, needs that require the IOO to approach this group differently from the Commander (Chapter One) and other intelligence personnel (Chapter Three). These needs cause
miscommunication and, to remedy this, revision of current documentation will improve
the effectiveness of conveying intelligence information to Aircrew members.

The primary training objective of intelligence personnel is to educate Aircrews on
intelligence matters. This education is based on “three goals of education, understanding,
retention, and application” (Perkins 77), and is pertinent to Aircrew as they learn and
apply intelligence material. Although Aircrew training can be theoretical, for the most
part the focus is on the practical application of intelligence information. For operational
or wartime environments, the ability to tailor intelligence support to each setting--training
and operational--is an essential part of an IOO’s duties.

The primary goal of the sender (the IOO) is to influence the behavior of the receiver
(the Aircrew) in some way (Emmert and Donaghy 45). Communication issues with
Aircrew must overcome diverse backgrounds, experiences, and objectives regarding
intelligence support to flying operations. To properly understand the complexities of the
relationship, it is important to identify and define the major elements in the
communication process. I will analyze each element in the communication process and
its affect on the relationship between the IOO and the Aircrew. The major elements in
the communication process are:

1) Communication or source
2) Message
3) Receiver or audience (Budd, Thorp, and Donohew 7)

“Within every communication system there are people called communicators. The
system theorist usually refers to them as the ‘components’ of a system. Another way to
think of them is to consider them subsystems within the communication system”
(Emmert and Donaghy 40). Intelligence personnel, as communicators, are tasked to
provide informational and instructional messages through briefings and papers to Aircrew. While apparent in all Intelligence–audience relationships, the elements of communicator and audience are entwined as in none other that an IOO encounters. This is true because of Aircrew’s reliance on a meaningful and understandable intelligence message during operational settings. Because of this setting’s unique risks, IOOs must communicate effectively to Aircrew so important information is disseminated.

The message, the second element of the process, is crucial in understanding the Intelligence–Aircrew relationship. The content of the message connects the IOO as the communicator and Aircrew as audience or receiver. Because Aircrew often receives briefings in operational settings that include wartime scenarios, they and intelligence personnel have heightened stress. These stressful scenarios introduce factors--time limitations and access to information/data--that deteriorate the quality of the message, ultimately impacting the critical link between communicator and audience.

Since an Aircrew audience varies from one to one hundred individuals, intelligence personnel must adjust their deliveries to most effectively communicate to different sized groups. This essential aspect can be done if the requirements of Aircrew members are understood, and this is possible only when intelligence personnel are familiar with vastly different skills, capabilities, and interest levels.

Foremost for intelligence personnel to communicate effectively is their knowledge of each Aircrew audience. This helps ensure all elements of the process--communicator and message--are adequately prepared and constructed to satisfy the requirements of an audience. AFH 33-337, The Tongue and Quill describes the importance of this step for USAF personnel:

Every communication has two audiences: one at the sending end and one at the
receiving end. Essential communications are vital to our profession and deserve careful analysis of purpose and specific objective, plus detective work on the audiences sitting at both ends. Remember, perceptive analysis of purpose and audience is the first step in putting the reader or listener on the road to drive your project through the rat maze of coordination. (11)

In addition, AFH 33-337 supports this point by providing questions helping a speaker meet an audience’s needs. Below are those important to the proper analysis of Aircrew:

- How do we want this audience to react to this communication?
- Is this audience basically receptive, skeptical or hostile?
- How much does the audience already know about the subject? What’s their background, education, and professional experience? (12)

Intelligence personnel provide a large number of briefings to Aircrew, and the types of briefings given are diverse. Because of this, intelligence personnel devote a significant amount of time preparing different briefings. Intelligence personnel are required to know an Aircrew audience much as an effective writer must adequately know for whom he is writing. For example, intelligence personnel must be prepared to address the question: “How much does the audience already know about the subject? What’s their background, education, and professional experience?” Because Aircrew’s different experience levels flying different aircraft, this is the most relevant question needing to be asked. More specifically, this is valid because some individuals have more “flying hours” in the KC-135 than others; in addition, some individuals have experience flying missions in combat situations, so this will enhance their overall knowledge. To address this when preparing a briefing, intelligence personnel must recognize that experienced Aircrew will understand material better than those with limited experience. Similar to composing a
paper, intelligence personnel should analyze the needs of an Aircrew audience early in
the briefing preparation process. Ideally, this should occur prior to performing a great
deal of research so valuable time is not wasted, therefore affecting the final product.

At this point, I would like to describe an important distinction within an audience of
Aircrew. Specifically, I am referring to the varying number of Aircrew constituting what
is considered an audience, and how the communication system is affected. There are two
systems encompassing an Aircrew audience: Interpersonal and Public communication
systems. The composition of these is based on the number of participants comprising
each. As expected, this is important because the complexity of each system increases as
the group becomes larger and more difficult to support. An Interpersonal system is not
the customary composition encountered when supporting Aircrew; however, when
present, it reduces some limitations found in larger groups. IOOs and Aircrew can
engage in close conversation and questions can immediately be answered without the
distraction of others in the group. While larger groups offer diverse opinions, one-on-one
or small group interactions allow intelligence personnel to provide superior training.

More commonly, intelligence personnel provide briefings for a Public communication
system usually involving communication from one person to a large audience. Though
the audience performs a significant interactive role, considerable burden is still placed on
a speaker who participates in this system (Emmert and Donaghy 48). Obstacles
preventing effective communication arise and must be overcome to ensure Aircrew
audiences understand information as a result of added communication dynamics. For
example, briefings given to larger audiences often produce more questions and
interaction, therefore requiring better briefing preparation. Without adequate preparation,
an IOO can quickly become ineffective as a trainer if dynamic activity common to a large
group develops. Intelligence personnel must also be trained to identify problems when speaking before a large group with diverse backgrounds and levels of interest. For example, Aircrew possessing significant knowledge because of their experiences should not be included in some large group settings. While their presence sometimes enhances group dynamics, the most likely outcome is their decreased level of interest. These individuals should have their intelligence training pared so their time is used efficiently. Another problem of large group communication is the responsibility placed on the trainer. For most, speaking before a large group is more stressful than presenting training to just one individual. Practice briefings to smaller groups are the best way to help an inexperienced trainer overcome the difficulty of presenting to a large group.

As seen in other relationships, two primary methods are employed when providing information to Aircrew: briefings and Talking/Point Papers. The primary briefings given to Aircrew are Current Intelligence Briefings (CIB), Threat of the Day (TOD), and Pre-Mission Briefings (PMB). While CIBs can be given for both instructional and informational purposes, TODs are designed strictly for instructional training; in contrast, PMBs only occur when there is an informational need. These three briefings encompass the primary means of providing information to Aircrew; however, using papers can provide clarification of complex topics. Regardless of the type of briefing or paper, Aircrew products must be the most comprehensive and current because of their importance regarding flying operations.

While all audiences require items designed for instructional purposes, this type of product for Aircrew differs in its content and focus. This is true because instructional information is specifically designed to support material in future informational briefings. Historically, informational briefings are less likely to occur for the Commander and
internal audiences because they occur during operational settings. A type of briefing provided for all audiences, CIBs, contrasts in its design and purpose when given to Aircrew. CIBs for Aircrew typically focus on only topics directly affecting flying operations. For example, material included in a CIB would describe a country’s recent or potential air defense acquisitions threatening Aircrew. Section five of the revised CIB checklist on page 56 is particularly helpful to IOOs because it addresses relevant air defense matters affecting Wing operations. With this information, other threat-focused instructional briefings can be given when required.

Aircrew differs from other audiences because of their need for instructional products concentrating on integrated air defense systems (IADS) and Escape & Rescue (E &R) information. Intelligence information pertaining to IADS and E&R is important to Aircrew because it assists in making decisions during operational missions. If accurate intelligence products are not provided before these missions, Aircrew members risk not having valuable information. Primarily, with the assistance of TOD briefings, page 59, intelligence personnel educate Aircrew about air defense topics. TODs are short briefings describing air defense threats such as surface-to-air missile systems (SAMS), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and foreign aircraft; these briefings are necessary so Aircrew understand characteristics and capabilities of foreign air defense threats. To make certain this happens, the revised TOD checklist addresses these topics by posing IADs-specific questions assisting IOOs in their briefing preparation.

A PMB is another type of informational briefing given to Aircrew. Intelligence personnel conduct a PMB when operational missions are performed by providing information about air defense equipment threatening flying operations. Though the material in a PMB is similar to that in TOD briefing, the purpose of a PMB differs
because it explains current threats. This factor influences an IOO’s requirement to utilize
time-sensitive, operationally-focused information intended to update Aircrew. To make
this point apparent, AMCPAM 14-104 explains a PMB’s objectives:

This is the final intelligence brief the Aircrews receive prior to takeoff. It must be
mission specific, covering the exact route the aircraft will fly. Ensure that you all
have the latest information posted/gathered prior to the briefing. Include the
mission objective, threats to the mission reporting instructions, E & R instructions,
EEIs (Essential Elements of Information), and debriefing instructions. (46)

So Aircrew receive information pertinent to the mission, an IOO must be aware of every
aspect of a mission, beginning to end, and inform the Aircrew about actual or potential
threats along the entire route of flight (AMCPAM 14-104 46). A PMB is the primary
means to convey intelligence information impacting a mission’s success, so it is
important intelligence personnel have sufficient guidance when preparing a PMB. At this
time, revision of a PMB checklist is not necessary because an adequate one is currently
available.

Knowing when and how to present information to Aircrew is among the greatest
challenges facing an IOO. This affects both the style and information direction, and often
allows information to be communicated in formal and informal settings. This differs
from other relationships operating either formally (Commander) or informally (internal).

While relationships relying on a single style create less communication problems, the
Aircrew relationship poses a dynamic atmosphere requiring IOOs to develop skills for
overcoming problems. The training of intelligence personnel to “negotiate” both formal
and informal settings, possibly during the same briefing, must be incorporated into
training. A formal setting has the information direction moving from speaker to receiver,
minimizing the feedback that the informal setting allows. Figure 2 illustrates information movement (arrows) throughout the communication process:

![Diagram of communication process]

**Intelligence – Aircrew Communication Relationship**  
*(Fig. 2)*

Common problems arise because intelligence personnel do not understand Aircrew characteristics, objectives, and expectations found in different settings. Some common problems in the Intelligence–Aircrew communication relationship are identified below.

Aircrew need to understand intelligence terms so “gaps” in communication will not occur during an operational environment. As is evident in the relationships intelligence personnel encounter, communication success is dependent on overcoming language obstacles. A mutual understanding of language, speech and other verbal messages is instrumental in developing a successful system. Far more than with the Commander, who is conversant with most intelligence terminology, the IOO needs to be sensitive to the Aircrew’s level of understanding of the myriad of aviation/defense codes and acronyms affecting flying operations.

This code is based on a shared system of signs and symbols, capable of logical analysis, and agreed upon by all participants as a recognizable form of communication (Andersen 313). In addition, “symbols involve communicative behaviors that have arbitrary, socially defined relationships with their referent, knowledge of which is shared by the sender and receiver” (Buck 35). Intelligence material dependent on “code” is something Aircrew must become proficient. It is the way intelligence personnel convey information in briefings and papers, so an understanding is necessary to ensure effective
communication. Although it is imperative that Aircrew members become proficient with "code," many do not because they are either new to flying operations or are recent transfers to the USAF from a different branch of the service. Their minimal experience with intelligence language can be overcome through training focused on identifying and understanding key intelligence terms. Also, an IOO can effectively reduce problems by using common diction (Brown 385). For example, while most veteran Aircrew understand the term MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defense System), it may be unfamiliar to inexperienced Aircrew. A supplementary Point/Talking Paper explaining this term and other uncommon phrases will help eliminate misinterpretation.

While language problems affect communication, the most difficult issue encountered when preparing and presenting intelligence products for Aircrew is their decreased interest regarding intelligence material. Related to this, Verderber's four functions, "getting attention, setting a tone creating a bond of good will, and leading into content" (27) are extremely important. In particular, the act of gaining attention must happen early in a briefing to reduce audience skepticism. Since the primary objective of Aircrew is flying aircraft, intelligence personnel need to tailor how they "sell" information about administrative or support activities. By using visual aids to present material in an appealing format, Aircrew are likely to be more receptive. However, careful preparation and review are necessary because many of aids detract from information being provided. "Visual aids provide a form of emphasis. Don't overdo it--when you emphasize everything, nothing receives emphasis" (AFH 33-337 102). Well-developed briefing preparation guides and practice briefings help create products that do not detract from the intended information.
Most often, intelligence personnel must focus the volumes of information on present and future deployments. For example, over the past two years, the Wing has been deployed to the Balkan theater on three occasions. These deployments required intelligence personnel to conduct significant research analyzing Balkan political and military issues. Even though only a portion of the plentiful material was relevant to the Wing’s Balkan operations, intelligence personnel more broadly briefed the Aircrew. When some Aircrew members became disinterested, this problem was corrected when intelligence personnel and other Aircrew provided feedback improving the quality of future briefings and papers.

A major tool that helps intelligence personnel effectively prepare Aircrew is a thorough checklist. Routinely, underdeveloped ones have left intelligence personnel without guidance that fosters comprehensive thought. Previously, the CIB checklist was generic, so it caused briefings to lack scope and depth. This is a problem because all aircraft have different capabilities and limitations affecting what material should be contained in a briefing. With this in mind, the revised CIB and new TOD checklists were created ensuring IOOs included only accurate and relevant data, specific to the weapon system they support. I have applied the checklist “shell” provided in AMCPAM 14-104 as a baseline, and then developed checklists specific to 107 ARW operations. These improvements have assisted IOOs when building CIB and TOD briefings that meet Aircrew requirements.

Similar to what was addressed in chapter one, I have identified in this chapter components of the Aircrew communication model, frequent problems, and solutions aimed at addressing these problems. This information will be valuable to intelligence personnel when they prepare training plans and products in the future. In chapter three, I
will describe activity affecting the Intelligence-internal training communication relationship. Chapter three will also help the reader understand how an effective internal training program ultimately affects the Commander and Aircrew audiences, and it will illustrate the close relationship and frequent interfacing among all three audiences.
CHAPTER THREE: INTERNAL TRAINING

The breadth and knowledge level of the audience and their missions make the intelligence internal training program the most complex of those I encounter as an IOO. Essentially, the task is to prepare the teacher how to effectively teach the material. As I discuss more fully below, intelligence personnel come to the Wing with various degrees of preparation: some have no military background, some have experience only in another military career field or service, and some have only intelligence experience.

In AFI 36-2201, Developing, Managing and Conducting Training, the strategy is described: “Develop, manage, and execute training programs that provide realistic and flexible training which produce a highly skilled, motivated force capable of carrying out all tasks and functions in accomplishing the Air Force mission. These programs should provide the foundation for Air Force readiness” (6). While AFI 36-2201 provides general information for a training program, it does not address potential problems and corrections in an ITP. Identifying and correcting these problems is especially important because unresolved problems ultimately impact the quality of material provided to all intelligence audiences.

In this chapter, I will describe the communication model of the intelligence ITP: style, information content, audience members, and their influence on the internal training program. Primarily, the broad goal for intelligence personnel is to produce material that satisfies any audience seeking intelligence information and instruction.

The reader will learn the importance of the interrelationship among internal personnel, the Commander, and the Aircrew, especially through my presentation of the problems and suggested solutions on how to develop the presentation skills of these future trainers. Figure 3 illustrates the fluid style in which a message moves from the source to the
receiver and returns to the source in the form of a question. As shown by the arrows below, this activity can repeat itself at subsequent training:

![Diagram](image)

Intelligence – Internal Communication Relationship (Fig. 3)

An IOO’s ability to support such a dynamic, quick exchange of information depends on being prepared for diverse audiences and their various needs.

The objective of ITP is to provide all intelligence personnel with initial and recurring training. Initial training is designed to offer a general overview of the unit, mission, organization, equipment, and local environment. Recurring training provides intelligence support to maintain proficiency. The performance of all intelligence trainees is documented in their individual training records. To accomplish this, the primary training focuses on the ability of intelligence personnel to communicate effectively with a particular audience. Training is also designed to teach personnel how to “build” a briefing that an audience will understand. Although personnel often possess the research and presentation skills required in intelligence work, they lack the ability to prepare an intelligence product. This is an essential link between research and presentation skill that, if missing, affects the overall dissemination of information. For example, in Current Intelligence Briefings, intelligence personnel must present a topic that “scratches the surface” while being prepared to further discuss details. That is, while keeping a tight focus on what the audience wants and needs to know, intelligence personnel must be prepared if further information is requested. To achieve this, a key preparation tool is a well-developed checklist. This will be discussed at the end of the chapter.
The most successful training sessions often are based on the knowledge that the intelligence personnel has of the audience. Unless internal intelligence personnel are experienced in the work of their audiences, their training needs to include audience analysis.

Internal intelligence audiences are divided into several groups. These groups consist of personnel with no military experience, personnel who cross-trained from another career field/service, and personnel with previous intelligence experience. Optimally, personnel have experience in USAF flight operations. In reality, this occurs infrequently. The most challenging group of intelligence personnel to train is those with no military experience at all. This happens often as most individuals enlist or are commissioned into the USAF and then attend initial intelligence training. While these individuals attend a formal USAF technical school introducing them to intelligence applications, they lack the fundamental knowledge only gained through experience at the unit/organizational level. For example, although they are book-trained on the capabilities of foreign weapon systems, aircraft, and surface-to-air missile systems, this becomes essential information only after they begin to understand the capabilities of their assigned aircraft.

A second audience is variations of personnel being cross-trained upon entering the USAF intelligence career field. Some come from non-intelligence USAF fields. For example, Security Forces is a group whom sometimes cross-train into the intelligence field. Because Security Forces are responsible for police-related duties on the installation that require intelligence support, they have trained and interacted with intelligence personnel. Also, many in Security Forces spend a great deal of time focusing on anti-terrorism/force protection, so they are well versed in terrorist organizations and their methods of operation. For the purpose of morale and efficiency, such cross-trained
personnel need to have a modified training plan. This plan needs to accommodate their advanced understanding and utilize their experience-based knowledge to train other personnel.

Intelligence personnel who enter the USAF intelligence career field from the US Navy, Marine Corp, or Army are another audience who need special consideration, even for those who have prior experience in air operations. Normally ideal candidates for USAF intelligence positions, they must be oriented to duties relative to USAF operations. Internal training must be responsive to the needs of individuals who bring inter-service intelligence experience. To effectively train these individuals, IOOs should test the knowledge level of new personnel. Evaluation can be done through written or oral testing focusing on USAF intelligence operations. This process allows IOOs to adjust training accordingly. Such competent personnel can be assimilated into the normal training program quickly. In contrast, remedial or measured training can be offered for personnel lacking adequate knowledge.

Finally, a well-planned internal training program must accommodate personnel who have a significant amount of USAF intelligence training and experience. Variations of intelligence disciplines (Imagery Analyst, Target Analyst, etc.) exist within the USAF, so a person who has received initial intelligence technical school training can be trained in a short time. Most importantly, they will know key terms and symbols specific to USAF intelligence operations. Newly assigned individuals who exhibit sufficient knowledge are promptly allowed to perform intelligence duties supporting all audiences. If ample preparation of a training plan is done, then those discussed above will adjust to positions in intelligence operations. However, this does not always occur, and, consequently, problems arise in an internal training program.
The greatest internal training problems are trying to have one training plan fit all, training that is too spaced out, and a lack of familiarity with the organization’s mission and training procedures. Based on my six years of experience in the 107 ARW Intelligence section and academic preparation, I follow the discussion of the problems with solutions that can or could overcome them. The first to be discussed, one training fits all, is inferred in the previous section on the prior experiences of incoming intelligence personnel.

Most problems affecting the internal training program are due to making one training plan that does not serve the diverse needs of personnel, as mentioned above. While a single plan is convenient to prepare and maintain, it can leave previously trained personnel dissatisfied with the intelligence training plan. Redundant or irrelevant training given to experienced personnel wastes the time of both the trainer and trainee.

Another problem is the lack of time intelligence personnel have to adequately prepare products for presentation. The infrequent training that monthly participation offers to Traditional Guardsmen has the potential to produce personnel who are unable to provide intelligence support. Because of most trainees’ status as a Traditional Guardsmen, the amount of time to remain familiar with Wing operations and responsibilities is minimized. Most Traditional Guardsmen do not hold civilian occupations involving intelligence operations, so they have limited knowledge about current political and military events. Therefore, their trainers must adapt training plans and scheduling.

The most important requirement of briefing preparation is for intelligence personnel to know about future operations or missions involving Wing personnel, the starting point for researching and presenting the topic. For example, before Wing personnel are deployed to areas afflicted by terrorist, foreign intelligence, or criminal threats, intelligence
personnel must analyze the potential threats. To do this, they must have time to learn about and prepare their audience with relevant political and military information about the location, and also, to the maximum extent possible, provide information pertaining to future operations. However, this is not always possible, and, when intelligence personnel are not knowledgeable about the Wings' current operations, briefings and papers lack sufficient detail. Recognition of these problems is crucial so strategies can begin to correct the mistakes intelligence personnel might make while going through the intelligence product preparation process (IP3).

Intelligence personnel can enhance their presentations by combining the stages of the IP3 and “the writing process.” Even though their briefings may be inadequate and need to be improved, personnel will have time to complete the IP3: research the material, interpret and evaluate the data, create an outline in written form, prepare visual aids for presentation, perform a practice briefing, and edit the briefing prior to its formal presentation. There are many similarities between the stages of the IP3 and “the writing process”: prewriting, drafting, revising, and editing. Also similar to “the writing process,” the IP3 has factors influencing the time spent in each stage when creating a product: preparation time, audience size, and the information’s objective in the future. The available time to prepare a briefing has the greatest impact on an IOO’s ability to utilize all four stages. An effective IP3 allows for a recursive process with flexible movement from prewriting to drafting stages, yet keeps the process moving forward.

Obviously, if there are time limitations, then an IOO must prioritize how much time will be spent in each stage. It is likely prewriting/drafting stages, focusing on the collection of information, will receive the greatest attention, and less time will be spent on revising/editing. Ensuring information is disseminated will take precedence at the
expense of a finished intelligence product. Next, audience size influences the degree each stage is used also. An IOO who is briefing a small audience of one or two people will use the revising/editing stage less. Again, the objective will focus on the collection and dissemination of information, and the style of presentation will intentionally be lower keyed. Last, the way in which information will be exploited in the future influences the purpose of each stage in the IP3. If intelligence personnel will utilize information exclusively, then less time will be spent in the revising and editing stages. Emphasis will be on information content rather than presentation style.

When assigned a topic, intelligence personnel should prewrite with bibliographic sources and an outline. This includes gathering information for several sources: the knowledge they or other personnel possess, on-site intelligence libraries, or computer network-based information sources. The Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), coupled with knowledge someone might have regarding a topic, is the most valuable tool available to intelligence personnel. SIPRNET is an internet-based computer network providing an abundant amount of classified intelligence information through multiple national agencies (CIA, FBI, etc.) and military services. SIPRNET provides such a massive amount of intelligence information it can be tempting to stay at the prewriting stage. To counteract this, checklists to develop outlines help personnel move to the next phase. See chapter four for the important ones.

PowerPoint™ is the primary visual aid that intelligence personnel employ for presentations. Drafting an intelligence briefing in PowerPoint™ should begin by creating research-based text using short “bullet statements” that the briefer will describe in greater detail. Avoid the urge to fill the slide with text; this suggests a lack of knowledge about the material.
Moving to the revision and editing phase, intelligence personnel should seek feedback and revise/edit prior to its formal presentation by doing a “dry run” with colleagues. Ideally, they will ask questions; if the speaker cannot provide an answer, then further research is needed. They will also provide feedback on grammar, mechanics, speaking style, and technique.

IOOs risk not being knowledgeable about the topic being briefed to an audience. At times, personnel simply “download” a finished product prepared by other agencies’ analysts who routinely post their briefings on the SIPRNET. While this is convenient and often useful for operations-level intelligence units during time critical situations, such a practice can degrade the depth of knowledge intelligence personnel gain from thorough briefing preparation. This will ultimately affect their ability to answer audience questions pertaining to the briefing topic. To correct this tendency of personnel to download a finished intelligence product, an ITP must provide training checklists emphasizing the stages discussed above. The checklists in chapter four are designed to guide IOOs to resources where they can increase their knowledge about an intelligence topic. When tasked to prepare a briefing or paper, effective training tools will require intelligence personnel to address each stage. As an additional training “safeguard,” the use of practice briefings will help promote an understanding of information presented.

Throughout this chapter, I have emphasized the requirement for an ITP to incorporate checklists as training aids to assist intelligence personnel as they prepare briefings. Although Air Force regulations and instructions provide a basic outline for the development of checklists, they are guides rather than a required format. The most effective briefings are tailored to a specific situation, unit mission and/or type of aircraft” (AMCPAM 14-104 46).
The characteristics of a well-developed checklist go beyond “scratching the surface” of the material covered in a briefing. Ideal checklists should “point” IOOs toward intelligence agencies’ links containing information necessary for briefing development. After an IOO collects data, a checklist should solicit mission-specific questions helping to identify relevant material. Also, every checklist must provoke analysts to think critically about what political, military, and economic events might happen that affect the Wing’s mission. Because the revised checklists in chapter four address these requirements, an IOO can ensure important information is included and a comprehensive product is created.

This chapter describes the intelligence internal training process and its affect on audiences. The area of internal communications with fellow intelligence personnel is highly complex—a divergent cadre that is available intermittently must be introduced to the Wing’s mission and taught how to maximize their time and resources such as checklists in preparing briefings for commanders and Aircrew. Beyond the “what” of analyzing the strategic and tactical needs of the Commander and Aircrew and then preparing appropriate briefings, the IOO must train the “how” to fellow intelligence personnel. Thus the heart of the intelligence internal training program is to teach others how to teach in an intricate, face-paced environment. Problems in the internal training program compound: ineffective presentation of intelligence reduces the performance of the entire Wing. Chapter four provides training tools—checklists and a critiques sheet—that will be valuable to IOOs in their work with the audiences described throughout this paper. The revised checklists and critique sheet are the result of recognizing communication problems, identifying the deficiencies of previous training aids, and the development of a product able to satisfy intelligence requirements. With these tools,
IOOs can improve their briefings, receive constructive feedback, and further develop them to suit the requirements of their USAF mission.
CHAPTER FOUR: BRIEFING CHECKLISTS

Throughout the Intelligence Community, checklists are available to assist personnel when preparing briefings and other informational products at both the strategic and tactical intelligence levels. Many checklists are produced at USAF headquarters and circulated throughout the community. The quality of these checklists, as modified at the unit level, is dependent on how well an HQ intelligence officer foresees and assesses the field requirements. Because of limited unit level experience, many officers prepare checklists so poorly focused and inadequately detailed that they are of little use to intelligence personnel when creating briefings. This chapter explains some common problems found in checklists and reinforces the negative impact they have on an IOO’s ability to support audiences identified in earlier chapters.

As a corrective action, revised checklists, accompanied by an explanation module, for Situation, Current Intelligence, and Threat of the Day Briefings are supplied which can be used in their current forms or modified to serve unique requirements. Non-revised checklists are included for Situation and Current Intelligence Briefings to demonstrate changes made; however, non-revised material is unavailable for Threat of the Day Briefings. Also found below is a critique sheet to assist an IOO in evaluating intelligence products developed from checklists. This sheet will solicit feedback from audiences and initiate subsequent improvements to the revised checklists.

In general, only rudimentary checklists were previously available to an IOO for briefing preparation. By reviewing checklists found in AMCPAM 14-104, it is readily apparent that they only provided general guidance. References such as “provide significant political/military activity” and “provide a brief background” are such extremely broad statements they do not stimulate an IOO’s critical thinking skills.
Historically, intelligence personnel address subjects more analytically if they are posed direct, continuing questions as opposed to providing narrative responses to the references listed above. This new format is part of each of the revised/new checklists.

In addition, checklists found in AMCPAM 14-104 do not address SIPRNET databases containing intelligence information. Not all personnel are aware of these computer-related resources, and, as a result, essential time-sensitive material risks not being included in some products. With on-going requirements for "near real-time" and "real-time" intelligence information, a briefing not including this data is inadequate and neglectful of its audience's needs.

A final problem with previous checklists results from increasing terrorist threats in areas where personnel are deployed. Because of the current anti-terrorism climate, all intelligence briefings must address force protection matters and its affect on Wing personnel. This subject might be overlooked when using non-revised checklists because there are no questions prompting an IOO to research this topic. However, revised checklists focusing on ground-based activity--Situation and Current Intelligence--address this in greater detail than previously available.

IOOs need to understand the purpose of checklists commonly used by intelligence personnel so they can most effectively modify them or other relevant tools. Military guidelines ensure that procedures are performed according to regulations, laws, and training, especially that personnel perform all parts of a given task. The primary requirement surrounding the use of intelligence checklists is that they must be detailed, relevant, and adaptable to the audience. Checklist information must be mission-specific and direct users toward applicable resources. A checklist or related training device must accommodate the experience level of audience members and the IOO providing
intelligence support. It must be written to eliminate misunderstanding commonly found by both the sender and receiver in a communication relationship.

Ideally, headquarters' checklists modified by unit level IOOs have these leading characteristics. First, IOOs have enough knowledge about or experience in the jobs of their audiences that they can create reliable material for them. Second, a model checklist directs users to research tools that quickly garner productive results. Third, it encourages analysis of what is likely to happen in the future. Finally, the ideal checklist clearly and logically presents the material to the trainer step-by-step who then makes it understandable to the audience. Historically, personnel who utilize a well-developed checklist will provide an equally comprehensive intelligence briefing.

Of all the checklists most IOOs and I use regularly, those for Situation, Current Intelligence, and Threat of the Day briefings consume the majority of my time; consequently, each briefing's supporting documentation is essential to my work. This factor has been the impetus for me to review previously written checklists, and then develop training aids that better support the needs of fellow IOOs and the Intelligence Community at large. However, the depth and scope of the work done to this point is not exhaustive. There are various directions in which the development of these checklists and critique sheet can be taken to satisfy the requirements of 107 ARW audiences further. But, for the purpose of this study, the checklists and critique sheet found below will be a valuable tool allowing intelligence personnel to address communication problems previously described throughout this paper.
**Module 1: Situation Briefing**

*Purpose:* The Commander receives this briefing at intervals determined by changes in military activity or events to remain informed on intelligence matters affecting Wing personnel. The Commander could also call for briefings on more long-term situations. To satisfy this need, I have revised the Situation Briefing checklist to assist intelligence personnel when preparing this briefing. Previous checklists did not provide adequate information or direction for briefing personnel. The revision ensures intelligence personnel deliver a Situation Briefing that includes all essential, relevant information.

*Revisions:* First, I added SIPRNET links (section three) directing personnel to the resources where most intelligence information can be found; each regional “command” has a website containing material specific to their area of responsibility. Using these sites, personnel can “build” a Situation Briefing, and, if necessary, return to them to update follow up briefings throughout an ongoing scenario.

Second, regarding political and military activity, I have added questions (section three) directing intelligence personnel to information specific to KC-135 operations and Wing personnel. These questions prompt intelligence personnel to focus only on threats to Wing operations. Last and most importantly, in order to assess what is likely to happen, I added prompting questions in section four that help intelligence personnel estimate the enemy’s intentions. This estimate is a critical aspect of a Situation Briefing often overlooked by intelligence personnel. By receiving this information, the Commander will be able to make educated decisions affecting Wing personnel and resources.
SITUATION BRIEFING (NON-REVISED)

1. Security classification

2. Information “Current as of” time

3. Significant political/military developments affecting unit (use displays)

4. Threat to home station/local area situation

5. Indications of impending attack (home station and bases unit aircraft may operate)

6. Deployment route threats (if applicable)

7. Security situation (threat condition/security level)

8. Enemy force disposition

9. Areas of major engagements (FLOT/FEBA, etc.)

10. Enemy intentions estimate/Probable course of action

11. OPSEC/COMSEC reminder

12. Solicit questions
SITUATION BRIEFING (REVISED)

Reminder: Clarify abbreviations/acronyms verbally or by using a handout.

1. Security classification

2. Information “current as of” time

3. Significant political and military activity affecting unit
   - Refer to specific area of responsibility (AOR) information
   - Political activity
     - What political developments have occurred since the last briefing?
     - What actions by key political leaders suggest military activity?
     - Based on the above, what activity might occur in the near future?
   - Military activity
     - What military developments affect Wing operations?
       - Have these developments been briefed to the Commander?
       - If new threats exist, do they impact KC-135 or ground operations?
         - What threats could impact KC-135 operations?
           - Changes in enemy disposition affecting operations
           - Route threats (if applicable)
           - Do threats impact mission effectiveness?
             - How is the mission affected?
         - What threats could impact ground operations?
☐ Threat to home station/local area situation (terrorist, sabotage, nuclear/biological/chemical weapons)

✓ Threat Working Group information

☐ Are there indications of an impending attack?

☐ Do threats impact mission effectiveness?

4. Enemy intentions & assessment

▪ Who in the Wing (Aircrew/ground personnel) will this impact?

▪ When will it impact Wing Operations?
  
  ○ Provide 24/48/72 hour estimates

▪ Trend / Outlook
  
  ○ What is the probable future activity?

▪ Why is this information important / relevant to the Commander?

5. Operations/Communications Security reminders

6. Security classification

7. Solicit questions
Module 2: Current Intelligence Briefing

Purpose: A Current Intelligence Briefing is the primary method for personnel to convey timely intelligence information to the Commander, Aircrew, and other Wing personnel. Because a variety of groups could receive this briefing, intelligence personnel must know each audience’s information requirements. CIBs are “driven” by current events, so the frequency and diversity of each briefing poses considerable challenges for intelligence personnel. Because of inadequate detail, the previous checklist did not assist personnel when “building” a CIB. The checklist below corrects this problem by ensuring intelligence personnel ask questions compelling them to include applicable information.

Revisions: Understanding what information an audience requires is the first and most important step when preparing a CIB. Section three does this by ensuring intelligence personnel understand the relevance of CIB material to Wing operations. By answering these questions, the intelligence personnel can prepare a CIB that focuses only on information that is important to Wing personnel. Next, the inclusion of SIPRNET sites (section four) directs personnel to theater joint intelligence centers (JIC) providing access to current intelligence material when developing a CIB. This “one-stop shopping” reduces the time intelligence personnel spend searching for data supporting a CIB topic.

In section five, intelligence personnel are prompted to furnish essential information for CIB subjects such as Integrated Air Defense Systems, Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection, and other topics included in a briefing. Each topic has specific information that must be included, and the questions in this section ensure this is accomplished. Finally, regardless of the topic, intelligence personnel’s must forecast the potential impact to Wing operations. The checklist’s reference to “trend/outlook” reminds personnel to accomplish this essential part of a CIB.
1. Security classification

2. Information “Current as of” time

Note: *Each topic you discuss should follow steps 4 - 6 below.*

3. A brief background on the topic (if appropriate)

4. Discuss main points of topic (only the ones that impact mission/mission readiness)

5. Impact/significance to your unit

6. Solicit questions
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING (REVISED)

Note: It should be readily apparent why you are covering this topic. You should understand the needs of your audience and how they will use the material you provide. Never allow your audience to be unclear about why they are receiving this briefing. Clarify abbreviations/acronyms verbally or provide a supplemental handout to your audience.

1. Security classification

2. Information “current as of” time

3. Identify intelligence topic; determine relevance of intelligence material
   - How will this material affect air refueling operations?
   - How will this material affect Wing personnel?
   - Is knowledge of this material necessary to ensure mission success?

4. Locate data through INTELINK and other information sources

5. Discuss main points of topic(s)
   - Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) topic
     - Is this system a new acquisition or is it an improvement to a current system?
       - Changes to system
       - Current capabilities
● Do advancements in an IADS now threaten Wing operations?

● Trend / Outlook

■ Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) topic

● Terrorist organization and/or activity posing a threat to Wing personnel
  ➢ What is the organization’s ideology and historical activity?
  ➢ Do they have the capability to conduct terrorist attacks?
  ➢ Do they intend to conduct attacks against US personnel/assets?

● What AT/FP precautions are present to preclude an attack against Wing personnel?

■ Other intelligence topics

● Provide sufficient background information

● Why is this material important to this audience?

● How does this affect the mission/base?

● Trend/Outlook

6. Operations/Communications Security reminders

7. Security classification

8. Solicit questions
Module 3: Threat of the Day Briefing

Purpose: Aircrew members receive critical "Threat of the Day" briefings to learn about foreign weapon systems, primarily surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), and fighter aircraft. Even though these briefings are frequent, intelligence personnel have had no checklist; thus TOD format was not standardized. The checklist below alleviates some problems that occurred with previous TOD briefings. For example, a common problem was intelligence personnel not including information pertaining to SAM, AAA, and aircraft range capabilities. Without knowing this essential information, Aircrew can unknowingly place their aircraft within threat range of these systems.

Items of Interest: Note that because intelligence personnel must know the capabilities of the KC-135 to reduce the effectiveness of some foreign weapon systems, I sited the training manual, AFTTP 3-1/Volume 22. Next, intelligence personnel should include in their TOD briefings a list of questions about the prospective "threat systems" to the KC-135. Intelligence personnel quickly lose credibility with Aircrew when they provide irrelevant, non-specific information.

Finally, to consider counter tactics for foreign weapon system capabilities, the checklist prompts intelligence personnel to provide the strengths and weaknesses of the threat. A TOD briefing is complete only when this information is included. This checklist can be modified as the threat to KC-135 operations changes.
THREAT OF THE DAY BRIEFING

Note: Ensure that you are familiar with KC-135 capabilities found in AFTTP 3-1, Volume 22. It is important to know this information so you can tailor your briefing to accommodate the aircraft’s limitations relative to the threat being briefed.

1. Security classification

2. Information “current as of” time

3. Air defense system threat information – AFTTP 3-1, Volume 2

http://198.97.90.10:5200/Documents/HANDBOOK/SXX00001/HTML/#start31

- Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) and Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Systems
  
  o Deployment/Employment
    
    ▶ Do countries where Wing operations might become involved possess this system?
  
  o Maximum / minimum effective range
    
    ▶ Is system mobile or fixed?
  
  o Maximum / minimum effective altitude
    
    ▶ Do standard air refueling altitudes exceed the system’s maximum effective altitude?
    
    ▶ Reminder: Provide situations that could enhance maximum effective altitude and increase threat to aircraft operations
  
  o Flight time to effective range
  
  o Missiles per target
  
  o Guidance
    
    ▶ Infrared (IR)
    
    ▶ Radar
- Strengths
- Weaknesses
- Counter tactics
  - Preemptive
  - Reactive

**Aircraft**

- Deployment/Employment
  - Do countries where Wing operations might occur possess this system?
- Combat radius/range
  - Is aircraft capable of air refueling?
- Armament
  - Missiles
  - Guns
- Strengths
- Weaknesses
- Counter tactics
  - Preemptive
  - Reactive

4. Security classification

5. Solicit questions
Module 4: Critique Sheet

Purpose: The Critique Sheet is designed for audiences to provide comments to IOOs regarding the quality of an intelligence product. Prior to the development of this sheet, a standardized means did not exist, so feedback pertaining to the quality of a briefing was not easily gathered. This was problematic because audience’s comments were not easily learned, and, as a result, subsequent briefings were difficult to develop. To date, the information used from audiences’ critique sheets has allowed me to evaluate and improve the checklists above. This Critique Sheet can further be used to edit these and other checklists.

Items of Interest: As mentioned throughout this paper, the success of an intelligence product is dependent on the ability of an IOO to convey the information. Improvements to this can only occur if an IOO is aware of problems. For example, distractions as a result of the briefer’s technique affect audience comprehension and their ability to use information. Because of potential problems, questions one through three pertain to the briefer’s behavior and ability to speak before an audience. In addition to presentation skills, an IOO must ensure supplemental training aids are effective. Questions four, six, and seven provide an opportunity for the audience to address this matter by evaluating the quality of training aids used. Coupled with opportunity for audience members to supply feedback in a narrative form, section eight provides a numerical scale system focusing on the content of an intelligence product. This offers IOOs the ability to quantify the effectiveness of a briefing by addressing key subject areas. Collectively, the narrative and scale sections provide an objective method to identify their performance for problems. With this information, corrections can be made to improve briefing techniques and intelligence products in general.
Intelligence Briefing Critique Sheet

Note: On a scale of 1-10 (with 1 = poor and 10 = excellent), please rate

1. The briefer’s presentation skills
2. The briefer’s ability

1. Please rate the briefer’s presentation skills (presence, delivery, articulation, etc.):

2. Please rate the briefer’s ability to answer questions:

3. Please rate the briefer’s assessment/analysis of the topic:

4. Please rate the supplemental training aids (Point/Talking Papers):

5. What could be done to improve intelligence training?

6. What was the most beneficial training aid?

7. What was the least beneficial training aid?

8. Please rate each block of instruction (1=Poor, 5=Average, 10=Excellent):

   Relevant to Wing Operations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Relevant to KC-135 Operations 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Integrated Air Defense (IADS) Threats 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Terrorist Threat 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Relative Quality to Previous Briefings 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
   Purposeful/Usefulness 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

*If you marked one of the above selections below a 5, please explain why:
CONCLUSION

This paper's examination of the Intelligence–audience relationships has provided me the opportunity to understand each communication process better, thus developing my effectiveness as an Intelligence Operations Officer. As a result of this study, several key findings were established to improve intelligence personnel’s ability to train the Commander, Aircrew, and other internal personnel.

Prior to conducting this study, I was not aware of the communication dynamics between intelligence personnel and different audiences requiring intelligence support. However, analysis of these relationships helped reveal how components such as style, and information direction affect each intelligence audience. Recognition of this helped define the qualities of the communication relationship, and, with this understanding, isolation of specific problems and solutions could be managed.

Language and knowledge levels of both the speaker and audience are the primary obstacles affecting the ability of IOOs to communicate. As in any instructional setting, all must share a common language to optimize their interaction and communication. This paper has addressed problems regarding language, so intelligence personnel can adapt material to the needs of the Commander and Aircrew audiences.

This study has also illustrated the need for intelligence personnel to realize individuals among the audiences likely possess different levels of knowledge. The extent of this problem will be determined by the experience members of each group have, and the ability of intelligence personnel to take advantage of any previous knowledge to instruct an individual. Information available in this paper will allow intelligence personnel to prepare for diverse levels of knowledge. Training plans and overall intelligence support can then be tailored to accommodate the Commander and Aircrew audiences.
The research involved when preparing this paper allowed me to develop the importance placed on each audience's training. Training plans designed for the Commander, Aircrew, and internal audiences must acknowledge potential communication problems, and, to correct this, with a range of solutions. Once problems are identified, intelligence personnel can improve the quality of support to external audiences.

Further, this paper has shown that a successful internal training program can only be achieved if training tools, checklists and guides, are clear and provoking. Consequently, and most importantly, my revised checklist will encourage personnel to perform an in-depth, critical analysis of an intelligence subject. Further revisions made to the checklists can be updated when needed to accommodate different audience members, theaters of operation, and other requirements affecting the Wing’s mission.

Though this paper addresses the communication process of intelligence personnel and their audiences, it is not an exhaustive study. It also does not include all of the potential audiences who might require intelligence support. With additional data, the intelligence–ground personnel communication relationship could be evaluated. Ground personnel increasingly receive intelligence support, so emerging problems and remedies could be evaluated using the model presented in this thesis. Because ground personnel consist of several subgroups, an analysis could focus on each group's communication problems. Also, a study could address the problems intelligence personnel encounter when working in a deployed setting with unfamiliar audiences.

This study still also allows for detailed research and writing about specific communication problems described above. First, in addition to the current research regarding language problems, an extended study could be conducted focusing on
terminology of intelligence personnel when communicating with the Commander, Aircrew, or internal audiences independently and exclusively. This would center on terms and symbols and on the encoding and decoding that occurs when communicating. More specifically, a study could be conducted pertaining to intelligence personnel's ability to understand (decode) the language particular to an audience. For example, Aircrew audiences utilize aviation-related terms extensively, so intelligence personnel must develop an understanding of these to train Aircrew. Problems associated with this could be analyzed further.

Using this thesis as a foundation, research could be continued on the positive and negative effect of individuals on group instruction. For example, research could address how communication differs between part-time and full-time Wing personnel. This problem would be worthy of review because of the differences in their military/civilian training and experience. As a secondary problem to the one above, a study could focus on part-time personnel employed in intelligence or aviation-related fields, and how their work affects their ability to perform in their positions with the 107 ARW. This could be contrasted with individuals who are employed in fields unrelated to intelligence or aviation.

Finally, it would be beneficial for intelligence personnel if further research and analysis were performed focusing on communications among national-level internal training programs. This research should evaluate DoD and USAF instructions/regulation to determine their contribution to intelligence operations, mainly training plans, including a review of documents at the national agencies such as the CIA, DIA, and AIA (Air Intelligence Agency). By conducting a "top down" review such as this, intelligence personnel at the wing-level will be able to prepare training plans with a better
understanding of the process at the national or strategic level. Often, internal training programs at the wing-level are not prepared with adequate USAF guidance, and, consequently, communication problems arise. A study of this type will serve to alleviate some of these problems before they arise.

This paper has served as a professional introspection about the relationships intelligence personnel encounter. While I communicate with several audiences routinely, I was not fully aware of the theory behind my IOO responsibilities; this paper addresses the process behind my communications. I improved the checklists and other documents my colleagues and I use after examining how I organize, prepare, and disseminate intelligence information. This has resulted in our more focused and relevant briefings. Future development of this material will, consequently, assist me and other IOOs in evaluating the effectiveness of briefing and training programs, and will enable continual improvements for personnel in the intelligence operations community.
Works Cited


Department of the Air Force (DAF). *AMCPAM 14-104, Intelligence Cookbook.*


