Aristotle's Analysis of Courage

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The main object of this paper is to examine and elucidate Aristotle's analysis of courage. But I shall also say something about his analysis of temperance, because it has a somewhat different structure. In fact, his concept of temperance provides a useful contrasting background for his concept of courage. About the third cardinal virtue justice, I shall say nothing.

I shall develop my thesis in two stages. First I shall argue that typical courage is an executive virtue, practiced in the service of further goals which vary from case to case: e.g. the further goal might be victory in battle or keeping a secret. In this respect courage is unlike temperance, because, though temperance may be practiced in the service of a further goal, such as health or happiness, if it is so practiced, the further goal is not one that varies from case to case. Let us call such further goals “the external goals of the virtue” in contrast with their internal goals, which would be acting courageously and acting temperately in the two instances with which I shall be concerned. Then the first part of my thesis will be that typical courage, unlike temperance, has external goals that vary from case to case, and is, in this sense, an executive virtue, and that Aristotle recognizes this fact.

I must explain at this point why I say ‘typical courage’ instead of ‘courage’ without qualification. The reason is that courage can also be exhibited in a patient’s attitude and reactions to a terminal illness, and in such a case there is not really anything that fits into the slot reserved for the varying external goal. So this kind of courage is not an executive virtue. It has a different structure. However, in the exegesis of Aristotle nothing is lost if this case is excluded from the discussion. For Aristotle's paradigm of courage is the courage of a citizen who risks being maimed or killed in battle, and in the Eudemian Ethics he calls the other kind of courageous person tough or enduring, rather than courageous (1229A 39ff). So I shall confine the discussion to typical courage with the structure of Aristotle's paradigm, and from now on, when I say ‘courage’ I shall always mean ‘typical courage’.

There is another piece of terminology that may be introduced at this point. I shall call such things as wounds and death the 'counter-goals' of courage, because the agent wants to avoid them. They too vary from case to case. It is obviously the frequency and the strength of people’s desires to avoid such counter-goals that make courage necessary, and explain why it is such an important executive virtue.

The second part of my thesis will be that Aristotle recognizes this fact too, and that it puts a heavy strain on his doctrine that true virtue excludes deviant desires. For given this doctrine, how can courage qualify as a true virtue? It seems that it can qualify only as self control, which requires deviant desires as its opponents, but which precisely for that reason does not count as a true virtue. In the last part of this paper I shall examine one way in which Aristotle may have solved this problem.

I begin with a more detailed discussion of temperance, the virtue which will provide the background to courage.

Aristotle's two main contentions about virtue are that it requires the right feelings as well as the right actions, and that, since virtue lies in the mean, the right feelings and actions will be medial feelings and actions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze Aristotle's concept of mediality. But even when it is left un-
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analyzed it is still possible to establish quite a lot about the way in which its application to feelings is connected with its application to actions.

Aristotle makes it perfectly clear that the requirement of mediality has to be met not only by the virtuous agent’s actions but also by his feelings (E.N. II.6.x & xv). It might be supposed that he values medial feelings only because they produce medial actions. But this Benthamite interpretation would not fit the passage in which he contrasts virtue with art (E.N. II.4.iii). For what he says there is that the products of art possess their goodness intrinsically, and that it is, therefore, enough that they should have a certain character, but virtuous actions involve the additional requirement that they should issue from a certain state of the agent. This way of drawing the contrast rules out the Benthamite interpretation. For an artist’s skill obviously has instrumental value, so that there would be no contrast if Aristotle were ascribing only instrumental value to the virtuous agent’s state.

The application of the requirement of mediality to feelings soon leads to a dilemma. For, as Aristotle observes, “we feel anger and fear without choosing to do so” (E.N. II.5.iv), but “virtue is a disposition to make choices” (E.N. II.6.xv). Therefore either virtue is self-control, or else virtue is often unattainable by the choice of the moment. Aristotle’s reaction to this dilemma was to reject the equation of virtue with self-control (E.N. IV.9.viii), and to accept the consequence, that therefore virtue cannot be instant in the sense in which coffee can be.

Self-control, in its central Aristotelian sense, operates in the same field as temperance, viz. food, drink and sex. So temperance provides the clearest illustration of the difference between virtue and self-control. I shall quote, and comment on two of Aristotle’s observations on the difference between these two achievements.

“If self-control involves the possession of strong and bad appetites, a temperate person will not be self-controlled, and a self-controlled person will not be temperate: for a temperate person will not possess excessive or bad appetites” (E.N. VII.2 .vi). The sequel to this passage shows that Aristotle in fact accepted the premiss, that self-control does involve the possession of excessive and bad appetites. Appetites are, of course, the feelings that range over the field with which this particular virtue, temperance, is concerned. (Appetite comes first on Aristotle’s list of feelings in E.N. II.5.ii).

The second passage that I shall quote is more enigmatic (E.N. VII.9.vi): “Both a self-controlled person and a temperate person are such as to do nothing contrary to the logos for the sake of bodily pleasure: but the former has bad appetites, while the latter does not have them: and the latter is the sort of person who would not feel pleasure contrary to the logos, while the former is the sort of person who would feel pleasure but is not led by it.”

This passage seems to go further than the previous one. For consider what sort of pleasure Aristotle has in mind when he says that a temperate person would not feel pleasure contrary to the logos. It cannot be satisfaction that his actions conform to his ideal: i.e. it cannot be self-image-fit pleasure. For though it is true that a temperate person would not feel that sort of pleasure if he acted contrary to the logos, this is also true of the self-controlled person, because he has the same ideal as the temperate person, and yet Aristotle says that the self-controlled person would feel this pleasure, whatever it is, if he acted contrary to the logos.

So is this pleasure, which the temperate person would not feel, the sensual pleasure of eating, drinking or sexual activity? This is not an easy question to answer.

Aristotle certainly distinguishes between such sensual pleasure and the self-image-fit pleasure which, I have just argued, cannot be what he has in mind in the quoted passage. E.g. he says that “someone who abstains from physical pleasure and takes pleasure in his own abstinence is temperate, while someone who is pained by
his own abstinence is self-indulgent” (E.N. II.3.i).

The pleasure of the temperate person, to which Aristotle refers in this passage must be, at least in part, the pleasure of self-image-fit. But it is more difficult to classify the pain of the self-indulgent person. If we say that it is simply the pain of self-image-misfit, we face the following, embarrassing question: “Why does this self-indulgent person abstain? His self-image is one of excessive indulgence, so why does he not go ahead and indulge?”

I shall discuss this passage and the previous one in more detail later. At present the only point that I want to make is that in Bk VII of E.N. Aristotle does mention another kind of secondary pain, viz. secondary pain directly caused by the frustration of an appetite (VII.7.iii). This differs from self-image-misfit pain, which is caused indirectly by reflection on the misfit. Now both the self-controlled person and the frustrated self-indulgent person will suffer the directly caused secondary pain. But the self-controlled person will not suffer the other kind of secondary pain, self-image-misfit pain, whereas the frustrated self-indulgent person will suffer it.

It is possible that Aristotle believed that directly caused secondary pain has a counterpart, viz. pleasure directly caused by the satisfaction of an appetite, but not identical with the ordinary sensual pleasure. It is more probable that he believed that a temperate person enjoys what he does, when enjoyment is not identical with self-image-fit pleasure. If we use some of this material we can get a plausible account of the pleasure-pain balance of the temperate person, if, contrary to his definition, he indulged to excess. On the credit side he would get ordinary sensual pleasure. But this would be outweighed by his non-sensual pain, which would be made up in the following way: the secondary pain of self-image-misfit, plus disenjoyment of the performance, plus, perhaps, the pain (disgust) of satisfying an appetite that he does not possess. In short, he would be revolted.

If we use this material, we can also give a plausible account of the pleasure-pain balance of the self-controlled person, if, contrary to his definition, he indulged to excess. On the credit side he would get ordinary sensual pleasure, plus, perhaps, the directly caused secondary pleasure of satisfying an appetite, plus, quite certainly, relief from the directly caused secondary pain of frustrating an appetite. On the debit side he would get self-image-misfit pain.

I have gone into these hedonic balances in some detail, because they are connected with the question, whether Aristotle portrays the temperate person as a kind of saint, and, if so, as what kind of saint. If Aristotle really means that he would not get any ordinary sensual pleasure from indulging to excess, then his saintliness would have a physiological basis, if indeed this counts as saintliness, which is doubtful. But if Aristotle means that he would be revolted by physically pleasurable excesses, and so would not even be tempted by them, then he would be the familiar kind of saint, one with a saintly character.

But it is one thing not to be tempted by excessive appetites, and another thing not to possess them. Surprisingly, Aristotle says quite explicitly that a temperate person will not have excessive appetites. This sets a very high standard, because it implies that he would never feel any desire to indulge to excess in food, drink or sex. If this is an exaggeration, Aristotle may have been led into it because he does not give any criterion which would distinguish between feeling an appetite but not being tempted by it and not feeling an appetite. Then, because he held that all appetites are locked onto sensual pleasure, in the sense in which a rocket is locked onto its target, he may have been inclined to conclude that the temperate person, not having excessive appetites, would not get any sensual pleasure if he did indulge to excess. But, as I have shown, Aristotle’s theory of secondary pleasure gives him a
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way of avoiding this mistake.

So much for the background, Aristotle’s analysis of temperance, against which I shall now set his analysis of courage.

Courage has a more complex structure, which I described briefly at the beginning of this paper. Perhaps the best way to appreciate the difference is to invent a new virtue, darage, which operates in the same field as courage, but which has the same simple structure as temperance. Courage has external goals that vary from case to case, but darage has no such external goals. Darage is concerned only with desires for a single type of object, risks, just as temperance is concerned only with desires for a single type of object, sensual pleasures. So the man of darage exposes himself to risks medially, but pointlessly, and either he does not want excessive or deficient exposure to risk, or else, if he does have deviant desires, he is not tempted by them. Of course, darage has an external goal—acting daringly for its own sake—just as any other virtue has an external goal. It may even be the case that darage has a constant external goal, such as health or happiness. But the point is that it has no varying external goals, and so it is not an executive virtue. The man of darage acts like a mountaineer or a racing-car driver, or an English public school boy on the playing field.

However, darage still has a counter-goal, like courage. For the man of darage does want, in general, to avoid harm to himself. If we wished to get a complete contrast with courage, and a complete assimilation to temperance, we would have to suppose that darage had no counter-goal, and that deviations from the mean were merely the result of excessive or deficient appetite for risks. Perhaps this is incoherent, because it would destroy the concept of harm. But to be on the safe side, I shall give a name to this bizarre virtue too, “super-darage”.

It is obvious that Aristotelian courage is not darage, and even more obvious that it is not super-darage. But before I try to establish in detail what it is, I ought to say something more about what it is not. In particular, I want to show that it is not what Ross thinks it is.

Ross criticizes Aristotle for failing to see that all virtue is essentially a matter of self-control (“Aristotle” pp. 205-7). Hardie rejects Ross’ criticism and applaudes Aristotle’s unwavering distinction between true virtue and self-control (“Aristotle’s Ethical Theory” pp. 138-40). When Ross applies his criticism to Aristotle’s analysis of courage, he argues that this particular virtue can be achieved by controlling either the desire for over-exposure to risk or the desire for under-exposure to risk, depending on whether the agent’s feelings happen to tend towards confidence or fear. So Ross substitutes two pairs of opposed dispositions for Aristotle’s single triad. In one pair, courage—cowardice, fear is the feeling that needs to be controlled, while in the other pair, discretion—rashness, confidence is the feeling that needs to be controlled. He calls confidence “cheer”, and he says that it involves the desire to expose oneself to risks.

Hardie rejects Ross’ thesis that all virtue is essentially a matter of self-control. But there is also something else wrong with the way in which Ross applies this thesis to the particular case of courage. He specifies the desire involved in fear as the desire for under-exposure to risk, and the desire involved in confidence as the desire for over-exposure to risk. Now this would immediately put these desires on a single homogeneous scale; in fact, it would put them on the scale of darage, or, possibly, super-darage. But if the scale really is homogeneous, Ross’ conclusion, that there are two distinct virtues, courage and discretion, instantly collapses. For Aristotle is evidently right in thinking that the medial state will be one and the same virtue whether the agent happens to arrive at it from the side of excess or from the side of deficiency.
This criticism of Ross' view is independent of the controversy about courage and self-control. For even if Ross had said that the agent achieves courage when his deviant feelings wither away rather than when he controls them, his account would still have been vulnerable to the same criticism that a single, homogeneous scale can only yield a single Aristotelian virtue.

Hardie avoids this mistake. His view is that Aristotelian courage is a single virtue with two distinct aspects; one aspect is what we would call 'courage', and it is connected with fear, and the other aspect is discretion, which is connected with confidence. Now if the two aspects of this single virtue really are distinct, the feelings with which they are connected cannot lie on the single homogeneous scale of dærage. It is the merit of Hardie's view that it has this consequence. It really is absurd to put fear and confidence on the single homogeneous scale of dærage.

However, this hardly amounts to a complete interpretation of Aristotle's analysis of courage. We also need an explanation of the nature of the two feelings and their relation to one another. If they do not involve the two deviant desires of dærage, the desire for too much risk and the desire for too little risk, which evidently do lie on a single homogeneous scale, how are they related to one another, and how can they be fused into a single virtue? It is clear that Aristotle does think that they are fused into a single virtue, but less obvious how. In what follows, I shall try to explain the complex structure of this single virtue within the general framework that I have been building up in this paper.

First, we need to go back to the text for more evidence. The main question that needs to be answered is a question about the counter-goal of courage. Is the agent's desire to avoid the counter-goal a necessary condition of Aristotelian courage? If so, will it not be a kind of self-control after all?

In E.N. III Aristotle admits that there is some asymmetry between the way in which courage is related to fear and the way in which it is related to confidence. He says that it is not concerned with both alike, but more with the objects of fear (E.N. III.9.1). He continues: "It is for facing what is painful.....that men are called 'brave'. Hence courage also involves pain .... Yet the end which courage sets before itself would seem to be pleasant but to be concealed by the concomitant circumstances ... . Death and wounds will be painful to the brave man, and they will go against his inclination, but he will face them because it is noble to do so, or base not to do so" (III.9.ii—iv). This is a clear application of the distinction between sensual pleasure/pain, which is attached to things by nature, and self-image-fit pleasure/pain.

But there is another passage, already quoted from E.N. II, which conveys a more complicated doctrine. After applying the distinction between the two kinds of pleasure/pain to temperance, the passage goes on to apply it to courage: "The man who abstains from physical pleasure, and takes pleasure in his own abstinence, is temperate, while the man who is pained by it is self-indulgent; and the man who stands his ground in the face of perils and takes pleasure in so doing, or at least is not caused pain, is brave, while the man who is caused pain by it is a coward ".

Earlier, when I quoted the first part of this passage, I pointed out that it may be necessary to invoke total non-sensual pleasure/pain in order to explain it. This may be necessary for the following reason. At first reading we are inclined to think that the two characters who feel pain do the wrong thing because of their pain. I.e. one of them indulges in physical pleasure to excess, while the other takes to his heels. For this would justify Aristotle's labelling them "self-indulgent" and "cowardly" respectively. But unfortunately the passage is immediately preceded by a sentence which rules out this interpretation: "We must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure and pain that ensues on acts." This rules out the suggested interpreta-
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tion because it implies that the examples that follow are examples in which the same act is done with two different hedonic accompaniments. So Aristotle must mean that each of the two deviant characters does the right thing, but without pleasure, and even with pain.

But without what sort of pleasure, and with what sort of pain? At first, we are inclined to answer, "Without self-image-fit pleasure, and with self-image-misfit pain". At least, this would conform to the two labels, "self-indulgent" and "cowardly". For the self-indulgent man has the wrong self-image, so that, if he performed the act of a temperate man, he would get self-image-misfit pain; and similarly the coward has the wrong self-image, so that, if he performed the act of a brave man, he too would get self-image-misfit pain.

But if these two characters have the wrong self-image, what makes them perform the right actions? There are answers to this question—e.g. conformity to the pressure of public opinion. But it may be that Aristotle made a slip in this passage. It may be that he should have called the two characters "self-controlled", so that each would suffer secondary pain caused directly by the frustration of a strong desire rather than self-image-misfit pain.

If this is right, it is necessary to invoke total non-sensual pleasure/pain in order to explain the passage. We would assume that both characters have the right self-image, so that doing the right thing gives them self-image-fit pleasure. But in each case this is outweighed by the secondary pain that is caused directly by the frustration of a strong desire. So the balance of total non-sensual pleasure/pain is negative in both cases, and both characters have a bad time.

It might help if I interrupted exposition at this point, and laid my last card face upwards on the table. What I am going to argue is that Aristotle almost had a way out of the dilemma, "Either courage involves no desire to avoid the counter-goal, or else it is not a true virtue". He could relax the standard required for true virtue, allowing some deviant desires in the truly virtuous agent, but not enough to tempt him, and allowing some diminution in the total non-sensual pleasure/pain balance, but not a significant diminution. This would reduce the gap between temperance and courage, but it would not eliminate it. Indeed, nothing could eliminate it, because these two virtues really do have different structures. However, Aristotle does not quite put himself in a position to take this way out. In order to take it, he would have to modify the stringent requirement that the temperate man must have no deviant appetites. But he never does modify it, and so his solution of the problem remains incomplete.

To return to details—the two passages just quoted show that, of course, Aristotle was aware that courage requires a counter-goal. It follows that he misdescribes the situation when he says in E.N. III.9 that courage is more concerned with the objects of fear. For this suggests that people tend to be cowardly rather than rash, just as they tend to excess in physical pleasure rather than to deficiency. But the way in which courage is concerned with the objects of fear is quite different from the way in which it is concerned with the objects of confidence. Courage is concerned with the objects of fear because it requires a counter-goal. E.E. 1229 A clearly states the need for a counter-goal, and specifies it as things that cause pain and tend to destroy life.

Dare to, on the other hand, does not require a counter-goal. So E.N. III.9, which misdescribes a situation familiar to Aristotle, might be regarded as a careless assimilation of courage to dare to. But though the assimilation is untypical, it is not quite right to call it "careless". For any attempt to fit courage into a triad runs the risk of assimilating it to dare to. It was difficult for Aristotle to keep the complex structure

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of courage constantly in view and firmly distinguished from the much simpler structure of a virtue like temperance.

It might be objected that, if Aristotle had realized that courage requires a counter-goal, he would have defined fear in a way that included the desire to avoid harm: but in fact in E.N. III.6.ii he defines it as "expectation of harm". But this is not a convincing objection. For this definition of fear is obviously incomplete. It omits all reference to avoidance, and so it gives a complete account only of those cases in which fear is simply the opposite of hope, and has no connection with taking avoiding action because no such action is possible. It is in this way that a person caught in an earthquake feels fear. But a soldier can run away, and, in order to cover this kind of case, the desire to take avoiding action must be built into the definition of this species of fear, and perhaps of all fear, because, when the situation becomes hopeless, the desire becomes a mere wish. Aristotle gives a hint of how the definition would go in D.A. 403. He gives a list of feelings, which include fear and anger, and he defines anger from a formal point of view as "the desire to return pain for pain". So it is plausible to credit him with a parallel definition of fear, which would go something like this: "Fear is the desire to avoid harm that is judged probable". This is confirmed by RHET 1383 A, which says that fear is impossible unless there is some hope of safety, because fear makes one deliberate, and nobody deliberates in a situation already accepted as hopeless. Interestingly, this passage goes too far in the opposite direction to E.N. III.6.ii.

But how does the courageous man deal with his aversion from the counter-goal? Does he control it? And what does he put in the other pan of the scales?

Let us take this last question first. One thing is immediately clear. In the other pan of the scales he does not put a desire for exposure to risk as such. For if a sane man confines himself to reflecting on the risk of death, there is no reason why he should want to expose himself to it. Of course, in the end, all things considered, he does want to expose himself to the risk. But that is only because the things that he considers include the external goal of courage, e.g. victory in battle, and its internal goal, courageous action because courageous action is noble. It must be his desires for these two goals that he opposes to his desire to avoid the counter-goal, wounds and possibly death.

But what about his desire for exposure to risk as such? And what about his confidence? How does Aristotle fit these two things into the structure of courage?

The answer to the first of these two questions is simple: Aristotle never mentions the desire for exposure to risk as such, and it is Ross' invention. Of course, Aristotle does say that excess of confidence leads to over-exposure to risk. But he never suggests that the connecting link is love of danger. The connection that he is thinking of is much more ordinary. It is simply that over-confidence leads to over-exposure to risk because it is produced by failure to calculate the chances correctly (see E.N. III.7.vii—x).

Ross is assuming that the two feelings, fear and confidence, make a symmetrical pattern. According to him, fear involves the desire for under-exposure to risk and, symmetrically on the side of excess, confidence involves the desire for over-exposure to risk. But this symmetry is exhibited by dariage and not by courage.

How then does Aristotle fit confidence into the structure of courage?

The first thing that needs to be put straight is the account of the object of fear. The desire involved in fear is the desire to avoid harm, and not risk. This may seem a fine point, because anyone who wants to avoid harm will, as a result, want to avoid the risk of harm. But it is important to remember that the direct and proper object of the desire involved in fear is harm. To identify it with risk is to take the
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first step towards confusing courage with darrage. The next step would be to observe that, though nobody likes harm, some people do like danger, etc.

The object that confidence prompts the courageous man to face is indeed danger. But this is not because he perversely loves danger as such. He is ready to face it only when circumstances require him to face it. Now confidence produces this readiness. So we could even say that confidence involves a desire, all things considered, to face danger. Aristotle recognizes that readiness or desire, all things considered, to last until the moment for action arrives, and one of his complaints against the rash man is that his excessive confidence evaporates in the actual crisis (E.N. III.7.viii—x).

What we must not say is that confidence involves a primary desire for danger as such, just as appetite is a primary desire for sensual pleasure as such. Primary desires are the material of virtue, and they have to be moulded into mediality. But the desire involved in confidence is a desire all things considered, and it cannot begin to exist until the agent actually has considered all things and weighed them up. Thus confidence is a secondary feeling, and the position occupied by it in the structure of courage is quite different from the position occupied by fear, which is a primary feeling. This is a further reason for rejecting Ross' interpretation of Aristotle's analysis of courage.

If confidence is based on a weighing up of the situation, we need to establish what sort of scales the agent uses. First, of course, he must weigh the value of the external goal against the disvalue of the counter-goal. But his confidence will be based on a second piece of weighing, a weighing of the probabilities of the various outcomes. For Aristotle defines confidence as a kind of expectation, or opinion about the future (RHET 1383 A), just as in E.N. he defines fear as a kind of expectation (III.6.ii, already quoted). But he also tells us that fear is impossible unless there is some hope of safety (RHET 1383 A, already quoted). He makes a parallel point about confidence in E.N. He says that confidence is a mark of hope (III.7.xi), but he puts a restriction on the confidence of the courageous man: it must not be based on certainty of success, but must contain an element of gamble (III.8.xiii). So the confidence of professional soldiers is not the confidence of courage, and Socrates was mistaken when he identified courage with practical experience and skill (III.8.vi).

The last question, towards which I have been working my way, is the question whether Aristotle regarded courage as a form of self-control, and, if so, how he could count it as a true virtue. I have already introduced a possible solution to this problem. Aristotle could have relaxed his requirement that true virtue must exclude all deviant desires. What I want to do now is to connect this solution with a feature of his analysis of courage that I have not mentioned so far.

When Aristotle is introducing the doctrine of the mean in E.N. II.6, he says: “Both fear and confidence, and appetite and anger and pity, and in general pleasure and pain may be felt too much or too little, and in both cases not well”. In E.N. III.7 he takes up this point and includes it in his account of courage: “Of the faults that are committed, one consists in fearing what we should not, another in fearing as we should not, another in fearing when we should not, and so on; and so too with the objects of confidence. Therefore, the man who faces and fears the right things for the right reasons, in the right way and at the right time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions, is brave”.

These passages make it clear that Aristotle required that the courageous man’s fear must itself be medial, so that his desire to avoid the counter-goal would be medial too. He gives examples of non-medial fears elsewhere. E.g. he says that fear of the squeak of a mouse is subhuman (E.N. III.5.v). However, in this range of
faults he does not say much about things that ought not to be feared at all, but concentrates on fearing too much and in the wrong way things that ought to be feared to some degree and in some way (III.7.i–v). The doctrine, that fears should be medial, is so important to him that he puts it first in his account of courage in E.N. (III.6.i–v).

It is a demanding doctrine, and the demand that it makes on the man of courage may be explained in terms of a distinction drawn by Aristotle in E.N. 1228 B. He says that the courageous man finds the dangers that he faces fearful in one way, but not fearful in another way: as a man he finds them fearful, but as a man of courage he does not find them fearful. This implies that in general he wants to avoid harm, but all things considered is prepared to risk it. But is no limit imposed on his general desire, as a man, to avoid harm? It seems clear that the doctrine of medial fearing does impose a limit on his desire, as a man, to avoid harm. The necessity for the doctrine is obvious. If no such limit were imposed, the fears of the courageous man could be wildly excessive, and his courage would be an extreme example of self-control. It is much more plausible for Aristotle to maintain that the fears of the courageous man must be medial, so that his desire to avoid the counter-goal will always match his assessment of its disvalue. Given this condition, when he combines this desire with his desire to achieve the external goal, it will be possible for his desire all things considered to match his total assessment of the project.

But how does this doctrine fit in with his general account of self-control and true virtue?

I think that it fits in quite well. For when he includes the doctrine of medial fears, there is a clear sense in which courage turns out not to be a matter of self-control. If we treat the combination of the courageous man’s two desires like the resolution of a parallelogram of forces, then the resultant desire all things considered will be the desire to perform the right action.

But he does still possess a deviant desire, namely his desire, as a man, to save his own skin. This desire does have to be suppressed even if only by his desire for the external goal. So there still is a sense in which courage remains a matter of self-control.

However, it is obvious that this residual self-control cannot be eliminated because courage essentially involves a conflict. The only question that remains is the question of the magnitude of the difference that this creates between courage and a virtue like temperance. If the temperate man really had no deviant appetites, then the difference would be a great one. But if Aristotle allowed the temperate man to have deviant appetites so long as they did not tempt him, the difference could be seen as a difference in the complexity of structure of the two virtues. For the courageous man’s fears would not really tempt him to abandon the external and internal goals of courage, and the temperate man’s appetites would not really tempt him to abandon the internal goal of temperance. Thus there would be some self-control in both cases, but there would be two controlling considerations in the first case, whereas there would be only one in the second case. But this way of assimilating the two virtues to one another does not really bring them very close together. For even if Aristotle allowed the temperate man to have deviant appetites so long as they did not tempt him, he certainly would not require him to have such appetites; whereas it is essential to courage that the primary desire of the courageous man to save his skin should deviate from what he wants to do all things considered. Nevertheless, there is some degree of assimilation. But even this vanishes when Aristotle requires the temperate man to have no deviant appetites.

Finally, if we look at the hedonic account of Aristotle’s brave man, we find, as always, that the various entries correspond to his different desires. On the debit side
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there is the primary pain of wounds and death, and the secondary pain caused directly by the frustration of his desire to avoid this counter-goal. On the credit side there is the self-image-fit pleasure of acting nobly. But this is not the only non-sensual pleasure on the credit side. For there may also be the pleasure of achieving the external goal, and, additionally, there may be enjoyment of the whole performance.