Between 1890 and World War I the ambitions of presidents, faculty, wealthy alumni, and students converged to change higher education dramatically. The expansion of professional and managerial positions in the burgeoning American economy created wealthy new potential constituents for colleges and universities. As the baccalaureate degree became part of what defined the new national upper and upper-middle classes, they financed a restructuring of the institutional forms and social meaning of higher education that is still evident.

Before 1890, the four colleges in this study depended on donors motivated by ethnoreligious loyalty who expected the colleges to promote a distinctive identity. After 1890, that changed. Many students of the 1870s and 1880s had rejected the values of such sponsors and developed a college life consonant with the less denominationally centered Protestantism and less pious life-style of the emerging urban upper-middle class. After graduation many prospered in professional and managerial jobs; colleges that cultivated their loyalty reaped rewards.

These four colleges emerged among the winners from this period of change. By the standards of 1890, they were thriving and secure in 1917. Their success is most simply measured by enrollment increases, ranging from two and one-third times at Franklin and Marshall to Bucknell's tenfold growth (Table 7).

Endowments grew apace. At the outbreak of the war they ranged from $5,000,000 at Princeton to $500,000 at Franklin and Marshall. Each college had cultivated an affluent constituency; the resulting funds were never as plentiful as the faculty and loyalists wished, but
Table 7. Total Baccalaureate and Graduate Enrollments, 1890–1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bucknell</th>
<th>F&amp;M</th>
<th>Princeton</th>
<th>Swarthmore</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1889–90</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899–1900</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>1194</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909–10</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916–17</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>1,555</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: These figures were compiled from college catalogs and other publications.

Between 1890 and World War I, Princeton became one of the colleges most valued by the Protestant elite. This connection with affluence, which had worried President James McCosh in the 1880s, solidified after the turn of the century. The College of New Jersey had been tied to Scottish and Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism since its founding. In the 1870s and 1880s President McCosh capitalized on the connection to court wealthy fellow Scots in New York, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. By distancing the college from Princeton Theological Seminary and Old School Presbyterianism, he associated Princeton with a version of Presbyterianism that was more familiar to mainstream Protestants.

The college’s denominational bonds weakened after 1890. This was simplified by the absence of legal, and only the barest financial, connection between denomination and college. The traditional association was protected by the charter provision that one-half of the trustees be clergymen; no denominational affiliation was specified,
but the self-perpetuating board normally appointed Presbyterians. Until the turn of the century, the general assembly received reports on the state of religion and morals at the college and routinely recommended that Presbyterians send money and students to Princeton. The New Brunswick Presbytery annually awarded two minor prizes to Princeton students and supported about four preministerial students in the 1890s and 1900s. Even this provision atrophied; the presbytery reduced its scholarships from $100 to $80 in 1892 and to $70 in 1898. The Observer, the leading New York Presbyterian newspaper, increasingly treated Princeton as one of its own.

The college continued its commitment to undergraduate training for future ministers and ministers' sons. They once were a significant segment of the student body, but now their numbers were dwarfed by those entering secular careers. The college granted free tuition to all ministerial candidates based on old scholarships that, by the mid-1890s, no longer covered the cost. In 1896 a faculty-trustee committee voted to make up the difference because scholarship students, two-thirds of whom were ministerial candidates or sons of ministers, outperformed their peers and provided an indispensable moral influence if Princeton was "to maintain her character as an institution under evangelical religious influence." Their presence comforted those uneasy with Princeton's growing Episcopalian enrollment and reputation as a "rich man's school." Such sentiments were embodied in a letter from an alumnus praising a speech by

1. The charter allowed up to twenty-seven trustees, with at least twelve clerical and twelve nonclerical members. Princeton University, Charters and By-Laws of the Trustees (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1883). In practice the seats were divided evenly, with 56 of the 112 trustees elected from 1800 to 1896 being clerics. Princeton University, General Catalogue, 1746--1896 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1896), 6--12.

2. Princeton College Bulletin 1 (June 1889): 90; Frederick Loetscher, "A Century of New Jersey Presbyterianism" (typescript of address, 16 October 1922). A copy is in the Presbyterian Historical Society. The general assembly officially controlled Princeton Theological Seminary, which had separated from the college in the early 1800s.

3. Presbytery of New Brunswick, Minutes, 1876--1907 (Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia). See esp. 4 October 1892, 19 October 1898, 23 October 1902. New York Observer, 72--73 (1894--95). In the 1920s the Presbyterian Board of Education ceased listing Princeton.

President Francis Patton (1888–1902), which “ought to send a great many boys to Princeton. It touched just the right key for the conservative laity of the West.”

But addresses that pleased conservative laity mattered less and less. Presbyterianism was liberalizing, and the proportion of Presbyterians among Princeton students was declining. About three-fourths of the students in the 1870s were Presbyterians, and about 60 percent in the 1880s and 1890s. The class entering in September 1901 was 56 percent Presbyterian. By 1911 it was down to 41 percent, while 24 percent were Episcopalians. Only 30 percent of students entering in 1915 were Presbyterians. In the 1920s Episcopalians and Presbyterians were about even, together constituting about two-thirds of each class.

Like Presbyterianism, Scottishness and Scotch-Irishness became less distinctive after the turn of the century. John Ingham found that the heavily Scotch-Irish Pittsburgh iron and steel elite became major supporters of Princeton. These elite families originally were attracted by Princeton’s ethnoreligious distinctiveness, but increasingly they valued its ability to blend Scotch-Irish Presbyterians into the Anglo-Episcopalian elite.

Presbyterians of Celtic descent continued to play a major role, but increasingly their tie to Princeton came from being alumni, a status shared by other Protestants. Ministers, especially faculty at the college or the theological seminary, dominated the Princeton alumni association for fifty years after its creation in 1826. Alumni from outside the local community, mostly laymen, started taking an active role in the 1870s and came into conflict with McCosh when the New York Association of Princeton College Alumni opposed his fraternity ban. They failed, but even McCosh recognized their potential and soon was promoting the establishment of local alumni associations and championing their representation on the board of trustees.


7. Princeton, Trustees, 22 December 1875. For his promotion of alumni, see James McCosh to James W. Alexander, 27 November and 9 December 1885, McCosh Papers (Princeton University Archives); Howard B. Maxwell, “The Formative Years of the University Alumni Movement as Illustrated by Studies of the University of Michigan and Columbia, Princeton, and Yale Universities” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1965), 167–75.
Unlike the McCosh era, when donors were primarily nonalumni inspired by ethnoreligious affiliation, in the 1890s alumni identity inspired most contributions. Publication of the first alumni directory in 1888 symbolized the growing group consciousness. When enrollment doubled between 1886 and 1892 without a corresponding increase in the endowment, New York alumni established a permanent alumni fund. In the sesquicentennial celebration of 1896, alumni donations were the primary benefactions; outside gifts failed to materialize. Alumni even paid several professors, including Woodrow Wilson, "under the table" to keep them at Princeton.\(^8\)

As president, Wilson's attempt to utilize ethnic loyalty backfired spectacularly. He courted Andrew Carnegie with the sentiment that Princeton "has been largely made by Scotsmen,—being myself of pure Scots blood, it heartens me to emphasize the fact,—and she is thoroughly Scotchish in all her history and traditions in matters educational."\(^9\) Wilson dreamed of a library or law school. Unfortunately, Carnegie spotted a small valley at the foot of the campus and donated a lake instead. Wilson bitterly retorted, "We needed bread and you gave us cake," and banned student rowing.\(^10\)

The board of trustees had squelched McCosh's earlier request for alumni representation, but the alumni became insistent in the late 1890s and threatened to withhold donations. In March 1900, the trustees approved a plan for indirect representation. But in April the first issue of the *Princeton Alumni Weekly* demanded direct representation, as did the Western Association of Princeton Clubs. In October, the trustees agreed to add five members elected by the alumni, effectively eliminating the requirement that one-half of the board be clergymen. Trustee Elijah Craven had his opposition inscribed in the board's minutes. Craven exemplified the older trustees. After graduating from the college and the seminary in the 1840s, he served several New Jersey pastorates and was secretary of the Presbyterian Board of Publications for seventeen years. Elected to the

---


board of trustees in 1859, Craven served until his death in 1908. He saw no reason for changing Princeton's practices or augmenting the power of younger alumni. Although an alumnus, Craven was more committed to preserving the traditional social and moral tone of the campus than to competing socially and academically with other institutions.\textsuperscript{11}

Trustees like Craven were a shrinking minority, in fundamental conflict with the wealthier young graduates of recent classes. President Patton's failure to fulfill the hopes expressed in taking the name "university" in 1896 exacerbated the conflict, and in 1902 younger alumni on the board of trustees and faculty ousted him. They replaced him with Woodrow Wilson, the first nonclerical president (though the son of a Presbyterian minister), whose less traditional Presbyterianism merged more easily with vigorous promotion of the university. In 1906 another charter revision further reduced the pro-

\textsuperscript{11} Maxwell, 190–95; Ingham, 149–51; Bragdon, 22; Princeton Alumni Weekly (April 1900); Princeton, Trustees, 19 October 1900. The addition increased the size of the board from twenty-five to thirty and effectively reduced the ministers' traditional 50 percent share.
portion of ministers and, in effect, the role of traditional Presbyterianism on the board of trustees.\textsuperscript{12}

During his first year in office Wilson triumphantly toured the alumni clubs, where he unfolded ambitious plans for new dormitories, laboratories, a gymnasium, a graduate school, and curricular innovation that depended upon their beneficence. The national system of alumni clubs and the \textit{Alumni Weekly} beat the drums. Administering the elections for alumni representatives to the board of trustees forced Princeton to hire a secretary of the university, who maintained alumni records and provided direct communication with the administration. Creation of the Association of Class Officers in 1904 streamlined the process. Wilson began distributing the heretofore secret annual reports of the president and treasurer to the alumni.\textsuperscript{13}

The president successfully used the machinery of alumni support to finance his dreams, including an ambitious curricular innovation.\textsuperscript{14} On 18 March 1905 he announced his "preceptorial" system (small-group instruction requiring fifty additional faculty members) to the Princeton Club of Western Pennsylvania. An alumni Committee of Fifty opened a Wall Street office and soon secured the requisite $12.5 million.\textsuperscript{15}

Wilson discovered that alumni power could be a two-edged sword, however, when his ideas diverged from the dominant alumni mentality. He had become increasingly concerned over the exclusionary membership policies and anti-intellectualism of the eating clubs. In December 1905 he presented a special report on the "Social Coordination of the University," proposing to abolish the highly selective clubs and replace them with an Oxbridge "college system" of quadrangles whose membership would be chosen randomly and in which

\textsuperscript{12} See Chapter 7 for a detailed account of Patton's demise. Princeton, \textit{Charters}, 1906. The number of ministers mandated on the thirty-member board was reduced from twelve to eight.


\textsuperscript{14} Bragdon, 357; Maxwell, 196–212. During Wilson's eight-year administration the university's annual disbursements rose from $200,000 to $700,000, an increase largely financed by the alumni.

\textsuperscript{15} Maxwell, 216–22; Bragdon, 288, 304. Wilson did, however, have a pledge from wealthy classmates to cover the deficits.
faculty would mix socially. Whereas Wilson had carefully consulted the alumni about his earlier plans, he kept this secret until the trustees approved it in June 1906.\textsuperscript{16}

Initially most alumni accepted Wilson’s plan as a fait accompli. But when several influential faculty joined the\textit{Alumni Weekly} editors in opposition, resistance snowballed among the younger alumni and converted several influential trustees. Fund-raising ground to a halt. With the expense of the preceptorial program draining funds and the panic of 1907 undercutting philanthropy, even trustees who shared Wilson’s dislike of the clubs could not support constructing expensive quadrangles. Four months after approving the plan with only one dissent, the board asked Wilson to withdraw it. Wilson tried to go over the trustees’ heads by appealing to the alumni, especially those in the Midwest who saw the clubs as bastions of the East Coast elite. He also received some support from the older classes, which had not rallied to his preceptorial plan but predated the eating clubs. However, his old allies on the\textit{Alumni Weekly} staff and among the younger alumni steadfastly defended the clubs’ social role. At the June 1908 meeting, a trustee committee report exonerated the clubs, criticizing only their most flagrant abuses. Wilson accurately ascribed his defeat to the same people who made his earlier successes possible.\textsuperscript{17}

Wilson depended upon relatively young alumni. When fund-raising was arranged by classes in 1906, organizations were created for all classes dating back to 1870. The oldest graduates represented were only in their late fifties. But the recent graduates had impressive resources; in 1904 an Alumni Dormitory Committee successfully raised funds for a dormitory from the twelve youngest classes.

Princeton systemized alumni solicitation in the decade before World War I. The trustees created a Graduate Council to bring alumni to the campus and to control the\textit{Alumni Weekly}. Fund-raising shifted


\textsuperscript{17} Princeton, Trustees, 10 June and 17 October 1907; Maxwell, 231–49;\textit{Princeton Alumni Weekly} 8 (25 September–23 October 1907); scattered correspondence, 8 July–19 November 1907. Woodrow Wilson Papers (Library of Congress Manuscript Division), box 35. One alumnus offered to finance an experimental quadrangle but Wilson declined, fearing that only club rejects would join. In the 1950s Princeton built an alternative to the clubs and appropriately named it Wilson Quadrangle.
from concentration upon a few hundred men during Wilson's presidency to a broader canvas that netted 2,635 contributions in 1916. The university could rely on an increasingly broad base of alumni support; but as Wilson found out, this meant that alumni opinion mattered. Wilson's successor, John Grier Hibben, reconciled most of the alumni and faculty factions that had been split by Wilson's attempt to abolish the clubs. Alumni, especially a moderate-sized group of wealthy, regular contributors, had to be reckoned with before launching new ventures.18

Thus Princeton, after 1890, successfully turned its prestige as a colonial college and its Scotch-Irish Presbyterian connections into a prodigious financial base headed by New York businessmen. As Scotch-Irishness and Scotch-Irishness blended with other northern European ethnic identities, Princeton's ethnic distinctiveness faded. While many students had Scottish blood and were brought up in the Presbyterian church, it was the alumni connection that now galvanized financial support. The demanding ties of Old School Presbyterianism were exchanged for a broad Protestantism centered on a modernized Presbyterianism and Episcopalianism. Its prestige in the upper class provided a financial base few colleges could match.

Like Princeton, Franklin and Marshall College served an ethnically and religiously distinct clientele, though one with considerably more limited means. Founded to serve German-Americans in the Lancaster area and legally tied to the German Reformed church, the college continued to serve and be defined by those groups after 1890. Acceptance of formal denominational control had rescued Franklin and Marshall from financial crisis in 1866; but after 1890 the affiliation stifled growth by limiting outside solicitation.

Denominational control was exercised through the thirty trustees, all elected by the Eastern Synod from 1866 until 1891. Then the Eastern Synod agreed to reduce its share to twelve, giving nine seats to its offshoots, the Potomac and Pittsburgh synods. This left nine not tied to the denomination that could be given to potential donors from other denominations, usually Lancasterians. Since nominees from the board of trustees were always accepted by the synods, it was virtually a self-perpetuating body. The only regular synodical actions on the college were annual approval of the catalog and a statement

urging support by church members. There was no criticism in the minutes.

Unfortunately, legal affiliation and official praise did not result in formal financial support. The only direct assistance was an annual recommendation that congregations hold a special service with a collection for the college. The results were modest, and as educational costs rose denominational contributions became increasingly inadequate. The centennial of Franklin College in 1887 provided an opportunity to solicit denominational funds; but the college encountered strong competition for funds from foreign and domestic missions, the theological seminary, and local church construction. Two donors gave the college an observatory and ten thousand dollars, but the drive to endow the presidency dragged on for two years. In contrast, alumni and citizens of Lancaster quickly raised the money for a gymnasium after a successful football season.19

A $500,000 drive begun in 1896 again failed to rally rank-and-file denominational support. General Watts de Peyster, whose only connection with the college seems to have been friendships with a trustee and the librarian, offered to fund a library if McKinley defeated Bryan. Otherwise, the campaign lagged, delaying construction of a badly needed science building. A special synodical Committee on the Endowment of Franklin and Marshall had little success. In 1898, after raising only four thousand dollars in two years, the committee charged that the church had “not responded to the demands of the College, as the necessities call for.”20 After two more unsuccessful years the committee asked to be disbanded. Meanwhile, personal donations from the trustees underwrote the new science building, which was finally completed in 1902. But the cost of laboratory equipment and the failure of the Potomac Synod to meet its pledge left the college twenty-one thousand dollars in debt.21

19. Reformed Church in the United States, Acts and Proceedings of the Eastern Synod, 1889–1916. The Eastern Synod approved the trustees’ nominations except in 1888, when it rejected two of three nominees. I have been unable to attach any significance to this rejection. Franklin and Marshall College, Board of Trustees, Minutes (Franklin and Marshall Archives), 19 June 1883, 18 March 1884, 12 June 1888; Reformed Church in the United States, Reformed Church Messenger 56 (1888); H.M.J. Klein, History of Franklin and Marshall College (Lancaster, Pa., 1952), 115–23.
20. Reformed Church, Acts, 1898, 58; Klein, 127.
21. Reformed Church, Acts, 1896–1901; Klein, 129; Reformed Church Messenger 71 (9 October 1902).
The college was somewhat more successful at the fiftieth anniversary of the unification of Franklin and Marshall colleges in 1903. The goal was to erase the debt on the science building and raise $150,000 for the endowment. Two young Reformed ministers canvassed congregations for four years before successfully completing the drive. The difficulty encountered by these agents, even with enthusiastic support from the *Reformed Church Messenger* and *Reformed Church Review*, indicated the limits of denominational fund-raising. This became painfully obvious when the General Education Board pledged $50,000 of Rockefeller money if the college raised $308,000 in matching funds. With credit for $106,000 already collected, $202,000 more was needed. The three synods pledged $50,000, but collecting the pledges was so difficult that William Hensel, president of the college's board of trustees, threatened to resign. He attacked the church membership in the *Reformed Church Messenger*, pointing out that a Presbyterian congregation in Lancaster (whose membership included four trustees) had contributed more than the three synods combined. President Apple was also blunt in his 1916 report to the synods: "It is to be regretted that more than $25,000 out of the $50,000 proposed to be raised within the bounds of the synods was not secured; and that the task of the College was made harder in gathering this amount from other sources to meet the obligation of the General Education Board."22

To deal with this denomination-wide problem, the eleven Reformed educational institutions created a joint promotional organization in 1915. Franklin and Marshall's share of the first campaign was to be $200,000, which the General Education Board offered to match with $100,000. Despite using Reformed ministers as agents, the congregational canvass failed. Only four fortuitous bequests from affluent individuals secured the matching funds. 23

The failure to support the college cannot be attributed to denominational opposition; the synodical meetings and journals consistently


23. The other ten institutions in the Association of Schools, Colleges, and Seminaries of the Reformed Church were Franklin and Marshall Academy, the theological seminary, Ursinus College, Allentown College for Women (all in Pennsylvania), Heidelberg University and Central Theological Seminary of Ohio, Masanutten Academy in Virginia, Hood College in Maryland, Catawba College in North Carolina, and Mission House in Wisconsin.
praised it. The *Messenger*, the denominational weekly, warmly supported the institution. In the course of an attack upon one of Harvard’s innovations, the editors boasted that Franklin and Marshall produced “a better all around scholar than if he had taken the same course at Harvard.”

In the 1890s and 1900s, articles regularly urged members to send their sons and donations to the college. Reciprocally, Franklin and Marshall professors frequently wrote for the *Reformed Church Review*, the denomination’s scholarly quarterly, and the college continued to advertise in the *Messenger* into the 1920s.

A 1902 editorial in the *Reformed Church Messenger* revealed the problem. By urging a few rich families to step forward to contribute to the college so that the rest of the denomination could concentrate upon its “regular benevolent work,” the editors implicitly admitted that the rank-and-file Reformed membership did not feel an obligation to the college. The denomination was a relatively small and rural one. In 1894 the eight synods had 221,000 communicants and 123,000 unconfirmed members in 1,646 congregations and raised a total of $258,000 for benevolent purposes. Even though Franklin and Marshall was the best-known Reformed institution, the money had to be divided many ways, and much of the Franklin and Marshall share went to the academy and the theological seminary.

As with Presbyterianism, the German Reformed church was inextricably twined with ethnicity. Explicit “Germanness” declined rapidly during the nineteenth century in both the denomination and the college. It was a German-American culture, with emphasis on the latter, by 1890. There was little ethnic flavor at the college, and most students and faculty strongly supported American participation in World War I. The record enrollment in 1920 suggests that the college was not tainted by its ethnic tradition.

As at Princeton, descendants of the founding ethnoreligious group were blending into a broader Protestant culture. Despite behavioral convergence, they continued to play an important role in the institution. Virtually all of the trustees elected by the synods had Germanic names, as did some of the trustees elected by the board.

Lancaster Presbyterians, sharing civic and Calvinist traditions, probably occupied the other seats. From the beginning, localism had mixed with ethnoreligious motives to support the college. Local donors came to the rescue several times when the denomination fal-

---

tered. The board usually selected Lancasterians with Anglo names to fill the non-Reformed seats. The Eastern Synod’s choices were also usually from the Lancaster area. Few were from Philadelphia or Pittsburgh.

Thus, Franklin and Marshall’s fate depended heavily on the Lancaster economy, which slipped badly in the 1890s as its iron, cotton, and cigar industries declined. It recovered by the turn of the century due to the rapid growth of new small industries and nearby Hershey chocolate. In 1901 Lancaster was the fourth largest manufacturing center in Pennsylvania behind Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Reading. This financial base helped Franklin and Marshall outdistance many colleges, but left it behind the three in this study that tapped Philadelphia and New York.

Despite its good reputation in the Reformed church, the college had to depend upon a few affluent individuals for financial support. Before 1910, most benevolence was inspired by denominational and local ties; none of the four major donors in the previous twenty-five years were alumni. In this respect George Baer, the infamous railroad and mining magnate and Franklin and Marshall’s best-known former student, was a transitional figure. Born to a German-American family in western Pennsylvania, he was a completely Anglicized lawyer who became a close associate of J. P. Morgan, whose interests Baer was defending in his famous dispute with Theodore Roosevelt. Having briefly attended Franklin and Marshall, Baer foreshadowed the blending of ethnoreligious loyalty and the alumni relationship. After 1910, most donations were inspired by the alumni connection.

The alumni association, founded in the 1830s, was dominated by local clergy and college faculty until the 1890s. Establishment of branches in several Pennsylvania and Maryland towns broadened its geographic and generational range. The average age of its activist Advisory Council was only forty-eight. The association became very active as the jubilee of 1903 approached, publishing annual reports and an obituary record, procuring a Phi Beta Kappa chapter, and


26. In the 1880s and 1890s the major donors were Charles Santee, George W. Fahnestock, Watts De Peyster, and James H. Hood; none were alumni.
talking optimistically of doubling the enrollment. But after the jubilee the president and trustees let the alumni spirit languish, and their publishing efforts ceased.\textsuperscript{27}

The new president, Henry Apple, shared the young alumni's dream of growth. He tried to revive their interest and create a new balance of power on the board of trustees.\textsuperscript{28} In 1911 he recommended reducing the synods' share of the thirty seats from twenty-one to nine, allocating six to the alumni association. Apple hoped to gain more support from non-Reformed alumni and qualify Franklin and Marshall for faculty pensions from the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching without relinquishing the denominational relationship. The trustees rejected Apple's proposal, and the composition of the board remained unchanged until 1921. No further alumni publications appeared until 1925, reflecting their estrangement.

Thus, Franklin and Marshall retained a structure that provided modest support, but far less than its most ambitious supporters wanted. Its ethnoreligious connection provided a steady flow of students; large numbers of non-Reformed did not attend until the 1910s.\textsuperscript{29} Franklin and Marshall received support from some wealthy Lancasterians and could call on the loyalty of a primarily rural church. But that tie restricted appeals to the wealthy in Philadelphia or Pittsburgh. The greatest potential for financial assistance existed in cultivating

\textsuperscript{27} The chairman of the first advisory council graduated only ten years earlier, and the average age was about forty-eight. Three of the nine were ministers. Franklin and Marshall, Trustees, June 1901; Franklin and Marshall College, Alumni Association, \textit{Printed Report} (1902–5); Franklin and Marshall College, \textit{Catalogue of Officers and Students}, 1787–1903 (Lancaster, Pa., 1903), 133–53. On Baer, see John N. Ingham, "Masters of the Mill: Innovation and Social Class in the Nineteenth-Century Iron and Steel Industry" (unpublished manuscript, 1985), 383–84, 403.

\textsuperscript{28} In Apple's first year he collected a remarkable amount of money, and the \textit{Reformed Church Messenger} (16 June 1910) proudly exclaimed that "the beauty of it all is that these generous donors are sons of the Reformed Church." Since the "sons" numbered only three or four, this munificence did not indicate broad-based church support.

\textsuperscript{29} There were apparently no official records kept on the students' religious affiliations. The only record I located was President Thomas Apple's report to the board of trustees of 11 June 1889 in which he noted that 96 of 107 students were members of the Reformed church. Changes in Franklin and Marshall Academy and in its relation to the college strongly suggest a decline in the proportion of Reformed students at the college after 1910. Charles Stahr Hartman, "Franklin and Marshall Academy 1872–1943" (Unpublished Master's essay, Johns Hopkins University, 1948), 45–72.
the younger alumni. Many had grown up in the German Reformed tradition, but increasingly they related to the college as alumni who wanted it to emulate other colleges. The church, through the board of trustees, chose to keep the college close to its original clientele rather than promoting the new alumni spirit that sponsored more rapid growth at the other three colleges.

In contrast to Franklin and Marshall, Bucknell grew dramatically and departed from its educational traditions. In 1890 it had only seventy-one undergraduates and a classical curriculum. By World War I Bucknell had over seven hundred students and a panoply of curricular options. Contrary to conventional expectations, the transformation was directed by a traditional Baptist minister.

The period began inauspiciously with the departure of a dynamic young president, David Jayne Hill, and the death of its principal benefactor and namesake, William Bucknell. For eight years after the “coup” of 1882, William Bucknell single-handedly underwrote the university. His contribution of a chapel, an observatory, a dormitory, a laboratory building, scholarships, and an endowment worth about $250,000 was a substantial windfall for a college of less than one hundred students. He expected that, given the physical plant, the college would pay its current expenses from tuition. This conservative fiscal approach corresponded with President Hill’s disinterest in enlarging either the enrollment or the expensive science programs.30

Hill’s successor, the Rev. John Harris, had a different vision. Harris recruited a freshman class for September 1890 that outnumbered the sophomore, junior, and senior classes combined. After William Bucknell’s death, Harris turned to the trustees for donations, but he found that because they were primarily clergy and educators, they could not underwrite his plans. Harris resolved that future members of the board would be wealthy businessmen and professionals. Apparently the trustees acquiesced, as only one of the twenty-four trustees selected in the next seventeen years was a clergyman. In 1908

Harris could boast that “the Board is composed for the most part of business men.”

The Lewisburg area, a minor railroad and manufacturing center and county seat for an agricultural area, supplied a few prosperous trustees like Harold McClure, a district judge and local bank director. The college had not been dependent on the Lewisburg area since 1882, when William Bucknell’s coup had shifted power to Philadelphians. However, many of the Philadelphians Bucknell brought in were the very ministers Harris hoped to phase out. In the search for businessmen, Harris was unable to entice many Philadelphians. More of the new trustees Harris recruited in his early years were Baptist businessmen or professionals from small Pennsylvania towns like Lewisburg. A few of the affluent new trustees came from further afield, such as John Stetson of haberdashery fame. But the best-known Baptist, John D. Rockefeller, declined to join the board.

Rockefeller did, however, help fund Harris’s ambitions through the American Baptist Education Society, which was created in 1888 to funnel his money to the University of Chicago and administer matching grants to other Baptist institutions of higher education. In 1891, the society granted Bucknell $10,000 if it could raise $90,000. William Bucknell’s survivors contributed $22,500, the Pennsylvania Baptist Education Society added $10,000, and a drive in Lewisburg netted $13,000. The remainder came so slowly that Harris needed an extension. Harris and seventeen voluntary alumni assistants gathered the requisite pledges by July 1892, but it took six more years to collect the money and obtain the matching funds.

31. Bucknell University, *Bucknell University Bulletin*, ser. 7, no. 4 (1908–9). See also Bucknell University, *Alumni Catalogue* (Lewisburg, Pa., 1926), 6; Harris, 7–8. In 1890 eleven of the twenty-three trustees were clerics.

32. Charles M. Snyder, *Union County, Pennsylvania: A Bicentennial History* (Lewisburg, Pa.: Colonial Printing House, 1976), 94–99; Bucknell University, *Bucknell University Bulletin*, Announcements, ser. 7, no. 9 (1908–9); Bucknell University; *Memorials of Bucknell University, 1919–1931* (Lewisburg, Pa., 1931), 161–79; Bucknell University, Board of Trustees, Minutes (Bucknell University Archives), 17 June 1902 and 23 June 1903.


34. Bucknell, Trustees, 23 June 1891; Oliphant, 198; Harris, 32–33; American
By the end of the decade a wealthier board of trustees and a more active alumni organization responded more quickly to Harris's ambitions. In May 1899 Rockefeller approved a $15,000 grant to Bucknell; the $60,000 in matching funds were raised by January 1901. Harris immediately proposed another fund drive, and in November the society pledged $25,000 of Rockefeller's money to be matched by $75,000. Eight trustees contributed $40,000 and seventeen other donors added $30,000, leaving only $5,000 to be gathered from minor contributors.\textsuperscript{35}

The Rockefeller grants enabled Harris to combine entrepreneurial goals and denominational commitment. Whereas denominational ties restricted growth at the other colleges in the 1890s, John D. Rockefeller single-handedly reversed that for Baptist colleges. Harris promoted expansion while maintaining a traditional vision of a denominational college. One of Harris's first presidential acts was to address the Northumberland Baptist Association to repair local denominational ties neglected by his predecessor. Harris preached to Baptists across the state and often in temporarily vacant local pulpits. Along with several professors and trustees, he participated in the Northumberland Baptist Association. The association maintained a standing committee on Bucknell that annually inspected the college and recommended it to the membership's favor.\textsuperscript{36} In his first campaign to increase enrollment, Harris distributed ten thousand leaflets through Baptist associations in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The trustees' Committee on Publication annually inserted advertisements in the published proceedings of both Baptist associations, a practice continued at least until World War I.\textsuperscript{37} Harris felt no tension between

\textsuperscript{35}H. L. Morehouse to John H. Harris, 10 May 1899, Harris Papers (Bucknell University Archives); Bucknell, Trustees, 20 June 1899, 9 January 1902, and 8 January 1903; American Baptist Education Society, Correspondence, 4 November 1901; Oliphant, 200.

\textsuperscript{36}Bucknell University, \textit{Charter and By-Laws} (Lewisburg, Pa., 1956), 36–38; Northumberland Baptist Association, \textit{Minutes} (1881–1916). In 1915 the president, five professors, and one trustee participated in the association's functions.

\textsuperscript{37}Bucknell, Trustees, 10 January 1889, 8 January 1891, 20 July 1891, 11 January 1894, 10 June 1910, 15 January 1915, and 13 June 1916; Theiss, 212–20; Oliphant, 196. Between 1891 and 1902 the budget for publicity increased from \$87 to \$1,638. I could not locate statistics on the students' religions, which makes it impossible to know what effect the public relations campaign had on the proportion of Baptists at Bucknell.
mammon and denominationalism. He fully accepted the charter stipulation, which remained in effect until 1926, that four-fifths of the trustees be Baptists; he just insisted on wealthy Baptists.

The convenient convergence of denominationalism and expansionism ended in 1902 when Rockefeller created the General Education Board to administer his educational philanthropy without preference for Baptists. The American Baptist Education Society collapsed, leaving denominational fund-raising in disarray. Fortunately for Harris, he had already capitalized on the Rockefeller money to transform Bucknell.

The loss of Rockefeller support caused Bucknell to begin loosening its denominational ties. The Pennsylvania Baptist Education Society continued to sponsor a number of ministerial students in Bucknell’s preparatory and collegiate classes. However, these students made up a smaller proportion of the rising enrollment. The founding of Temple University in 1886 ended Bucknell’s exclusive claim upon Pennsylvania Baptists.

Bucknell began to recruit actively outside the denomination. It purchased advertising in eighty-five weekly and daily newspapers and sent public relations dispatches to newspapers in New York, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. In 1906 the university increased its publication budget in order to send literature to all secondary school principals and normal school graduates in eight neighboring states. In 1911, for example, in addition to 30,000 leaflets to Baptist associations and 2,700 letters to ministers and alumni, the Committee on Publication distributed the *Bucknell Bulletin* to 17,000 high school graduates.38

The incentive to reach beyond Baptist circles was further encouraged by the continuing inability of northern Baptist educators to replace the American Baptist Education Society. Northern Baptists were the last major denomination to create a single coordinating body (the Northern Baptist Convention, founded in 1907), and their educational efforts suffered. In reaction to the faculty pension plan offered by the Carnegie Foundation, the northern Baptist colleges unsuccessfully tried to create their own retirement benefits. Four years later the Northern Baptist Convention created a Board of Education, but it did not raise money until after World War I—and

then with only limited success. Northern Baptist priorities had shifted from controlling colleges to sending Baptists to colleges and supporting theological seminaries.  

After 1902, explicitly Baptist appeals for funds supplied less of the university’s needs. In 1904 Andrew Carnegie donated $30,000 to construct a library. Three years later President Harris, frustrated by the lack of dormitory space, began another $100,000 drive. Progress was slow, and the president waited until he had the lure of matching funds before his next pursuit of mammon in 1911. The General Education Board offered $35,000 to be matched by $135,000, the first infusion of Rockefeller money since 1902. Bucknell raised the sum in two years, with the trustees contributing over half.

Alumni began to replace denominational grants and nonalumni Baptist trustees as dependable sources of largesse. When an early fund drive for a gymnasium stalled, Harris decided that “the main difficulty was that it was an alumni undertaking and nearly all the alumni were ministers who were unable to do much.” The president set out to change this situation by shaping the curriculum to appeal to the sons of businessmen and lawyers. He was also an early champion of alumni representation on the board of trustees. In 1892 the trustees designated the seven alumni already serving on the board as alumni representatives, whose successors would be elected by the alumni association. Since five of the seven trustees so designated were Baptist pastors, this was neither an immediate threat to the older leadership nor an immediate solution to Harris’s problem. The first elected alumni representative took his seat in 1896, but none of the eight trustees appointed over the next dozen years were alumni. Then between 1909 and 1919 ten of the fourteen new trustees were alumni. Most had to be Baptists, but, as at Princeton and at Franklin and Marshall, denominationalism was being submerged under alumni status. Unlike those two colleges, however, the emergence of alumni

39. Limbert, 39–42; Oliphant, 247–55; Bucknell, Trustees, 16 June 1908. In the 1920s the proportion of Baptists on the board of trustees was reduced from 80 percent to a mere majority after further unsuccessful fund-raising in the denomination.
41. Harris, 17.
42. Bucknell, Alumni Catalogue, 5–6; Harris, 7–8, 43–45; Bucknell, Trustees, 8 January 1891, 23 June 1891, 14 January 1892, 11 January 1893, and 10 January 1895.
power was not a vehicle for ethnic blending; Bucknell had been
-dominated by those with English names since its founding.

The alumni became noticeably more active and self-conscious after
1890. Between 1885 and 1895, seven new alumni clubs were founded,
and the proportion of offices held by ministers declined considerably.
The trustees' Committee on Publication began distributing newslet-
ters to keep the alumni informed of university affairs. Athletics be-
came a rallying point, especially after Christy Mathewson '02 became
a major league baseball star. In 1908, one hundred alumni formed
"The Bucknellians" in order to "make every Alumnus directly re-
sponsible for the success or failure of her athletics" by paying for
professional coaches and providing athletic scholarships. The Alumni
Monthly began in 1914 with an initial circulation of 2,800; the fol-
lowing year Bucknell published its first alumni catalog.

President Harris's policy of creating an affluent board of trustees
and alumni body resulted in dramatic growth. During his thirty-year
presidency from 1889 to 1919, there were remarkable physical changes:
college enrollment increased from seventy-one to over seven hundred,
the endowment grew from $200,000 to $800,000, and the campus
was transformed. His tenure demonstrates that a traditional denom-
inational college and ministerial president could pursue the entre-
preneurial fiscal policies usually associated with Veblen's "captains of
erudition" on university campuses.

The years between 1890 and 1917 were a watershed for all four of
the colleges in this study, but most dramatically for Swarthmore. It
began the period as the one most alien from other colleges; its au-
thorities had just decided to close the preparatory and normal schools
but remained ambivalent about emphasizing collegiate work. In 1890
Swarthmore was tied to a small sect that was Anglo-American, but
whose beliefs dictated a more distinct life-style than ethnicity did at
Princeton and at Franklin and Marshall. Within fifteen years Swarth-
more was at the center of national controversies about football, and
by 1917 it was on the verge of becoming a national model for liberal
arts colleges.

Founded by Hicksite Quakers to provide a "guarded education"
that protected their traditional life-style and beliefs, Swarthmore re-

43. Open letter from "The Bucknellians," 15 July 1908 (Bucknell University Ar-
chives).
mained under control of a wholly Hicksite board of managers until the 1910s. Like Princeton and Bucknell, the denominational relationship was informal (the only attempt to place Swarthmore under the control of a Quaker Meeting was rejected by the managers in 1895), but the leaders of the college expected Swarthmore to serve the denomination.44 The first question students filled out on the admission form asked whether the applicant or either parent was a Friend. Until 1898 an affirmative answer brought a 25 percent tuition reduction. Even with that, only about half of the students before 1898 were Friends; the proportion dropped to about one-third by 1907.45

Since Friends had no professional clergy, ministerial training was never a function of Swarthmore. Thus, the task of cultural transmission fell to teachers in Friends schools, making teacher training a high priority at Swarthmore in the 1890s even though the normal department had been abolished in 1886. The managers permitted the faculty to eliminate Swarthmore's preparatory school in 1890, a decision facilitated by a bequest that enabled the Hicksites to open George School.46 The *Friends Intelligencer* lavished attention on Swarthmore with a weekly column as well as news stories and letters to the editor about the institution. The college reciprocated with weekly advertisements reaffirming that Swarthmore was "under the care of Friends."

Swarthmore entered the 1890s torn between those wishing to compete with other colleges and those wanting to protect a threatened

44. Swarthmore College, Board of Managers, Minutes (Friends Historical Library), 17 September and 12 December 1895.


life-style. The financial system discouraged growth. Once the initial capital was raised through the original stock issue in the 1860s, the college was expected to support itself. Gifts from a few rich managers covered the annual deficits, and when the main building burned in 1881 they made up the difference between the insurance and the rebuilding costs.

The only major fund drive between 1869 and 1902 was an 1887 campaign to endow a professorship. It took President Magill almost a year to raise the money through small donations; when he did, three wealthy managers endowed three more chairs. There were no further additions to the endowment for fifteen years. In a college featuring science and engineering programs that required expensive equipment, this was a severe handicap.47

The dominant managers rejected expansion; in 1899 the college's total expenses were only six thousand dollars more than they had been a quarter-century earlier. This represented both the limits and the potential of Swarthmore. Joseph Wharton, Isaac Clothier, and some other managers presided over fortunes. Wharton was a nickel and pig-iron tycoon who helped found the forerunner of Bethlehem Steel and the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Clothier founded the famous Philadelphia department store with an Orthodox Friend, Justus Strawbridge. Other managers carried such famous Philadelphia names as Shoemaker, Roberts, and Biddle. They were loyal Hicksite Friends who served Swarthmore for years; this generation remained in power until 1902 and held the college to a modesty that conformed to their beliefs.48 Swarthmore was tied to a small minority group and to the Philadelphia region. But the attendance of these Hicksite offspring guaranteed Swarthmore's continuing connection with some very wealthy families in one of the nation's leading cities.

These few wealthy Hicksites were crucial because the rank and file


offered little financial support. As with Franklin and Marshall College, the affiliation with a rurally based denomination provided a distinct mission that imposed financial and cultural limits. Unlike most Protestant denominations, the Quakers were shrinking. From the Hicksite separation of 1827 to 1900, the Hicksite Philadelphia Yearly Meeting shrank by almost 40 percent while Philadelphia’s population grew fivefold. While the Orthodox Friends were fewer in number and suffered similar losses, that sect had a larger share of wealthy urban Friends. Wharton and Clothier were exceptions. Rank-and-file Hicksite philanthropy was unlikely to go toward the higher education of an urban few. Preparatory and normal schools were more in line with most Hicksites’ interests.⁴⁹

The conflicting purposes and financial limitations eventually led to crisis. After abolishing the preparatory and normal schools, the managers hedged their bets by hiring Charles De Garmo, a nationally recognized expert in pedagogy, as president in 1891. His conception of teacher training proved to be more academic than the managers liked, and his interest in emulating prestigious colleges fit neither their ideology nor their pocketbook. After seven uncomfortable years, De Garmo resigned and the managers replaced him with William Birdsal, principal of Friends’ Central School in Philadelphia. He represented “the position of Friends, with whom education is a religious concern, and who would make the development of character always a primary consideration.”⁵⁰ Most younger Friends who planned to attend college defined character differently.

In 1902 declining enrollment and rising deficits led to Birdsal’s return to secondary education and a dramatic alteration of the managers’ educational, social, and financial policies. The leading Hicksite educator in the nation was Joseph Swain, president of Indiana University; in desperation, the managers offered him the presidency. Swain agreed, on the conditions that he would control faculty appointments and that the managers would increase the endowment from $400,000 to $1,000,000 within three years.⁵¹

This acceptance of the academic revolution mirrored a changing

⁵⁰. Friends Intelligencer 57 (1900): 613.
⁵¹. Babbidge, 210–16. Joseph Swain to Howard C. Johnson, 31 March, 12 May, 17 May, and 9 June 1902, Swain Presidential Papers (Friends Historical Library). Swain admitted that while he and his wife “have both remained Friends we have been away from a Friends Meeting for a number of years.”
philosophy and life-style among the new generation of Hicksite leaders. In the 1890s and early 1900s the Hicksites revised their rules, gained new members, and moved away from Quietism and plainness. Cultural defensiveness was replaced by a more dynamic Quakerism that surrendered much that was distinctive. Swarthmore faculty and graduates articulated their new vision in the Friends Intelligencer and other forums, agreeing with Swain that “modern Quakerism must adopt any improved method of modern civilization that does not violate its principles and reject any tradition that does not bear the test of modern scholarship.”

Swain’s election did not end the denominational relationship; rather, its meaning shifted. The attitudes of Hicksites elected to the board of managers changed significantly in the years after Swain’s inaugural, while a close relationship between college and denomination continued. Swain continued to court the Friends and their secondary schools, calling the latter educationally equal but morally superior to other preparatory institutions and reminding the denomination that the failure to provide high-quality higher education was causing many young Friends to leave the faith. Still wanting Swarthmore to produce teachers for its schools, the Friends General Conference began to endow a department of pedagogy in 1906. But by 1910 the conference had collected only a fraction of the required funds, and the campaign had to be rescued by a few individuals. The Friends Intelligencer continued diligent reporting of campus events, as well as its “Swarthmore College Notes” column.

The denominational relationship no longer demanded a distinct life-style. As with the rejection of ethnicity at Princeton and at Franklin and Marshall, students and alumni increasingly valued Swarthmore for its conformity to national collegiate values rather than for providing an alternative. As denominational membership decreasingly conveyed a distinctive life-style, alumni status became a more important identity, one that encompassed Swarthmoreans of all denominations. All managers were Friends until the 1930s, but increasingly they identified with Swarthmore as alumni.


53. Babbidge, 195–97; Swarthmore College, The Register of Swarthmore College, 1862–1914 (Swarthmore, Pa., 1914), 28. For an early demand for alumni representation on the board of managers, see Friends Intelligencer 39 (7 October 1882): 534–35; see also 65 (9 September, 24 October, and 21 November 1908).
The absence of older alumni (the first class graduated in 1873) delayed the victory of the new college culture that repelled the older managers. The early graduates created an alumni association in 1882, the same year as the first of their number was elected to the board of managers. A few alumni participated in the life of the college in the 1890s as faculty or managers, but there was not a strong alumni organization until after 1900. Even then their numbers were low. In 1900 there were still only 421 alumni, and less than 100 alumni over the age of forty. At least 40 percent of the graduates were female—in an era when most families contributed to the husband’s alma mater. When a young member of the Clothier family endowed a chair of physics in 1905, it was the first major alumni donation. William Sproul, class of 1891 and a future governor of Pennsylvania, followed with thirty thousand dollars for an observatory two years
later. Between 1902 and 1914, four regional Swarthmore alumni clubs were created to represent those outside the Philadelphia area for the first time. The number of alumni managers slowly increased, becoming a majority after World War I.\textsuperscript{54}

Foundation money offered temptations to loosen the denominational tie. Rejection by the Carnegie Foundation forced the managers to try to establish their own pension fund to remain competitive in faculty recruitment. Two years later they acknowledged failure and dropped the requirement that managers be Friends in order to qualify the faculty for the Carnegie pension. The managers pledged that Swarthmore would remain under de facto Friends' control, and no non-Friend was elected for several decades; but the legal tie to Quakerism was gone. In 1909 the General Education Board offered a matching grant to Swarthmore, on the condition that the stockholder system be abolished. The shares were duly turned in and the stockholders disbanded in 1910.\textsuperscript{55}

One gift created a dilemma for those favoring increased acceptance of the world. In 1907 a wealthy Friend, Anna Jeanes, best known for her contributions to African-American schools, left Swarthmore a sizable bequest on condition that the college ban intercollegiate athletics forever. A committee of managers weighed the offer and sampled the opinion of college presidents across the country. A debate raged over the issue in the \textit{Friends Intelligencer} as well as in national journals. Some Friends vigorously opposed intercollegiate athletics and especially the relatively violent game of football. But others, primarily alumni, came to the defense of athletics. A young alumnus from the influential Clothier family retorted that “after all, what does a broken bone here and there amount to compared to the great amount of good which football accomplishes.”\textsuperscript{56} Although the man-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} Society of Friends, \textit{Proceedings of the Friends General Conference} (1906), 99–101; Swarthmore College, \textit{Annual Catalogue}, 1910–11, p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Edward Magill to Andrew Carnegie, 15 July 1905, Magill Papers (Friends Historical Library); Swarthmore, Executive Committee, 13 April 1906; \textit{Friends Intelligencer} 65 (5 and 12 December 1908); Swarthmore College, Stockholders, \textit{Minutes}, December 1909, December 1910; William I. Hull, “History of Swarthmore College” (ca. 1940, Friends Historical Library, typescript), 2:23–25. In practice the majority of stockholders surrendered their privileges to the managers in the 1890s. General Education Board, \textit{Report of the Secretary}, 1916–17, pp. 9, 23.
\item \textsuperscript{56} \textit{Friends Intelligencer} 65 (28 March 1908), 203; see also 4 January, 1 February, 14 March, and 21 March; Swarthmore College, \textit{Papers on the Bequest of the Late Anna T. Jeanes} (Philadelphia: Franklin Printing Co., 1907); Burton R. Clark, \textit{The Distinctive College: Antioch, Reed, and Swarthmore} (Chicago: Adams Publishing Co., 1970), 178–83.
\end{itemize}
agers finally rejected the bequest, they compromised with denom­
national opposition by canceling football and basketball for a year
while they tried to eliminate the worst abuses. By 1915 the Friends
Intelligencer included sports news in its “Swarthmore College Notes,”
suggesting a growing acceptance of athletics in the denomination. 57

Swarthmore had embraced modern college life and the financial
benefits that could accompany it if a college had access to the wealthy.
In 1916 Swarthmore became one of the first non-Baptist colleges to
receive a second allotment of Rockefeller money. The General Edu­
cation Board offered $125,000 toward the fiftieth anniversary Ju­
bilee Fund if Swarthmore raised $625,000. The alumni organized by
class and gender for the first time and raised $160,000. The managers
more than doubled that figure. It is not clear how much of the
managers’ share was contributed by alumni, but Swarthmore clearly
was cashing in on long-standing upper-class connections whose fi­
nancial potential was no longer limited by Hicksite traditions. In this
fund drive Swarthmore compared itself to the most prestigious small
liberal arts colleges. During Swain’s presidency, the campus was trans­
formed and the endowment increased from $400,000 to $3,000,000,
the third highest per student in Pennsylvania. Swarthmore was be­
coming very attractive to the Philadelphia elite. 58

Swarthmore’s acquiescence to a student request for military train­
ing in World War I showed how fully Swarthmore had accepted
modernity and left its Hicksite roots behind. The managers initially
rejected a student petition demanding the formation of a Student
Army Training Corps on campus but relented when Swain warned
of sharp enrollment declines. No other Quaker college accepted a
SATC unit, and the Friends Intelligencer lambasted Swarthmore for
surrendering its principles. Nearby Haverford, also a Quaker school,
“stuck to its guns” (to reverse a metaphor), and its enrollment fell to
sixty-five students in the fall of 1918. 59

57. Friends Intelligencer 65 (13 June and 3 October 1908) and 72 (1915). For two
accounts of the controversy with different emphases, see Benjamin, 40–48, and
Ronald A. Smith, Sports and Freedom: The Rise of Big-Time College Athletics (New York:
on Freedom.” Benjamin looks at the bequest in terms of Swarthmore straying from
Quaker tradition, while Smith stresses the implicit assumption that students are no
longer to control athletics.

58. E. Digby Baltzell, An American Business Aristocracy (New York: Collier Books,
1962), 356.

59. Swarthmore College, Board of Managers, “To the Undergraduate Men of
Swarthmore College,” Swain Presidential Papers; Walton, 26–28; Gregory Kanner-
Swarthmore preserved enrollments but set off a bitter debate. The arguments provoked a new activist spirit in Quakerism, one that provided Swarthmore with a modernized denominational mission. Swarthmore faculty were leaders in movements that reunited the Orthodox and Hicksite Friends and created the American Friends Service Committee in 1917. The Quaker service orientation coexisted with football and other trappings of mainstream campus life and enabled Swarthmore to combine a semblance of its earlier distinctiveness with the academic revolution.\textsuperscript{60}

On the surface, these case studies repeat the conventional account of the decline of denominations and the rise of alumni, businessmen, and foundations. But that description is superficial. Beneath these broad labels are more subtle interactions among the groups shaping the relationship between colleges and their communities.

The new possibilities for institutional aggrandizement were unsettling. Those wanting expensive, fashionable facilities had to find new sources of revenue. Between 1890 and 1917, the aspirations of most presidents, faculty members, and younger alumni intersected to change the colleges dramatically. The explosion of knowledge, the example of the leading universities, and the emergence of an academic culture gave faculty and presidents new models to emulate. New professional requirements, growing wealth, and changing life-styles created alumni willing and able to support an institution that fit their educational and social needs. But these forces had a wrenching impact on the relationship of the colleges to their traditional constituents.

Increasingly, the wealth that could finance such ambitions was in the hands of urbanites. The combination of congregational canvasses, individuals motivated by ethnoreligious loyalty, and local boosterism that financed more modest visions of higher education before 1890 no longer sufficed. Princeton developed the greatest access to urban wealth, drawing particularly on New York, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh. Wealthy Philadelphians underwrote Swarthmore's new eminence. Bucknell combined support from some Philadelphians with that from wealthy rural and small-city Pennsylvania Baptists to underwrite substantial growth. Franklin and Marshall, limited by legal

\textsuperscript{60} Herbert Hadley, "Diminishing Separation," in Moore, 138–53.
denominational ties, received little support outside the Lancaster area and remained the smallest and poorest of the four. Formal contributions from denominational organizations and churches had rarely been significant. In the 1880s and 1890s, the denominations increasingly turned their limited educational funds to theological seminaries. Formal denominational relationships became fiscal liabilities, except while Bucknell received Rockefeller money through the American Baptist Education Society.

Each college had been founded to promote denominational identity. At Princeton and at Franklin and Marshall, denominationalism was tied to ethnicity; at Swarthmore, to a distinct life-style. In the 1870s and 1880s, students increasingly shunned cultural uniqueness for a student life that ignored distinctions among Protestants of northern European ancestry. After 1890, as these students became prosperous alumni, they valued the colleges for assisting their acceptance into this culture rather than for promoting ethnic or denominational distinctiveness. Colleges founded to protect cultural pluralism had become agents promoting Anglo-Protestant upper- and upper-middle-class culture.

Increasingly it was the alumni identity, rather than an explicitly ethnoreligious one, that inspired loyalty and financial contributions. Graduates' growing self-consciousness and ability to give were demonstrated by their broad-based and predictable benefaction in the 1890s and 1900s. Only Franklin and Marshall, inhibited by the Reformed church, failed to cultivate alumni. Although the colleges continued to invite wealthy outsiders to contribute and serve on their governing boards, they relied more and more upon their own graduates. The new foundations and their matching grants provided a powerful incentive that ambitious college leaders could use to mobilize wealthy alumni and trustees.

Using the labels “ethnicity,” “denomination,” and “alumni” obscures the nature of the change. The majority of alumni grew up in the ethnoreligious group that sponsored the college. But at these colleges, that background had less and less behavioral significance; a similar student life-style dominated all four colleges. “Alumni” became virtually a surrogate for “generation.” As graduates, most entered an upper-middle class in which it was essential to be a Protestant of northern European ancestry; but denominational and ethnic differences within that group were losing their importance. As Stuart
Blumin has shown, distinctions within the middle class were becoming more finely tuned in the late nineteenth century, and a visible upper-middle class was emerging, one increasingly defined by college degrees.  

Hidden beneath the behavioral homogeneity was considerable structural continuity, as suggested by the continuity of the charters. Swarthmore’s dramatic revolution occurred while all its managers were Friends. Bucknell mushroomed without changing its stipulation that 80 percent of its trustees be Baptist. Princeton’s and Franklin and Marshall’s trustees continued to be dominated by the founding groups. Instead, the key was occupational and generational change, replacing clergy and traditional laymen on the boards with a new generation of wealthy businessmen, bankers, and lawyers and attracting their children to the college. Not until the immediate prewar years did the proportions from the founding groups drop significantly.

The entrepreneurial success of these four colleges might be explained in terms of their having responded to the needs of society. But they responded to some groups while disregarding or discarding others. The Anna Jeanes bequest is only the most dramatic expression of a deep cultural conflict. These case studies demonstrate that groups with competing visions fought to control colleges that particularly responded to wealthy urbanites who could finance more expansive visions of higher education. The colleges responded to society selectively, consciously cultivating those who could help them shape a new educational order.